

**A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster
Haiti 2010**

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACTED	Agency for Technical Co-Operation and Development
ASB	Arbeiter-Samariter Bund
BAI	Bureau des Avocats Internationaux
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
CDAC	Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities
CHF	Cooperative Housing Federation
CROSE	Coordination Régionale des Organisations du Sud-Ouest
DFID	Department for International Development
DPC	Direction de la Protection Civile
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building Project
ERC	United Nations Emergency Response Coordinator
Federation	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
GIS	Geographical Information System
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HR	Human Resources
IASC	United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IJDH	Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
IM	Information management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MAST	Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MTPTC	Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNS	Participating National Society
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
TWIG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WDR	World Disasters Report
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

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Many of the recommendations in this review draw on suggestions by informants. All errors and omissions are my own.

Sara Davidson

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The International Organisation for Migration was asked to lead both the Shelter and Camp Management Clusters after the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. The scale of the disaster and the response to it called for greater capacity, however. IFRC responded promptly to requests to take over as Shelter Cluster lead agency in Haiti in February and to assess the feasibility of establishing a 'shadow cluster' in the Dominican Republic in March.
2. There was inevitable loss of momentum owing to logistical issues and the change of leadership but IFRC quickly established a national office in the MINUSTAH base in Port au Prince, and staff in Geneva moved rapidly to recruit national and regional coordination teams in Haiti.
3. IFRC and its partners recruited and maintained a large, dedicated coordination team covering Port au Prince, Léogâne-Gressier, Petit-Goâve and Jacmel. The team was provided with remote support for information management and translation. The size of team, its independence from operations, and the level of experience and competence of its staff were seen as key to the IFRC's achievements in a cluster deployment longer than any it had undertaken to date.
4. The Haiti Cluster was challenged by an initial shortage of French and Creole speakers. Given the scale and complexity of urban aspects of the disaster, specific expertise might also have been brought in sooner. Linking the innovative organigram to Cluster strategy could have helped ensure clarity about personnel requirements and competences in Geneva and Port au Prince.
5. Rapid scale-up put pressure on staff of the Shelter Department in Geneva, its partners, and on cluster coordinators and team members. IFRC must increase capacity in the Shelter Department if it is to strengthen recruitment, management and support, and put Cluster funding on a surer footing. Work with HR colleagues on issues in recruitment and parity should include a rapid induction package and clarification of Cluster personnel procedures.
6. Management and training visits from Geneva and remote support were valued by the team but additional capacity for people management and support was needed in the large coordination team. Attention to people management in Geneva and Port au Prince might have helped stem turnover, and the loss of morale and staff when lack of funding threatened the cluster's continuation in August 2010. IFRC needs to clarify and communicate responsibility and procedures for Cluster fundraising and budget management
7. Staff turnover was frequently cited as a – if not the – major weakness. Turnover made it hard to establish relationships with counterparts and partners, including Government. Difficult living and working conditions were likely to have been contributory factors, as they were in other organisations. IFRC needs to understand the different reasons for turnover and how better to manage retention: the job of the Cluster is to build relationships not shelter.
8. Slow recruitment in the Delegation made it harder to recruit Haitian staff for the Cluster and to build continuity and capacity. IFRC needs to make use of local

personnel by the Cluster a strategic issue and work with HR colleagues to understand and overcome local barriers in future emergencies.

9. Nevertheless, the Delegation in Port au Prince provided strong support to the Haiti Cluster despite the challenge of leading one of the IFRC's largest ever responses. It freed the Cluster from a number of logistical considerations though Delegation security regulations limited the Cluster's opportunities for informal networking and living conditions, though improving, remained difficult. For its part, the Delegation benefited from the Cluster's expertise and media profile but retained a measure of uncertainty and ambivalence about the Cluster role.
10. The Shelter Cluster should be more proactive in risk assessment and security management for its staff. Security in the field should be linked to people management, consultation and communication, and factor in the work functions and locations of coordination teams. This does not conflict with the obligation of team members to comply with IFRC security regulations.
11. The Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) began meeting in January and developed a comprehensive Response Plan setting out options and phases for emergency and transitional shelter. The Response Plan, effectively the strategy, appears not to have been completed or reviewed. Review and work planning could have assisted the sector in questioning shelter options and targets, particularly the emphasis on transitional shelter, in light of the complex situation in Haiti. It could have helped the Cluster more clearly justify its addition of new roles in the latter half of the deployment.
11. Shelter Cluster strategy should specify the 'products' the cluster aims to deliver through e.g. coordination, information management/GIS, communication, advocacy, etc., their 'audiences' and the personnel and competences, including language competences, needed to deliver them.
12. The Shelter Cluster employed media and communication advisers for the first time in Haiti. The Cluster was quickly seen as a reliable and authoritative source of information by international partners and media. Though separate identity and branding were largely maintained, the Cluster's media role also added to the profile of the IFRC itself and the role should be maintained in future emergencies.
13. Communication with the affected community included outreach material in Creole, work with local radio and journalists, and a survey of beneficiary expectations. The Cluster should build on innovations in Haiti and links with sectoral initiatives to make communication with the affected community a strategic issue in future emergencies. The Global Cluster continues to need information in hard copy and local languages to explain what it is and what it does. A suggestion from one informant was that the Cluster set up a shelter helpline for affected persons. The feasibility of this or of support for a shelter ombudsman should be considered in a future response.
14. *Who-what-where* information and mapping were highly valued. The Cluster should review the ease with which data are collected and consider whether contingency stock tracking, seen as a weakness, is an information product which can be developed from the start of deployment. *'When'* information –for example, on the durability of emergency shelter – could have assisted the Cluster in strategic review and response phase planning.

15. The dual-language (English and French) website was seen as comprehensive, up to date and a valuable resource. Coordinators and the Shelter Department should work with information managers to increase the visibility and accessibility of strategic resources and products. 'Essential reading' and core resources should be available in local languages.
16. Difficulties in eliciting accurate national data on persons needing shelter were largely beyond the Cluster's control. The Cluster advocated for comprehensive data, supported the development of assessment guidelines on host families and host communities and analysed available data to show gaps and over-coverage in two areas. The IASC and its partners need jointly to understand responsibilities and how to overcome barriers. In the short term, the Shelter Cluster needs to clarify with partners its role in and support for localized assessment when gaps are identified.
17. Meetings of the national cluster were regarded as well-chaired and a valuable platform for information and networking by those attending them. As in other clusters, it was difficult to retain engagement by central government. Participation by Haitian organisations was limited by lack of access to the MINUSTAH Base where shelter meetings were held in English. This made it difficult for the Haiti Cluster to model participatory approaches. A good working relationship was maintained with the Camp Management Cluster nationally and in the hubs. The relationship with the WASH Cluster was seen as weaker.
18. Technical Working Groups (TWIGs) addressed topics of major significance for the affected community, including Host family–Host Community, Land and Settlement, and Transitional Shelter. The Cluster needs to ensure that TWIGs have clear terms of reference and that outputs transparently inform strategy and are reported via SAG and hub meetings and thematic areas of the website.
19. Hubs serving Léogâne-Gressier, Petit-Goâve and Jacmel were valued for their local information management, and were seen as further evidence of commitment to coordination by the IFRC and its partners. Regional meetings were in French or English and French by the latter half of the deployment. A local coordinator was employed in Léogâne. Hub effectiveness was diminished at the start if staff did not speak local languages and / or had no induction. Communication between the centre and the hubs needed to be systematised, ensuring that technical guidance and direction reached partners, information was shared and regional staff were supported.
20. Sub-hubs in and around Port au Prince were jointly led by the respective Mayor's office and a sub-hub member, with the Port au Prince hub coordinator providing support when needed. Sub-hubs were valued for their sustained level of engagement with government counterparts and high level of coordination between partners.
21. The existence of multiple coordination bodies, weakness of inter-cluster coordination and absence of a government shelter counterpart made advocacy hard. However, the Cluster's support to other bodies was appreciated and advocacy, for example, on Housing, Land and Property, welcomed by peers. Language issues were a further challenge for work on advocacy and a francophone coordinator was belatedly assigned in July to strengthen relations with the Government and other coordinating bodies.

22. Staff provided training in use of GPS and Google Earth at Léogâne and Petit-Goâve, and held a workshop on seismic construction, debris, settlement, and Housing, Land and Property in the regional hubs. The Cluster publicised training by HAP and Sphere. Given the Cluster's role in promoting standards, Sphere training may be a topic on which it can usefully collaborate in future emergencies.
23. The Haiti Cluster promoted emergency and transitional shelter standards, and best practice guidance on hazard-resistant construction. Informants' comments on quality indicated an expectation of leadership by the Cluster on implementation and enforcement of standards and suggest scope for global advocacy. With the exception of Sphere, there is little information about promotion of other humanitarian quality and accountability standards which could have helped promote participatory approaches and cross-cutting issues. The Global Cluster should assemble a package of resources for use in future deployments.
24. Few strategic documents name any of the cross-cutting issues. However, the Haiti Cluster included an environment adviser and, for the first time, a debris adviser. IFRC funding ran out in August before the environment advisers' work could be completed. However, a number of resources were developed and a prototype house using recycled earthquake rubble built by the debris adviser. Both were important roles and should be better resourced in future emergencies.
25. Work by the Housing, Land and Property Coordinator addressed human rights in the context of eviction from private land. The Haiti Cluster could also have promoted simple messaging about human rights on its website. The Global Cluster should assemble a package of resources for use in future deployments and consider the feasibility of a helpline, as discussed above. This would also provide a link with work on communication, participatory approaches, and other cross-cutting issues.
26. UN-Habitat was due to take over the Haiti Cluster on 10 November 2010. Informants did not understand the IFRC's rationale for handover to a non-emergency agency during the hurricane season. Handover is a strategic and reputational issue for the IFRC: it needs to include it in cluster planning and budgeting and to share the rationale for exit with the SAG and the wider Cluster.
27. The Shelter Cluster did very well in very difficult circumstances. What the IFRC and its partners did best was to field and maintain a large team who brought collective experience, skill and dedication to their work across Haiti. The review provided considerable evidence, well-noted by external informants, of competence, professionalism and innovation, and of disinterested commitment to coordination.
28. What the IFRC can do better is set out in the recommendations on the following pages. Few of these recommendations are new. Most are suggested by informants. All are important. Adequate follow up on these recommendations is dependent on the availability of additional management capacity and resources at global level. If the Federation can act on only one of these recommendations, therefore, it should strengthen management capacity and funding for the Cluster in Geneva.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Activation

1. Review cluster activation procedure with IASC and global partners to avoid delay / loss of momentum in a future emergency.

Funding

2. Agree responsibility for cluster fundraising and budget management. Ensure responsibilities and procedures are clarified and communicated within IFRC.

Personnel

3. Work with partners to increase number of French speakers in recruitment pool.
4. Link personnel plan and organigram to strategy to maintain a shared overview of staffing requirements.
5. Include recruitment and/or mentoring of national staff in strategic framework.
6. Ensure all staff receive a contract, job description and briefing before deployment.
7. Develop a rapid induction package.
8. Strengthen support for regionally-based staff through regular meetings, management visits and direct communication.
9. Make people management and security management explicit in strategy, coordinator job descriptions and training.
10. Consider early use of a logistics delegate for large teams and of urban planning expertise for urban coordination.
11. Continue work to increase parity of terms and conditions in shelter coordination teams but retain flexibility and short lines of decision-making in recruitment.

IFRC support

12. Strengthen capacity in Geneva to support the Cluster in terms of funding, recruitment, learning and personnel issues.
13. Analyse reasons for staff turnover to manage retention.
14. Clarify and communicate personnel procedures, for example, grievance and discipline, performance management, personal conduct, responsibility for (local) hiring and firing, security compliance, working time and time off, stress management, in accordance with good practice.
15. Continue to strengthen management support through field visits and training.
16. Maintain an archive of cluster documentation and use it for accountability and lesson-learning.

Handover

17. Review handover arrangements with IASC and global partners to share understanding of challenges.

18. Communicate rationale for and implications of IFRC extension, exit or handover in Cluster strategy, action plans, and budget.

Strategy

19. Identify strategic products, specifying personnel resources required, counterparts, audiences, languages, formats, for cluster activities, e.g.
 - Advocacy
 - Assessments
 - Communications
 - Coordination
 - Cross-cutting issues
 - Information Management / GIS
 - Media
 - Standards
 - Technical support
 - Training
20. Monitor coherence between cluster policy / terms of reference at global level, and strategy at field level, (e.g. on transitional shelter, host family support).
21. Use scenario-planning, 'when' information and project management tools to test delivery assumptions and targets, identify bottlenecks and forecast progress.
22. Review Cluster strategy and action plans monthly. Identify, justify and communicate changes in writing. Ensure current strategy is identifiable and accessible.

Communications

23. Develop information materials in appropriate languages and formats, including hard copy, to communicate Cluster's local role and mandate.
24. Include media and communications in strategic framework. Maintain early use of expertise in future responses.
25. Ensure cluster communications use consistent terminology (e.g. 'transitional shelter') and description of cluster role.
26. Enhance links with relevant sectoral initiatives, e.g. HAP, CDAC, ECB, to strengthen communication with affected communities and participatory approaches.
27. Maintain support for translation during deployment and hire interpreters for key staff and meetings. Identify essential resources for translation into key languages.

Information Management

28. Maintain early use of GIS expertise in future response.
29. Review field website design to ensure content and classification give emphasis and visibility to strategic issues.
30. Ask local and national partners how easy it is use current data collection tools and if a 'Shelterpoint'-style document would aid communication of findings.
31. Consider whether data and training on contingency stock records should be information products available from the start of deployment.

Assessment

32. Ensure that resources, tools, findings and issues relating to assessment are grouped together and easily accessible in thematic area of Cluster web site.

33. Clarify local role of Shelter Cluster in assessment and communicate this to partners.

Coordination

34. Promote access to meetings by local counterparts, partners and affected community.
35. Ensure TWIGs have clear terms of reference and that outputs are communicated via the SAG, hub meetings and thematic areas of the website.
36. Use consistent formats for meeting minutes and progress reports. Avoid acronyms and abbreviations which exclude new readers or explain them in a key.
37. Consider the feasibility of piloting a community helpline / support for a shelter ombudsman in a future emergency.

Advocacy

38. Prioritise early advocacy with government counterparts.
39. Ensure that advocacy messages are up to date and in appropriate languages.

Training

40. Track take-up of / feedback on cluster training to inform future deployments.
41. Collaborate with sectoral initiatives (e.g. Sphere) to increase access to training for shelter partners and counterparts during response.

Standards

42. Between emergencies, assemble a package of sectoral resources on quality and accountability standards, as well as technical and construction ones.
43. Communicate availability of resources via the SAG, cluster and hub meetings, and thematic areas of the website.

Cross-cutting issues

44. Name cross-cutting issues in strategic documents and job descriptions. Consider early use of cross-cutting expertise in future responses.
45. Between emergencies, assemble a package of sectoral resources and messaging on cross-cutting issues
46. Make information on cross-cutting issues more accessible via the SAG, cluster and hub meetings and thematic areas of the website.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aim of this review

This review draws on desk research, interviews in Haiti and written and telephone communication with informants. It is not an evaluation of the effectiveness of the shelter response following the earthquake of January 2010 although it reflects the opinions of some informants on this issue. The review's primary aim is to identify lessons and provide recommendations for the IFRC and the Shelter Cluster on coordination in future emergencies.

1.2 The IASC and humanitarian reform

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in June 1992 in response to a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance.¹ Its objectives and principles are shown at Annex A.

Principals of the IASC are the heads of UN agencies, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN-Habitat. IASC standing invitees include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and three networks of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC 'develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles.'² In 2005 'the ad hoc, unpredictable nature of many international responses to humanitarian emergencies prompted the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) ... to launch an independent review of the global humanitarian system.'³ The humanitarian reform programme which emerged was a response to chronic systemic weaknesses identified. Humanitarian reform is based on three 'pillars':

- The *cluster approach*: addressing the need for 'adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors' of humanitarian response.
- *Humanitarian financing*: addressing the need for 'adequate, timely and flexible financing' of humanitarian response, notably through the CERF.
- *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*: addressing the need for 'effective leadership and coordination in emergencies' by the senior UN figure in country.⁴

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response also depends on the quality of *partnership* between the agencies that respond globally to emergencies.

1.3 Cluster approach

IASC principals endorsed the cluster approach in December 2005. The cluster approach is intended to ensure 'predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies, by clarifying the division of labour among organizations, and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response'.⁵

At global level, a cluster is effectively a standing committee whose lead agency takes responsibility for sectoral coordination. Cluster lead agencies are responsible for technical support, long term planning and enhancing partnership. They are expected to set standards and policy, build surge capacity – additional personnel capacity for emergency response – to provide support for and channel funds to country level clusters. The OneResponse website sets out the procedure for activating the clusters in a new emergency.

- The Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) consults relevant partners
- He/she proposes leads for each major area [of humanitarian response] and sends a proposal to the ERC
- The ERC shares the proposal with Global Cluster Leads
- The ERC ensures agreement at global level and communicates agreement to HC/RC and partners within 24 hours of receiving the proposal
- The Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator informs host government and all partners.

1.4 Emergency Shelter Cluster

The Emergency Shelter Cluster is one of three clusters chaired globally by agencies that are not UN agencies.* The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) leads the Shelter Cluster in the context of conflict and IFRC in natural disaster. At global level, the Shelter Cluster in 2010 has nearly thirty partners (see Annex B). At country level, any agency - local or national government organisation or NGO involved in emergency shelter - may be a cluster partner.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between OCHA and IFRC in 2005 states that IFRC expects to lead or convene the Emergency Shelter Cluster at country level following natural or technological disaster. The IFRC pledges to inform the ERC if it is unable to do so.

The IFRC-OCHA MoU defines emergency shelter as:

The provision of basic and immediate shelter needs necessary to ensure the survival of disaster affected persons, including "rapid response" solutions such as tents, insulation

* The Education Cluster is co-chaired by Save the Children, and the Camp Management Cluster co-chaired by IOM, an inter-governmental organisation.

materials, other temporary emergency shelter solutions, and shelter related non-food items. This definition explicitly excludes transitional and permanent housing.’⁶

The MoU emphasises that the IFRC’s commitment at country level is not open-ended. It does not act as Provider of Last Resort if a gap in the provision of shelter goods and services remains unfilled. Despite the explicit exclusion of transitional and permanent shelter from the MoU, the IFRC’s Global Shelter Plans, which include both operations and coordination, have increasingly framed ‘emergency shelter’ as a process of ‘sheltering’, implying a longer commitment to disaster-affected communities and one that is not based on physical shelter alone.

Sheltering, even when the needs are generated by natural disasters and other emergencies, goes beyond the immediate provision of basic shelter solutions and is closely associated with longer-term reconstruction as well as with measures to assist individuals, families and communities to re-establish themselves and resume ordinary life.’⁷

1.5 Haiti 2010

What was the biggest challenge? Haiti.’[†]

‘The disaster of Haiti is not the earthquake. What we are seeing here is what happens when an extreme natural event occurs in the lives of people who are already frighteningly vulnerable.’⁸

An estimated 3.4 million people were affected by the earthquake which struck Haiti on 12 January 2010.⁹ The devastation was immense, even by the standards of a country frequently exposed to hurricanes, floods and tropical storms.[‡] The earthquake left 230,000 people dead and over 300,000 injured. 1.23 million became homeless.

Among buildings destroyed were the Presidential Palace, the Legislative Palace and the UN headquarters. Those who lost their lives included senior government and UN officials. Over 100 UN workers were killed, including the Special Representative and the Head of Mission. Half a million people fled the capital, Port au Prince.¹⁰

Across the country, over 105,000 homes were destroyed and more than 208,000 damaged.¹¹ Over 90% of housing was destroyed in Léogâne. In financial terms, losses were estimated at approximately \$8 billion dollars, equivalent to 120% of Haiti’s 2009 Gross National Product.¹²

Yet, as an IFRC report noted, the disaster confronting Haitians was not solely the earthquake. Man-made issues which pre-dated the earthquake compounded its effects. In a report written in 2009, UN-Habitat noted that the absence of spatial planning and building codes saw the hills surrounding the capital

[†] Unless otherwise indicated, comments in italics are by review informants, taken from interviews, questionnaires or end of mission reports.

[‡] ‘Over the past 20 years, Haiti has experienced 9 serious storms, causing the death of 7,550 persons and affecting in total 3.5 million people. The most recent, Tropical Storm Fay and Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike ... in 2008, caused 700 deaths.’ (IASC, Response To The Humanitarian Crisis In Haiti, 6-Month Report, p 7)

*'covered with dwellings of different quality, many of them situated precariously on steep slopes and in danger of being washed away by the next torrent or hurricane. Other slum dwellers, in the centre of the city, risk flooding due to their location in the bottom of the basin of Port-au-Prince.'*¹³

According to this report, a 'combination of political insecurity, corrupt leaders, natural disasters, migration of academics and skilled workers, unfavorable trade agreements and poor administration together form an explanation that is a first step to understanding the situation' in Haiti.¹⁴ A 'second step' is the persistence of gross inequality. Four percent of Haitians hold 66% of national assets. One percent receives 55% of national income; 75% live on less than \$2 a day.¹⁵

By 1998, following trade liberalisation and the privatization of state-owned assets, NGOs were delivering 80% of public services.¹⁶ Paradoxically, given the large number of NGOs and international organisations working there even before the earthquake, Haiti is also included in lists of countries where chronic emergency has been 'neglected' or 'forgotten'.¹⁷ In January 2010, OCHA described Haiti as 'the sort of international "aid orphan" the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was set up to help.'¹⁸

Estimates of the number of organisations working in response to the earthquake range from 400 to 2,000.¹⁹ Some have seen in the earthquake response an opportunity to build a 'new' Haiti.²⁰ Yet disaster response rarely wipes the slate. The learning from other earthquakes is that 'a single disaster response cannot undo decades of underdevelopment.'²¹ The 2010 World Disasters Report (WDR) emphasised that 'disaster does not undo the often antagonistic relationships between local governments and the urban poor and their informal communities and livelihoods.'²²

Relationships with the international community are not immune from antagonistic relationships. An IASC evaluation in 2003 had warned of concerns about loss of impartiality in humanitarian assistance at international level²³ while its second evaluation of the cluster approach drew attention to the politicization of aid in Haiti itself.²⁴ Though MINUSTAH supported humanitarian and recovery efforts after the earthquake, public ambivalence towards it was manifest in the immediate assumption, only later confirmed, that the outbreak of cholera in the latter half of 2010 had been 'imported.'²⁵

Response to humanitarian crisis alongside 'structural poverty arising from failed governance or ongoing political crisis' was among the challenges for partners the IASC had identified in 2003.²⁶ In their response to the Haitian earthquake, therefore, operations and coordination teams encountered not only immediate devastation resulting from the natural disaster but a chronic and complex emergency due to 'decades of political instability, foreign intervention and dictatorship.'²⁷

2. SHELTER CLUSTER IN HAITI

2.1 Activation in Haiti and the Dominican Republic

*'The rationale behind the cluster approach – to ensure greater predictability, efficiency, and sectoral leadership within a response – is somewhat undermined if clusters are unable to become operational immediately in a sudden-onset disaster context'*²⁸

Clusters were first activated in Haiti in response to the hurricanes of 2008. Because of funding constraints, the IFRC had no Delegation in country.²⁹ In accordance with its MoU with OCHA, it recommended that IOM, leader of the Camp Management Cluster and with representation in Haiti since 1994, lead the Shelter Cluster.³⁰ The Camp Management Cluster was not activated. Camp management remained the responsibility of the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC), the Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail (MAST) and the Haitian Red Cross. These and other national bodies worked alongside international organisations, in accordance with national contingency planning.³¹

An IASC evaluation found that the work of the Shelter Cluster in 2008 had focused on collective centres.³² The Shelter Cluster had been animated effectively and efficiently by an experienced staff with good contextual knowledge, backed by global support.³³ The evaluation noted challenges, however, including the fact that cluster guidelines had not assisted the Cluster in addressing urban aspects of the disaster in Gonaïves. Challenges for all clusters operating in Haiti in 2008 included lack of dedicated coordination capacity and lack of participation in activities by the affected population and government. Humanitarian aid had focused on the hardest-hit area, Gonaïves, but left gaps in coverage in other affected areas, including Jacmel.³⁴

The IASC evaluation found that by 2009 most clusters were 'in a dormant status and staff turnover had left little institutional memory.'³⁵ It reported that OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator had yet to establish clear procedures for cluster activation and deactivation. Cluster contingency planning was generally not in place though an informant to the present evaluation noted that the Shelter Cluster had had contingency stock in place which was used in response to the earthquake in 2010.

After the earthquake some clusters were activated immediately. On 14 January, the ERC informed global cluster lead agencies that five clusters had been activated by the Humanitarian Country Team (though this Team, its members affected by the earthquake, was not re-established until three weeks into the response).³⁶ IOM was to lead the Shelter Cluster though the ERC's message suggests that IFRC had yet to agree to the arrangement.³⁷ The Camp Management Cluster, like the Shelter Cluster began meeting from the middle of the month under IOM leadership. Joint updates on meetings by the CCCM and Shelter Clusters were issued by IOM from 15 January.

The IFRC proposed to IOM that the Shelter Cluster and Camp Management Clusters be led by the IFRC and IOM respectively or that the IFRC coordinate shelter within an IOM-led Cluster. The proposal was not accepted. According to IOM, the ERC had asked it to lead a combined Shelter / Camp Management Cluster.³⁸ Global Cluster partner

representatives, who had committed resources to shelter coordination during and between emergencies, found the situation baffling.

... We've got this formal global lead but actually that only applies when we're sitting in Geneva. When we're in country it's a free for all...

We had five years before this disaster to build Global level capacities. We ... have developed a series of tools and agreements for responding to this type of emergencies. However, when a different Cluster Lead is appointed, all these tools and agreements have to be built from scratch during the emergency ...

Why commitments to predictability and partnership fell away at a time when the IASC continued to request additional capacity from its members not only in Haiti but in the neighbouring Dominican Republic (see below) is not known. The scale of the devastation in Haiti and of the international response proved so great, however, that, following discussion between the HC/RC and the ERC, separation of the two clusters was subsequently agreed. From 10 February, almost a month after the earthquake, IFRC became Shelter Cluster lead agency.

IOM had received funding from the Department for International Development (DFID) for cluster coordination.³⁹ With assistance from CARE, it had recruited an Information Manager and a Technical Coordinator, both with Shelter Cluster experience. A consultant from the Shelter Centre was IOM's Shelter Cluster Coordinator at the time of the handover. He remained available to provide remote support to the IFRC-led Cluster if needed.

Two IFRC delegates, a trained shelter coordinator and the Global Cluster's information management focal point, both in Haiti at the end of operations missions, assisted in the transition from IOM to IFRC leadership and in the development of a Shelter Cluster organigram. The organigram was a useful tool for initial recruitment and later restructuring of the Cluster. An experienced Cluster Coordinator arrived to lead the shelter coordination team on 8 February. IOM-led Cluster staff transferred to the IFRC-led team.

Despite a generally smooth transfer, the new shelter coordination team initially faced a number of logistical problems. While seeking an office and accommodation in Port au Prince, it also had to recruit personnel for the national cluster and regional hubs. After some days, UNDP agreed to make a single container office available at the MINUSTAH Log Base.

Though IFRC had moved rapidly and its lead role was welcomed, there was some loss of time and contextual knowledge owing to the transition.

...Taking on the cluster later in the emergency means that most people who could be deployed have already been deployed for operations...The IM team went from 3 core people plus 1-2 support staff with IOM down to 1 IM at the handover, causing a lot of strains.

[IOM] staff appeared to have stronger understanding of the context than IFRC staff appeared to have... The cluster was beginning to expand operations beyond Port au Prince and a significant delay (approx 2 weeks were lost) due to staff changes and delay in scaling up.

In a separate development, 'shadow clusters' in the neighbouring Dominican Republic were activated by the ERC in mid-February 2010. The aim was to facilitate delivery of aid and coordination at a time when Haiti itself faced considerable logistical and communication challenges. In addition, a number of Haitians had fled following the earthquake, and sought shelter and medical attention in the Dominican Republic.

In March, the Shelter Department appointed as Coordinator in the Dominican Republic a consultant whom it asked to assess the added value of the shadow Shelter Cluster which had already begun work under IOM leadership and which was expected to transfer to IFRC. The assessment found that most Haitian temporary migrants were, in fact, staying close to the border with Haiti. A Cluster Coordinator based in Santo Domingo would be located four hours from the frontier and be likely to play a largely representational role.

Given the size of the Haiti Shelter Cluster and the proximity of Port au Prince to the border, the costs to IFRC of maintaining a second cluster from Santo Domingo were thought likely to outweigh the benefits. The role of the IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordinator in the Dominican Republic ended after this assessment and all shadow clusters were dissolved in April.⁴⁰

2.2 Funding

The IFRC raised funds for Shelter Cluster coordination in Haiti separately within its overall Haiti appeal. Financial support for the initial six-months shelter coordination budget of CHF 2.07m came from the Netherlands Red Cross, the Japanese Government, the Swedish Red Cross, and DFID (via IOM and CARE).⁴¹

Although the IFRC's total appeal for Haiti of CHF 218.4m was almost entirely (98%) covered by mid-2010, the budget line for shelter coordination was only 77% covered.⁴² There appears to have been a lack of procedural clarity within IFRC about what should happen in such a case. On 10 August, when committed expenditure for shelter coordination had reached the 77% mark, IFRC's Finance Department ceased to allow further expenses to be charged to the Shelter Cluster budget.

A proposed interim solution - to switch some un-earmarked funding from operations to shelter coordination while the balance was found elsewhere - was agreed by the donor and the Zone but not by the Haiti delegation. The alternative was termination by 20 August of contracts for freelances and consultants in the Haiti Shelter Cluster.

On 18 August, the delegation agreed to a temporary allocation of funds to bridge the gap and approached the Canadian Red Cross which on 24 August provided CHF 450,000 for shelter coordination. As discussed in later sections, however, the funding situation and the way it was addressed resulted in confusion, demoralisation and some loss of staff in the Shelter Cluster. Responsibility for fundraising and budget management for shelter coordination should be agreed and procedures clarified and communicated.

2.3 Recruitment

The need for large coordination teams in all sectors had been indicated in requests from the ERC to cluster lead agencies in January. The request was repeated with greater urgency in February because of the magnitude and complexity of the emergency and the number of agencies responding to it. The ERC underlined the need, also noted in the IASC's evaluation of the cluster approach in Haiti, for dedicated and experienced coordinators, information managers and technical support personnel.⁴³

By the end of February, the IFRC-led shelter coordination team comprised:

Port au Prince

National Cluster Coordinator
Deputy Coordinator / Port au Prince Coordinator
Government Liaison Officer
Information Manager
Technical Coordinator
GIS and Mapping Specialist

Léogâne / Petit-Goâve

Hub Coordinator

Jacmel

Hub Coordinator


In addition to coordinators and technical and information managers, the Haiti Cluster employed specialists in several new roles during the deployment, including GIS and mapping, logistics, and media and communications. In total the Shelter Cluster appointed nearly sixty individuals for approximately twenty roles.

The human resource strength of the Shelter Cluster Coordination Team was hugely beneficial in terms of presence and representation at the numerous forums and capacity, particularly when compared to some of the other clusters.

There's a direct correlation for me with the Shelter Cluster between how well they did and the fact that they [were] staffed properly ... they made a huge effort to understand the distinction between cluster and agency and that really paid off.

Cluster personnel were drawn from National Societies in Andorra, Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Nigeria, Spain and the USA, from CARE UK, CartONG, MapAction, UNHCR (co-convener of the Shelter Cluster which normally responds in conflict only) and the World Wildlife Fund, and from the centralised roster of consultants the IFRC has built up as part of its global responsibility for Cluster surge capacity.

In Port au Prince, the Delegation and the Haitian Red Cross supported the Cluster in the hiring of local staff. A list of all shelter coordination team roles between 10 February and 10 November is shown at Annex C.



The speed with which Cluster posts were filled was to the credit of the two-person team in the Shelter Department, and to work by IFRC National Societies, partners and members of the Global Cluster, notably CARE. The Shelter Department was assisted by short lines of decision-making and a recruitment model based on that of the IFRC's FACT teams.

I found the whole recruitment process ... the expeditious way it was done, the helpfulness of Geneva really quite refreshing ... They just got on with it pretty quickly ... it took a week – ten days, very quick. It was amazing.

I think the pool of people that IFRC have - considering how difficult it was to get good people in Haiti, we had some really good people in the Shelter Cluster.

The wider Federation had successfully recruited over a thousand delegates for the Haiti operation by June 2010. Gaps remained, however, including in shelter operations. The Shelter Department deployed its own staff to support operations, vetted operational candidates' CVs and proposed names to recruiters. Some in the Delegation saw themselves as competing with the Shelter Cluster. However, recruitment procedures for IFRC-led coordination were different from those for operations. The IFRC's devolved structure meant lines of decision-making were diffused and decision-making inevitably slower in operations.

To get a delegate ... I have to get sign-off from Finance [then] I need to get sign-off from two line managers. Then we have to go to a technical department for review which is actually in Panama Then I need to go to HR. Then HR has to put it on Job Net. Then we need to open it for 2-3 weeks or whatever, and then you take the applicants ... That's approximately ten steps or something.

Rapid recruitment for coordination nevertheless placed considerable demands on the Shelter Department, the Haiti Cluster and on individual staff. Pressure of work, turnover and irregular communication meant that coordinators and staff in Haiti were not always

aware of the organigram and the planning behind it. Some team members arrived in Haiti without a contract or a specific job. In one case, a team member moved unhappily between different roles, a situation neither Geneva nor Port au Prince seemed able to resolve to the dismay of all concerned. Linking the organigram to cluster strategy would have ensured it remained visible and that staff requirements were clear to managers in both Port au Prince and Geneva.

... there is no organigram that says 'This is where we sit. This is where you go for support.' I had no terms of reference, no contract. I had a letter saying that [they] wanted me to be in the IFRC Shelter Cluster.

More or less unannounced, these people popped up. I didn't know these people were coming. [Geneva] said 'they're in the organigram.' ... But if you don't have the organigram ... you don't know what you don't know.

They said when I got to Haiti 'we don't have a job for you.'

The IFRC's Real Time Evaluation in Haiti made a number of recommendations on improvements to operations recruitment. The Shelter Department has begun work with Human Resources (HR) colleagues on recruitment and on parity in terms and conditions for coordination teams. Nevertheless, the Shelter Cluster is likely to continue to need a measure of flexibility when recruiting coordination teams: the alternative is for the Federation to invest in standby capacity.

Work with HR colleagues should include attention to issues that strengthen good practice and retention, including contractual matters, job descriptions and terms and conditions. Staff in shelter coordination teams also need clarity about personnel procedures such as performance management, personal conduct, and grievance and discipline. The roster needs more French speakers, an issue discussed in subsequent sections of this report. Critically, the Shelter Department too needs additional capacity if it is to support large coordination teams without suffering the overload evident to informants.

2.4 People management

The shelter coordination team comprised staff of different nationalities, with different levels of experience, from different parent agencies, working in different locations. Surprisingly, people management does not feature in the Global Cluster's shelter coordination 'toolkit.' It is listed under 'Other' in the job descriptions of Cluster and hub coordinators.

Coordination staff in Haiti acknowledged the need for team management. Deputies could take on some of the people management role but in practice sometimes had to fill other gaps in the team.

My priorities were directed to numerous things being only one person doing the coordination: the actual team building or the teamwork or team HR issues, team meetings, team structure. Whilst everybody had their ... position there was no real time [for] that together ... I know that wasn't there.

I think in Haiti it really needed a deputy because effectively the coordinator is just completely tied up with meetings and in order to have some sort of management of the team or to plug together what's happening within the rest of the team ... there was a need to have someone in that role.

There is a general lack of standard human resource management in regard to recruitment, handovers, performance management, end of mission reports and work certificates.

I think we haven't managed to have stable teams at appropriate locations with proper support...I think this management part is lacking a lot. So you can have these people with technical skills...but the team management is something that is crucial, and more so in a big team like this.

The level of communication within the shelter coordination team varied. One deputy coordinator instituted a weekly email summing up 'hot topics' from each hub. Some Coordinators held regular team meetings. Hub staff sometimes felt isolated, however, and Port au Prince staff out of the loop.

The coordination between the ESC coordinator and the hubs was regular, positive and continuous. In order to bridge the gap between PaP and the two hubs, our coordination also included regular visit to PaP's office to report relevant information from the hubs.

We went away as a team three times when [Cluster Coordinator] was here. Drivers were part of the team meeting.

Every Friday we had to write out our hot topics of the week. It was a hassle. But now I no longer know what's happening in Port au Prince. It stopped ...it faded out.

... The coordinator of the hub was not included in the main Shelter Cluster email list ... The hub did not submit periodic reports to Port au Prince so relevant information of the region in terms of coordination were not included in national reports.

Towards the latter half [of the cluster deployment] ... there was a lot of people and perhaps at times a lack of clarity over certain roles and how they all fit together and perhaps not very good communications of all issues to all team members to make them feel that they understood everything that was going on.

Support, training and management visits from the Shelter Department in Geneva were appreciated.

While there were many complications regarding the budget and human resource planning for the mission, I would like to pay compliments to [Shelter Department staff] that worked long, long hours to try to find solutions and was always available 24/7 to provide support.

It's pretty full-on trying to coordinate in a situation like that, it's very stressful, we were fluid in terms of our turnover... so I think to get people out from Geneva headquarters ... in addition to the trainings... I think just having them there ...to actually spend a couple of days with the guy and put a name to a face, that was great.

Most Shelter Cluster staff contributing to this review found colleagues and coordinators supportive.

This is my first time in the cluster. It's a great group of people. The Team has been fabulous. It's good to have trust from [the coordinators].

In a disaster response scenario, I think motivation is a key factor for you to continue work on a high level. For me, my motivation levels were really high and my work was appreciated by Shelter Cluster during the first phase of work.

Conversely, lack of people management and support contributed to the problems caused by the gap in funding for shelter coordination in August. Though what appears to be an internal accounting issue was resolved, coordination work was disrupted or curtailed and two staff left. Most were demoralized by the experience.

I lost 3 weeks at the start because 2 days after I got here [Cluster Coordinator] turned to me and said, 'we don't know if you're staying.'

The way that this whole incident was handled managerially was extremely poor, and caused significant upset and issues within the team which definitely affected productivity over a certain time.

I wanted to stay longer. It went back and forth – lack of money, no lack of money ... it was totally preventable.

It was one of the worst work experiences for me over my whole career.

2.5 Staff turnover

The IFRC's commitment to maintaining a large team throughout the deployment was noted and appreciated by partners.

I think the Shelter Cluster needs to be held up as an example to other agencies: you know, what you can do if you staff things properly and if you commit and if you draw the distinction between agency and you fund. it properly that you can deliver. It's not rocket science. They need to be so praised for that.

'It is relevant ... to highlight the success of the Shelter Department in the way they have been able to maintain full staffing levels for the numerous positions required to fulfil the IFRC's Shelter Cluster commitment since they took over the responsibility in early February'.⁴⁴

However, turnover was high. Between January and November 2010, there were seven changes of staff in the post of Cluster Coordinator, three of which took place before the IFRC became cluster lead. The IFRC-led Cluster had five changes of technical coordinator, five different hub coordinators in Léogâne-Gressier and Petit-Goâve, and four in Jacmel.

The IASC's Real Time Evaluation notes high reported rates of burnout in a number of agencies and lack of psychological support for staff.⁴⁵ An informant in a partner agency described the physical collapse of colleagues through overwork. The IFRC's Real Time Evaluation noted a number of issues for staff in Base Camp in Port au Prince and Cluster end of mission reports indicate very difficult living and working conditions in Léogâne in the first months of deployment.⁴⁶ Living conditions for staff in Port au Prince

and Léogâne improved considerably during 2010 but ongoing problems cited by Cluster staff in Port au Prince included lack of sleep, lack of dietary choice for staff living in one section of the camp and curfew restrictions.

The living conditions were very hard. So [shelter coordination team] people didn't last very long. We had a turnover at some point of one month or less.

... the key issue was the cumulatively negative impact of lack of sleep. Sleeping in pods within tents, lack of private space, severe humidity and heat can take their toll, and likely, over time, impact on output and undermine people's wish to remain living/working in such an environment.

Since the beginning of the mission living condition has clearly improved but the lack of freedom is the most important point ... The consequence of this situation is the very frequent turns over (1 - 3 months for most of the positions) in the team.

IFRC tried to mitigate the effects of turnover in the Haiti Shelter Cluster. Measures taken included repeat assignments, particularly in the role of Cluster Coordinator, training in the field and remote support for information management. However, IFRC needs to do more to understand and address turnover: in addition to the personal costs for individuals and the financial cost to IFRC, frequent staff changes placed additional pressure on fellow team members, on recruiters and the Delegation, and made harder the task of establishing key Cluster relationships. Though jobs were seldom left unfilled for long, lack of continuity was the most frequent criticism of the IFRC-led Cluster.

[Hub] turnover is very high. Every month a new person. But at least there was no break. So the handover is better than in other clusters. Turnover was high but handover was smooth.

You need to represent, establish relationships with power players. You lose personal contact. The Shelter Cluster was good at maintaining handover lines [but] different managers have different approaches and views.

Frequent rotation of Shelter Cluster staff is one of the repetitive critics from the Shelter Cluster agencies. This issue interrupts processes, reduces sustainability of actions and reduces credibility and thrust.

You lose information ... There have been three Technical Coordinators ... so there is a loss of corporate memory.

[Hub] coordinators were changed frequently, what provides that topics were raised up several times or discussed twice. Information gets lost if there is not a sufficient handover.

One measure relatively little used to address continuity was the employment of local staff. Local recruitment is a strategic issue if the Cluster is maintain continuity and build capacity. In addition to drivers, only three local staff were employed: an Information Manager and an Assistant Coordinator in Port au Prince, and a Deputy Hub Coordinator in Léogâne.

There is little in terms of capacity building of national staff and while recruiting the right people was not an easy task in Haiti, I feel that we had the tendency to fall back into bringing in more internationals too easily.

If we're going to spend a lot of time mentoring someone then ... I would argue, do it with a local member of staff. Do some capacity building... That's something we missed out on in Haiti. We should have had more local members of staff.

You need people to do transfer of competence to nationals ... They understand local politics.

You should train a counterpart.

The process of local recruitment via the Delegation was a lengthy one and added to the already heavy workload of the small HR team in the Delegation. In March, the Cluster was asked to do its own recruitment of local staff but by mid-2010 the situation was again unclear.

The need and attempt to hire locals first was tried in March, HR procedures made this very difficult and time consuming ... so in the end we pretty much gave up. Then one evening I went to see HR [who said] ... why don't we just do it ourselves? ... this is what we had been requesting all along ... and 3 days later we had the national staff employed!

I sent the request for local staff to help us with communication ... to HR ... and I didn't hear anything back and after a few weeks I asked, you know, what is happening? And they told me that they had printed it out and hung it up like in their warehouses which is probably not where you'd find communicators.

IFRC needs to understand the reasons for Cluster turnover and how to manage retention better: the job of the Cluster is to build relationships so that others can build shelters, and for this it requires continuity.

2.6 IFRC support

'For the IFRC, the greatest urgency lay in emergency shelter and non-food relief on which it leads a UN-designated cluster of agencies'.⁴⁷

The IFRC Delegation in Port au Prince and the Haitian Red Cross gave considerable support to the Haiti Shelter Cluster. The Delegation provided accommodation, financial services, logistics, vehicles and security. The Cluster Coordinator had a dual reporting line to the Shelter Department in Geneva and the Head of Delegation in Haiti. Co-location gave the Delegation good access to Cluster information and additional support for operations during shelter, storm and cholera responses. Leadership of the Cluster added to the IFRC's standing.

I found it brilliant living [in Base Camp]. Great move by IFRC. You can get things done a lot more simply ... It makes for a good relationship. ... So I feel camp has been a real boon.

It was very good working with [the IFRC] for that day ... the professionalism and the way in which in which they just got down to it and got the job done in terms of that storm response was really impressive ...

99% of the information I get is from the Shelter Cluster. The Shelter Cluster was in the Base Camp so it was good for me. I've got really wonderful information.

I think [the Cluster] has done fantastic work. I say this on the basis of feedback from OCHA, from the Humanitarian Coordinator, no question about that. Compared to other clusters the Shelter Cluster was by far the best in terms of quality and quantity of work ...

*'In terms of IFRC's role as cluster lead on shelter, it has led the Emergency Shelter Cluster well and its role is acknowledged by all external interlocutors.'*⁴⁸

Unfamiliarity with the cluster approach in the large Delegation is evident from other comments and is referenced in the IFRC's Real Time Evaluation.⁴⁹ Ambivalence towards the cluster commitment, and the difference in management culture, terms and conditions, and modus operandi led, as one informant put it, to the feeling that Cluster was something of a 'red-headed step-child':

I think they knew how [the Shelter Cluster] fit into the overall deployment for IFRC in Haiti, but not what we did ... We did try to integrate socially, but there was a palpable sense of cultural difference ...

Our presence ... often felt tolerated rather than welcomed with an open arm.

We should have had a presentation on what they [the Cluster] do.

[The Cluster] are arrogant and narcissistic and they think they are better than everybody else ... I don't know what the Cluster does and where they are working.

The mandate of this organisation is not to make the UN look good.

Parity in terms and conditions was also a concern for delegates from different countries in the Cluster or based in different locations in Haiti. Work on this issue has begun in the Shelter Department.

Despite difficulties and pressure of work, staff on both sides generally worked together well. Hardest for the Cluster was the curfew. Because other international organisations, including PNSs, the ICRC and the UN, had later curfews, the Delegation's was viewed as a logistics measure. Though exceptions were made, the Cluster Team saw the curfew as reducing work time, leisure and the networking which was part of its coordination role.

Our inability to socialise or have meetings beyond 6.00 really was quite problematic. ... just as an example, one evening where we were staying in a hotel when we were actually out of Base Camp I ended up getting into a conversation with someone ... that led to us being able to get hold of the Ministry of Public Works data which we'd been trying to get hold of for months.

Cluster contracts and job descriptions were unambiguous about the requirement to comply with IFRC security guidelines. Delegation managers were entitled to expect that Shelter coordination team members would comply with contracts and that coordinators would lead by example. However, staff consultation and communication are considered good practice if policies and guidelines are to be understood and adopted.⁵⁰ The Delegation provided a briefing on security when staff arrived but Cluster staff, in different roles from their operations counterparts, arguably required risk assessment and management tailored to their work role and location, neither of which the Delegation could be expected to be familiar with.

A more proactive approach by the Cluster should not conflict with the Delegation's overall responsibility for security but ensure gaps in risk assessment, consultation and communication are addressed. Security management should be linked to people management, and responsibility be clearly allocated to a Cluster Coordinator or deputy. In addition to working with the IFRC on this issue, the Global Cluster could draw on work by its partners, for example RedR.

2.7 Handover to UN-Habitat

UN-Habitat normally leads the Shelter Cluster in the transitional and permanent housing phases. IFRC had originally planned and budgeted for a six months Shelter Cluster deployment, in accordance with its mandate to lead during the emergency phase. In consultation with the Head of Delegation in Haiti, it later agreed to extend cluster deployment until 10 November by which time the hurricane season and the risk of further emergency were expected to be past. The cluster's budget was revised to CHF 2.56m.

In a press release in March 2010, IFRC announced that it would extend the emergency phase for operations in Haiti for up to twelve months after the earthquake.⁵¹ In July, the Shelter Department proposed extending Shelter Cluster deployment for the same length of time. The Delegation and Zone were not in agreement with this proposal and the November handover date was confirmed in discussions with UN-Habitat in July.

UN-Habitat had been unable to provide an Early Recovery Advisor for the Shelter Cluster in Haiti but the two agencies agreed a MoU in August 2010. By 12 October, a month before the handover date, UN-Habitat's own funding was not yet in place.⁵² Handover was announced at the main Cluster meeting in October. During that month, UN-Habitat's Shelter Settlement Adviser attended hub and sub-cluster meetings to introduce the agency and its role to partners.

UN-Habitat was respected for its understanding of long-term housing need but informants were concerned about handover to a non-emergency agency with less funding and coordination capacity than IFRC. Two weeks before handover, the Cluster was preparing for Hurricane Tomas which struck on 5 November, bringing heavy rain and flooding to Haiti. Informants, including some in the Delegation, now questioned the 10 November handover date.

We think the handover is too early ... This is still the hurricane season...

They say we're not in an emergency phase. But in my opinion we're still sitting on a major catastrophe. ... If we are not in an acute disaster, it's only a matter of time.

If I hand this [role] to someone and I know they cannot do it I should take more effort to make sure they can because in the end the Shelter Cluster provides services to agencies and they provide help to ... beneficiaries and that's what we're about ...

I think it's our duty to do it longer. You can't hand over when UN-Habitat doesn't have the resources to do it.

UN-Habitat placed Cluster recruitment advertisements in early November. The IFRC-led Cluster's local staff transferred to UN-Habitat and three internationals under contract to

CARE prepared to stay in Haiti or to return in 2011. A notice on the Cluster website advised that data collection would re-start after a two-month break in January.

3. ACTIVITIES

3.1 Strategy

One of the Cluster's main tasks is to develop a strategic framework and work plan. The framework is a leadership and accountability tool to be reviewed monthly.⁵³ Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) meetings had begun in January. The IOM-led Cluster drafted a Shelter Sector Response Plan which was agreed with IFRC in February.⁵⁴ The SAG met at least twice a month until late April then monthly until the end of August. Meetings, usually at the CARE office, averaged eight participants between February and August, including representatives of NGOs, donors, the IFRC in its operational role, IOM and UNOPS (see Annex E).

The affected population and local NGOs do not appear not have been represented at SAG meetings between February and August. A member of the shelter coordination team echoed the concern raised in UN-Habitat's pre-earthquake report on Port au Prince about lack of opportunity to influence decisions.

Community and beneficiaries participation could play a significant role at strategic level ... for development of ideas and also in the decision process ... For example, policies could be considered to include local players and beneficiaries in SAG meetings. Experts are needed to orchestrate and provide solutions, local players should then decide.

In setting strategy for the sector, the Shelter Cluster was seen as stronger than others:

*'On the coordination front, clusters need to shift from simply sharing information, to setting strategy. This has long-time been a recommendation in humanitarian response, yet is still not practised across the board. One sector to do this well was shelter.'*⁵⁵

Though the SAG developed common positions for the Cluster on a number of issues, the Response Plan does not appear to have been finalised, translated or reviewed. Elements of it were incorporated into other strategic documents, including those on risk analysis and support to host families. The strategy section of the Cluster website held a number of documents, including the Response Plan, a Position Paper on Cluster roles and responsibilities, a 'Vision and Roadmap for Haiti' by the Private Sector Economic Forum, and an Advocacy Document. It is not easy to see which of these represented current strategy. Situation Reports, intended to provide the 'working frame of reference' for Cluster members and stakeholders appear to stop in April.⁵⁶

Informants noted the need for review and for initial assumptions to be questioned.

We were like 'we'll do 130,000 [transitional shelters] and we'll do them by March' ... Is this really realistic? And I think if that question had been asked by the cluster in their leadership role a little bit earlier then it might have been checked a little bit ...'

We got to June and realised that the strategy hadn't really been re-looked at and may not be entirely relevant in all parts ...

It would be great if the Shelter Cluster could finalize [the strategy] as a part of achievements.

The need for host family support or for house repairs were seen as receiving less focus than camps or those needing transitional shelters.

Did the Cluster over-project T- shelters? Have we focused too much on T-shelters as opposed to repairs and permanent shelter?

There is such a huge need you need multiple approaches to temporary shelter.

[Host families] are providing the assistance. I'm sorry. It wasn't us half the time. It was these poor families out there who were on the absolute edge anyway ... Everybody got very caught up in numbers and in T-shelters delivered but again they were going to people in camps.

Some felt contingency planning for the hurricane season should have had higher strategic priority. The issue was included in the Cluster's Advocacy Document, was the focus of SAG meetings in May and July and discussed in coordination meetings in Port au Prince, Petit-Goâve and Léogâne-Gressier. Agencies were urged to share their own contingency plans and the DPC's plan was circulated. In September, however, the concept of contingency stock was found to have been poorly appreciated by some agencies. A Shelter Cluster Lessons-Learnt Workshop made recommendations for the future.

One of the criticisms: it came out in the 29/9/10 storms ... There was no clarity. They had no idea what stocks were there.

There is surely a technical information management solution to that ... it had real, real, real consequences ... what is the responsibility for having an accurate picture at any given time of what stocks are available where?

Any country hosting a Shelter Coordination Team is clearly subject to further disasters. Planning the SCT role needs to include contingency planning for new disasters from the beginning ...

Strategic review and, as one partner proposed, scenario-planning, could have helped the Cluster strengthen leadership and transparency.

Maybe there's a kind of misunderstanding that if you're doing coordination you're not doing project implementation therefore you don't need to do project management ... but actually you need to project manage your coordination.

By October, with assistance from CARE, the Cluster had added new roles in urban planning, debris recycling and Housing, Land and Property. These were areas in which it had originally expected to play only a supporting role.⁵⁷ The new roles evolved from the work of TWIGs and from attempts by the Shelter Cluster to fill gaps left by other coordinating mechanisms. Nobody was seen as taking responsibility for debris clearance; UN-Habitat had been unable to second an Early Recovery specialist to the Shelter Cluster; the Early Recovery Cluster, handed over to Government by UNDP, was unable to function until November.⁵⁸

The rubble issue ... it was a very sort of frustrating issue because nobody was taking the responsibility for it, from the UN or the humanitarian community – if we could have someone in the office who could act as a focal point, just as a resource focal point then I thought that would be positive.

[CARE] was heading up this TWIG on land rights ... with loads of different people attending ... because there was good coordination happening we felt able to sort of set up quite an informal group that was producing practical outputs ... the land rights post came out of the recommendation of that working group

On the one hand, the Shelter Cluster's rationale was not always obvious to partners, even those active in the SAG. On the other hand, its capacity and flexibility in filling evident gaps were appreciated.

There was probably a tendency by June-July to insert specific coordinators or advisers for very specific roles or very specific problems and it seemed that an awful lot of financial resources, manpower resource, is being given over to what seem like technical questions rather than looking at these as strategic issues to be coordinated...

... the recruitment of specialists relating to land tenure, settlements and rubble removal. Whilst these may not generally be core Emergency Shelter Cluster areas, the ability of the cluster to provide such expertise where it was obviously lacking was seen very favourably.

3.2 Communications

The IFRC deployed a Cluster media and communications adviser for the first time in Haiti. The adviser's job description recognised three constituencies: cluster partners, including the Government of Haiti; donors and the general public in donor countries; and people affected by the disaster. Combining communication with all three constituencies in one role was ambitious but there was good experience on which to build in future deployments.

a) Communication with cluster partners

The biggest challenge to Shelter Cluster communication in Haiti was language skills. Official languages in Haiti are French and Creole. Lack of French was problematic, particularly at the start of IFRC leadership. By the second half of the deployment, hub and sub-cluster partner meetings were in French or dual-language though national meetings were still in English.

I think for the [Shelter] Cluster there was some very basic logistical-technical stuff: the fact that very few of the coordination team in the first months and ongoing could speak French.

As I didn't speak/understand French, I could not work closely with local agencies and people.

It got better towards the end, more so with the coordinators than with the Information Managers ...

Most of the people [in the Cluster] we worked with were fluent in both languages. They made considerable effort to do things in both languages.

An information management consultant in Geneva created a French version of the website and translated many of the Shelter Cluster's documents. Conference interpretation equipment was purchased early on by the Cluster though disappeared until almost the end of the deployment. Interpreters were not hired for reasons that remain unclear.

When IFRC/UNHCR deploys a cluster team, translation resources is absolutely needed if local participation is expected.

We'd like to have translators ... I guess there must be some issue that I'm completely unaware of because it seems like such a no-brainer. I just don't understand why it doesn't happen. We always, always, always say the same thing.

b) Communication with donors and general public in donor countries

The media and communication adviser's role was important in briefing international journalists, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the Cluster Coordinator during the high profile response. Shelter coordination team members were quoted in numerous international news outlets as well as in the Haiti media.

Other IFRC press releases cited facts and figures attributed to the Cluster and acknowledged the IFRC's leadership, particularly during the emergency shelter phase. Shelter Cluster leadership added to the wider Federation's already high profile in the shelter response. An operations update from the Secretariat reported that the UN had requested its presence, as lead agency in the Shelter Cluster, at UN-sponsored press conferences.⁵⁹

Despite its delayed start, the IFRC-led Cluster came quickly to be seen as an authoritative source of information for international media as well as international partners in Haiti. The work of successive advisers was praised by partner agencies and peers.

The presence of a media officer later was very much a blessing in dealing with some of the numerous enquiries that come to the cluster.

The fact that the Shelter Cluster had a communication person changed my life. It made everything so, so much easier ...so when I went on CNN I could talk intelligently about shelter ...

It's the first time the cluster had a communication person ... You look at it and think, 'how could that not have happened before?' ... The impact it's had has been invaluable. It's a credit to [Media and Communications Advisers]... The Shelter Cluster was one of the most competent entities. It seemed to be a voice you could trust.

The Shelter Cluster's first adviser started a media messages bulletin for partners, one of the clearest documents about the Haiti shelter response available.⁶⁰ The second commissioned posters in English and French summarizing achievements, challenges and targets in the shelter response. The media pages of the Cluster website included

facts for journalists to convey the scale of the disaster and the response to it.[§] These tools were widely praised. There was, however, a note of caution concerning the Cluster's communication of shelter targets.

The tangible figures of the Shelter Cluster – I think it's one of the most important things the Shelter Cluster has done.

I was worried in May and June. [There were] a lot of expectations. It's not the cluster that controls implementation. It's quite a risky operation. A lot of challenges, elements that we don't control.

The Shelter Cluster should make the appointment of a media adviser standard, at least at the start of a response. As Cluster information and communication of all kinds expand, there need to be clear definitions of what the Cluster is and does, avoidance of any suggestion that the Cluster itself is a provider of shelter, and consistency in terminology in different documents: 'transitional shelter', for example, appears to signify different things in the media messages bulletin and in the Advocacy Document.

c) Communication with people affected by the disaster

The IASC's generic terms of reference for Clusters include promotion of information, inclusion and participation. They require cluster lead agencies to promote participatory and community-based approaches. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, annexed to the Cluster's strategy template, include the right to information and participation by affected people.

Coordination staff in Port au Prince and other informants were concerned about overall lack of communication between affected community and Cluster partners.

The [sub-hub] beneficiaries have no reasonable way to contact the very people working in their neighbourhoods. No input, even perfunctory. Up here on the mount, we've got computers and internets and the information is at our fingertips.⁶¹

No mechanism really exists within the [cluster] structure for involvement of beneficiaries, it's a top down government focused mechanism which is a weakness in the whole humanitarian coordination system I think.

My instinct was that we had really missed the boat on beneficiary communications.

Exclusion from this process has led to feelings of disenfranchisement and distrust among the population, and the absence of input and ownership from Haitians undermines the success and sustainability of the clusters' work.

The first media and communications adviser linked the Cluster with CDAC, the network on Communicating with Disaster-Affected Communities, which used local radio to broadcast humanitarian messages. The second adviser tried without success to recruit a Haitian counterpart to strengthen work with local media.

[§] E.g. 'If you laid all tarpaulins that have been distributed by Shelter Cluster agencies end on end, they'd reach from New York City to Panama City, Lisbon to Moscow, New Delhi to Beijing or Nairobi to Baghdad.'

Together with the Cooperative Housing Federation (CHF), Habitat for Humanity and the Haitian Red Cross, the third adviser, a fluent French speaker, organised a roundtable discussion for local journalists, and tours of camps. She also commissioned a survey of expectations and issues of concern among people living in nine camps, distributing findings to partners shortly before the IFRC handed over the cluster.⁶²

The need for communication with affected communities grew. Minutes of Shelter Cluster meetings in Léogâne record demonstrations against shelter agencies. Some among the small group of beneficiaries who informed this report expressed profound scepticism about the motives of Shelter Cluster partners, mistrust of camp committees and the fear or experience of coercion or eviction from camps. The last issue was addressed at advocacy level by the Cluster and at individual level by human rights organisations.

The benefit of the programme is for the organisation not the people.

They say if you go [from the camps] you will get T-shelter. You leave then you get nothing.

I argue with [international agency] every day. They tell me its private land and there's nothing they can do ...

Suspicion and scepticism about international humanitarian assistance have led to initiatives on participation and accountability backed by the IFRC and Global Cluster partners, including CARE, Oxfam and World Vision. The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB) had relevant materials in Haitian Creole.

The Shelter Cluster need not duplicate the work of other initiatives but needs better institutional awareness of them. A suggestion from one informant was that the Cluster set up a shelter helpline for use by affected persons in a future response. This would not replace shelter providers' accountability role or legal providers' advice but would be a direct means of communication between the affected community and the Cluster or even the basis for a Shelter Ombudsman role.

3.3 Information Management

Information Management was led by an experienced manager who transferred from the IOM-led Cluster in February. Information management capacity was located for the first time in hubs and mapping provided for the first time by GIS experts from MapAction and CartONG. The Shelter Cluster needed an information management team of approximately five persons at any time, and on the job training for personnel who had not had prior field experience with the Cluster.

Throughout the deployment, remote support was provided from Europe and North America by consultants and the global cluster's information management focal point. Between February and November an information management consultant in Switzerland provided back-up and support. He created the French version of the Cluster website and translated many of its new documents into French. Following negotiations with Google, the cluster was granted unlimited web storage. The site was moved to a more

user-friendly format which enabled easier uploading and downloading. The site was regarded as a valuable resource.

What's the most useful thing? The website: it's a wealth of information for example, forms of contract; tenancy agreement ... Coordination is never easy. But the website is particularly good, and the mapping.

The website is well-managed and always up to date.

Cool website.

The website had comprehensive, easy-to-see records of meetings, *who-what-where* information, technical and media materials and templates. Documents were generally easy to locate but coordinators, technical and information managers should consider whether classification can follow Cluster strategic aims more closely: the section headed 'Technical References', for example, includes documents on assessment and cross-cutting issues. Lessons learned in previous responses might be more clearly signposted in a dedicated section.

Maps and information were greatly appreciated. The GIS advisers mapped delivery of emergency shelter and NFIs, coordination zones and progress in delivery of transitional shelter. The website had a 'map room' covering the country as a whole, and areas around the hubs sub-hubs. A Google Earth 'Tips and Tricks' document in English and French was developed and OCHA asked for permission to include this in its own emergency tool kit.

Information Management was really good. So was mapping: the people were very patient, both people ... There was a lot of staff turnover in the Shelter Cluster but information management and mapping was continuous. There was the same line of quality.

The cluster is good at sharing information. They go out and get information in the community, for example, in Léogâne. They have so many more resources than the other clusters.

Always someone from the Shelter Cluster was coming to [sub-hub] meetings, sometimes with new maps. It's useful to use meetings like this. It's practical ... it's easier for us to coordinate because it's on the map.

I am impressed by IM, GIS work, bulletins. They've responded to particular, additional functions. The sharing of information – they're one of the few clusters to share information.

The Shelter Cluster, like others, was challenged by difficulties in eliciting accurate numbers of persons displaced to camps and to host families, and data on their locations from other coordinating bodies. The need for additional capacity for assessment had been emphasised in the ERC's messages to cluster lead agencies in February. The Shelter Cluster found some data were not available or not shared. The IASC's six-month evaluation found 'serious delays in compiling and sharing comprehensive data on the number, location, and activities of humanitarian organizations, and on sectoral needs, coverage and gaps.'⁶³

Informants at Petit-Goâve wanted Cluster data collection forms in Creole for local staff and NGOs; coordinators and information managers wondered if data capture and analysis could be made easier, particular in a large response lasting many months.

It's important to understand that there are different dynamics in the same country. [Have] for example [IM] forms translated into Creole, given that in the mountain areas not all the people who are doing assessments speak French.

It's very easy to make a mistake ... It's easy for someone to erase a formula or information. To analyse data it's a lot of work in Excel ... For example, say to agencies 'Here is the data you provided. What has changed?'

Excel is an excellent tool ... but reaches the end of its capacities after a few months when too many records have been collected.

I think we fatigued our partners with requests for information. I had no idea before how much we generate and manage..

'Who-what-where' information might be linked with 'when' information to aid project management:

If we are tracking where we are doing emergency shelter distribution then we should also put a temporal factor to it: how long is that [shelter] going to be useful for? ... Obviously we need to know where we are operating and to what degree but that needs to be translated into looking at it over time as well.

The Movement Shelter Coordinator in Port au Prince summarised information from the Cluster and other sources to produce 'Shelterpoint', a bulletin for IFRC shelter partners. Such a bulletin, providing selected information and updates for partners, might be worth testing with the wider cluster in a future deployment. As with other areas of the Cluster's work, information management products should be specified and reviewed in strategy-making processes. The Cluster should consider whether future information products can include data and training on contingency stock recording.

3.4 Assessment

As noted above and in evaluations of the earthquake response, assessments were hampered by factors beyond the control of the Shelter Cluster.⁶⁴ There were many assessments, including remote assessment by UNOSAT, a Rapid Interagency Needs Assessment led by the IASC, IOM registration of people in camps, and assessment of all buildings in the earthquake-affected area by the Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications (MTPTC). Individual agencies also conducted assessments in the areas in which they were working.

Assessments only partially covered shelter needs: for example, IOM data covered families living in camps but not those staying with host families. As major distribution points for material assistance in a country where most people were extremely poor, camps attracted a moving population, including some not affected by the earthquake and people moved, willingly or unwillingly, from other camps and collective centres. MTPTC and UNOPS had limited data on damage to housing but for reasons unclear were unable or unwilling to share these with the Shelter Cluster until the latter part of the deployment. Individual agencies' assessments used different methodologies and covered limited but sometimes overlapping areas. Data could not be verified.

We agreed in [hub] on a common format for a questionnaire on needs ...[but] no follow-up. ...So nine months after the earthquake we have no reliable data for shelter needs.

The cluster issued an assessment form. Agencies don't want to give information. It's as if they are together but just playing their own game ... Cluster documents, information management and mapping are good but the data from partners is bad. There is no evidence to support the figures. You need some way of verifying data.

There are still many gaps. Nobody assessed in the mountains.

I came in five and a half month months [after the start]. I was surprised that we didn't have a needs figure ... Good data was hard to come by. But I felt that if I was an agency coming in, where do I go? I wouldn't have been able to answer that question.

Initiatives by the Shelter Cluster and its partners sought to address some of these issues. In Léogâne, a Hub Coordinator organised a working group on provision for under-served mountain areas around Léogâne and Petit-Goâve; CARE and CHF led a Technical Working Group (TWIG) on Host Families and Host Communities which produced assessment and response guidelines, *who-what-where* information and resource documents in English and French. A deputy coordinator analysed partner figures for transitional shelter. By comparing assessments from three sources, UNOSAT, IOM and MTPTC, with the number of shelters planned, he identified excess coverage of nearly 10,000 units at Léogâne, and under-coverage in Port au Prince.

The shelter needs analysis was very good.

Consolidated needs analysis came late. You can't blame the cluster. There were other factors.

They found that Léogâne was over-covered while there was a shortfall in Port au Prince. I said, call all the NGOs and tell them – you have to explain to each of them ... you have to go out to say 'this is the implication of the numbers for your organisation.'

The Shelter Cluster Assessments webpage does not carry assessment analyses but a link to a site hosted by OCHA. This has assessment documentation until June 2010 on different sectors. Other assessment documents, templates and resources, including documentation on heightened risk, environment, livelihoods, host families and T-shelters, are located in different places across the website, making them harder to locate. The Shelter Cluster needs to communicate its role and that of partners in assessment perhaps through a document such as the Position Paper.

3.5 Coordination


As noted earlier, the number of organisations thought to be working in the earthquake response was anything from 400 to 2,000. A draft document from May lists approximately 80 non-governmental organisations attending meetings of the Shelter Cluster throughout Haiti.⁶⁵ Challenges for all clusters included not only the number of participating agencies but the varying levels of experience they brought to the complex response.

Haiti's proximity to the States means that there was a large influx of various groups of people from various backgrounds with no experience in international emergency relief. While this was not a bad thing, it was time consuming to the team.

[There's] a handful of really experienced people but in general I was really surprised by how young everyone was ... It's like a huge, on-the-job training programme.

a) National coordination meetings

National level coordination meetings were held in a tent at the MINUSTAH Log Base in Port au Prince. Minutes do not always record attendance but in January and early February meetings are said to have involved as many as 200 people. Meetings from 10 February to 25 May, for which figures are available, indicate attendance by one or more persons from an average of 33, almost all of them international.



The Government of Haiti nominated two consultants to represent it at early meetings but, as in other clusters, involvement was difficult to maintain. Limited government capacity following the earthquake is, unsurprisingly, noted in all sectors apart from WASH though turnover and lack of French skills in the Shelter Cluster are thought to have added to its difficulties in establishing relations. In addition, the Government had no department with responsibility for housing hence no automatic counterpart for the Shelter Cluster.

National level cluster meetings were seen as well-chaired and a valuable platform for information and networking. Staff provided good support between meetings too and in August a partner needs' survey was conducted.

Those guys knew how to run a meeting.

The cluster was a good meeting place and a place to develop relationships.

*I like the way the cluster meetings are generally handled well and are fast moving and informative. It is often the only way a small organisation such as [agency] learns who is doing what, where and when, which is invaluable and saves us a lot of time that we'd otherwise have spent trying to find it out.'*⁶⁶

I could call one of the guys and they would respond by the end of the day by phone or email.

On the other hand, national meetings could not always model the participatory approach the Cluster sought to promote. Participation by Haitian organisations in national clusters was limited, particularly at the start, partly because, by contrast with international agencies, it was almost impossible for them to get through the gate at MINUSTAH where meetings were held in English.

At the start it was really difficult because Haitians couldn't get into Log Base ... Shelter Cluster was only in English. [I] saw no translation at all which I think is appalling.

Other cluster meetings are held in French, which is preferable, but still does not allow for participation by the vast majority of Haitians (only 10-20% of the population speaks French) ... meetings are generally not run in a way that is sensitive to simultaneous translation even if participants are able to arrange their own translator ... we suggest that cluster meetings be held in Kreyol.

I found that on one hand the Shelter Cluster has been proactive in inviting [shelter] actors to share their experiences with stakeholders. The shelter cluster meetings happened to be a good platform for sharing information ... On the other hand I didn't see local NGOs participating at the national shelter cluster meeting.

Cluster leads are good but they are operating in a system [where] there's virtual exclusion at all levels.

As one Cluster Coordinator saw it, the language of the national cluster remained English because only English speakers attended its early meetings. Others said that there appeared to be few national NGOs involved in shelter.

However, though many foreign NGOs working in Haiti after the earthquake were doing so for the first time, others, for example members of the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) were likely to have had previous experience and local NGO partners.** Local NGOs, like the UN, had been directly affected by the earthquake but did not vanish. A DEC evaluation found that pre-existing local partnerships strengthened members' response, but that some local partnerships had been forgotten or 'ignored in the relief rush.'⁶⁷ Where working relationships existed, they needed to be maintained and built on.

'... the pressure to scale up and deliver rapid results can jeopardise relationships with

** DEC members are ActionAid, Age UK, British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care International UK, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund, and World Vision.

*partners ... In the words of one local partner representative, “There was a huge change in the way our partner agency worked from before the earthquake and after. There was a rapid expansion and it became like a huge machine ... Before, we were the ones who were doing the implementation; but after, we had to run in order to avoid being left behind. The human face got lost.”*⁶⁸

Evaluations of the tsunami response of 2004 include similar findings.⁶⁹ Local participation and relationships remain an area in which the Shelter Cluster can usefully lead by example.

b) Technical Working (TWIG) meetings

According to the Cluster website, the national Cluster had four TWIGS

- Host family – Host Community
- Public Outreach
- Land and settlement
- Cash for Work (Léogâne)

Additional TWIGs at national and regional level are referred to in minutes and reports. They focused on needs and shelter kits in mountainous regions around Léogâne and Petit-Goâve, para-seismic construction, transitional shelter, and transitional to permanent shelter. Minutes are generally not available though extensive documentation on transitional shelter is available on the Cluster website. Only one TWIG, Host family – Host Community, appears to have started in response to a SAG decision and has clear terms of reference against which to report back, as recommended in the shelter coordination toolkit.

TWIGs at national and regional level were clearly very active. It is not always easy to see who was involved, how effective outputs were or whether a TWIG fulfilled its terms of reference. Some in the hubs were not always aware of national TWIG activities. Conversely, hub meetings refer to work by local TWIGs but the outcomes are not separately minuted.

A big issue for the cluster system in Haiti is that it is not a national system. [There are] no clear guidelines from national level e.g. on replicating achievements, learning lessons.

Host Family – Host Community TWIG

The needs of those living with host families were recognised in the Response Plan, Position Paper and SAG as a core responsibility of the Cluster. Host families sheltered over half a million people, 30% of all persons displaced by the earthquake. As discussed above, however, their needs and capacities were thought to have been under-assessed and under-served by comparison with those in camps and / or in need of transitional shelter. Some informants believed focus on host families should have come earlier and be seen as a strategic rather than a technical issue.

I think there were a lot of technical engineer-types for NGOs who'd done transitional shelter before. ... I think they wanted to talk about that because it was their solution ... instead of looking at the big picture of other things that should be done. Host families were outside Port au Prince and no-one could see.

If host families are one-third - how is that just one TWIG? ... Everybody got very caught up in numbers and in T-shelters delivered ... but again they were going to people in camps. Accessibility to the T-shelter project for people in host families - that's a third of your case-load.

CARE and CHF led the TWIG. No minutes of meetings are available but the group drew on work by a number of partners in the development of policy, response and assessment guidelines.

Agency for Cooperation and Development	IFRC
Agriculture Cluster	Mercy Corps
Cordaid	OCHA
British Red Cross	Organisation pour la Réhabilitation de l'Environnement
CARE	Oxfam
Caritas	Shelter Cluster
Cash Learning Partnership	UNHCR
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	UNICEF
Haitian Red Cross	
ICRC	

The TWIG helped to provide a platform for work which, as the Position Paper noted, required an inter-cluster, national approach. Resources, including a Shelter Cluster map showing where assessments had taken place by June, were available in French and English.

Its aims were set out in a June document, 'Host Community Guidelines', written by its coordinator, a consultant working for Cordaid.⁷⁰ Aims included evaluation of hosting situations, and guidance and coordination for organizations supporting IDPs who wanted to remain in host communities and rebuild lives outside the earthquake zone. Without support, the alternative for many was to return to urban earthquake-affected areas.

Public Outreach TWIG

The work of this TWIG is related to the Cluster's work on communication with beneficiaries. It developed Creole language posters on safe building practices and hazard resistant construction. Its web pages included material in Creole by CARE on fixing tarpaulins and in French by the Haitian Red Cross, French Red Cross and IFRC on shelter construction.

There was a recognition particularly when [media adviser] was there that public information was a really crucial part of the shelter work ... the Shelter Cluster understood that public information really mattered and that's huge progress ...

Webpages also link to insights on transitional shelter construction by Shelter Cluster partners Concern, IOM and Un Techo Para Mi País. These provide lessons on technical and participatory approaches and could usefully have been included in a dedicated lessons learned section on the Cluster website.

Minutes of two meetings are available on the Cluster website. The second set lists attendance by staff of CARE and IOM, the Shelter Cluster's Information Manager and its Media and Communications Adviser.

Land and settlement TWIGs

An informal working group started by CARE shared experience in dealing with land tenure in urban and rural areas. The group's remit was

*'to document the problems and questions that individual agencies could not answer; map what agencies were doing in terms of agreements; identify organisations with Housing, Land and Property specialists; and get feedback from Haitian experts on the legal implications and potential longer-term risks with NGO activities.'*⁷¹

A Housing Land and Property TWIG was also formed by partners in Petit-Goâve and Grand-Goâve. Minutes of its meeting at Léogâne in July do not list participants but share experience in informal resolution of tenure issues by Abeiter-Samariter Bund (ASB), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the Canadian Red Cross, Entraide protestante suisse (EPER) and IOM. An undated paper on the Google Groups site, *'Towards Tenure Security after Disaster: Principles and their application in Haiti'* references Cordaid and GOAL.

A national Working Group was chaired by the Housing, Land and Property Coordinator, a member of the shelter coordination team. The Housing, Land and Property Working Group was an inter-cluster group (also described as a working group of the Early Recovery Cluster, the Protection Cluster and of UN-Habitat). Draft documents on the TWIG webpage addressed policy on displacement and resettlement in Haiti, specifically

- Forced eviction
- Enumeration (gathering statistical information about a community)
- Assistance to those who had lived in rented accommodation before the earthquake

Agencies cited in draft documentation are Architectes de l'Urgence, CARE, IOM, Habitat for Humanity, UN-Habitat, the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) of the Government of Haiti and the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC)

While the cluster's involvement in land tenure was welcomed, particularly in its contribution to advocacy (see below), some wondered if there was a risk of re-framing humanitarian issues as legal ones in a country where informal settlements before the earthquake had consisted of permanent structures and where tenure was hard to maintain even if successfully claimed.⁷²

When I arrived people were talking about land tenure and technical aspect. For me there is no problem with land tenure. They have made it complicated. They talked for months. ... They are looking for problems they expect to see at home.

We are not here to push an international advocacy land reform agenda. Actually as humanitarians we are here to make sure at a humanitarian level that people have the resources they need and the living environment they need to survive.

Cash for Work TWIG

A TWIG in Léogâne led by CARE established cash for work guidelines. Minutes are not available but recommendations for daily rates were accepted by the national Cluster and posted on the website.

c) Coordination outside Port au Prince

Coordination hubs on shelter and camp management had begun working in affected areas at Léogâne, Petit-Goâve and Jacmel by early February. By late February, with assistance from CARE and from the Australian and the Spanish Red Cross, the Shelter Cluster had an international team at Léogâne (also covering Gressier and Petit-Goâve) and at Jacmel.

The hubs were seen by as evidence of the IFRC's willingness to commit capacity to the Cluster and valued for their input into information management and coordination. Information management capacity was for the first time located in hubs.

[Jacmel Coordinator] knows very well the zone. IM does marvellously.

Participation [at meetings] is still high. Other clusters have decreased. Meetings are regular. Actions are taken afterwards. If partners don't get added value they don't come. [Jacmel coordinator] is very proactive.

[At Léogâne] the discussion forum was open and there was place to raise up topics of particular interest. Perhaps also because this sub cluster was smaller and there were less organisations ... [the] shelter cluster in Léogâne asked for help to relocate 104 families that should move from their previous sites and we included this shelter project in our programme to support this urgent need.

[The hub's] been an essential thing in making Léogâne more effective than Port au Prince. Sure it's a larger programme in Port au Prince. People know each other better here.

Successive coordinators had built relationships with local authorities, including mayors and representatives of the DPC, though the Shelter Cluster's role was not well understood and information materials were still needed to help explain it:

In both my experiences as Emergency Shelter Cluster coordinator, this is a major shortfall that should be addressed. Local authorities do not understand the clusters' role and how they are useful. They are confused with the many organizations swarming the operational area and the clusters that are unable to provide directly requested items / humanitarian aid.

Good collaboration with the Camp Management Cluster was noted though links with WASH were seen as weaker, in the regions as well as in Port au Prince.

I want to mention the good coordination between the shelter and the Camp Management Cluster. At the very beginning they were together (CCCM-shelter cluster), but once they split, the coordination continued very good. With other clusters perhaps there was not such strength collaboration, but it's interesting this complementation between clusters and the sharing of information.

One of the bits missed is the link with the WASH Cluster. It is not the fault of the Shelter Cluster. There will be a lot of T-shelters without WASH.

Technical information was appreciated, particularly by agencies new to shelter though some informants in the hubs would have welcomed more direction.

We are changing the [transitional shelter] bracing. [Léogâne coordinator] raised this issue. We tried to do it.

... the Federation has lots of experience – it could make more input. It's the first time I've done shelter. So we need more direction. Maybe they are used to work with agencies with more experience.

The hubs encountered many of the same challenges as the Haiti Cluster as a whole: logistical and living challenges, initial lack of office and of French speakers. Coordinators at both Léogâne and Jacmel were conscious of the need for better contextual knowledge. At Jacmel, a local network, *Coordination Régionale des Organisations du Sud-Ouest* (CROSE), had started the hub though its role appeared to diminish: whether this was due to local politics, a change of programme by the agency or change of staff by the cluster was not clear but its initial input was seen as invaluable.

It was the local partner NGO CROSE that showed me ... some ways to involve local beneficiaries ... In the future I would always look from the beginning for the mechanisms to involve local NGOs and beneficiaries ... I think CROSE was able to bring local knowledge, and understanding particularly of the political landscape to the cluster, something that an outsider could not have hoped to pick up in a short space of time.


At Léogâne, the only hub in which a local deputy coordinator was appointed, a coordinator emphasised the importance of adequate staff briefing and proper handover: a partner concurred. Without French language skills and contextual knowledge, otherwise skilled and experienced coordination staff were hampered.

It's not just to deal with thousands of people without shelter. You need to know what was the conditions before, who were the partners already in place before, what kind of communication and coordination they have ... what is the political, what is the economical and the social situation of this country?


Have a strategy for effective overlap during the appointment of new cluster leads. You've got to get in front of the problem. With the international experience the Federation has they should be able

Léogâne-Gressier coordination meetings were held weekly then fortnightly at the MINUSTAH Log base at Léogâne where a hub coordinator had negotiated use of office and meeting space. Minutes do not always record participants but on average 18

agencies were represented at the six meetings from 8 July to 21 October for which figures are available.




At Petit-Goâve, meetings were held at the hotel where the hub team lived. Minutes of twelve meetings for which figures are available show that they were attended by representatives from an average of 15 agencies (see below).




At Jacmel, minutes of meetings from 26 April July to 28 October show participation by 11 agencies, including regular attendance by local and central government representatives.

Meetings were held initially at the MINUSTAH base but subsequently at partner agencies' offices.



d) Coordination in and around Port au Prince

The Port au Prince hub started meeting in April. Coordination meetings were held at the office of Parole et Action in Delmas. Minutes of eleven meetings between 28 April and 11 August for which attendance details are available show participation by an average of 12 agencies, predominantly international ones.



In addition to the Port au Prince hub, sub-hubs were started in municipalities in the city. Sub-hubs were formally led by a representative of the Mayor's office and an international NGO or participating Red Cross Society. There was limited participation from local NGOs.

Sub-hub meetings in French and/or French and English achieved a sustained level of engagement with local mayoral representatives. Practical support from the Port au Prince Coordinator was appreciated by government and non-government partners.

We provided translations, contact lists, IM, mapping. Otherwise it was up to them – the NGOs and the mayor – to determine what they wanted.

I heard about [the Shelter Cluster] from the Port au Prince Coordinator. He went to Mayor's Office. He was very dynamic... every day he called me and asked 'what do you need?' The beneficiaries' list was handwritten and [Port au Prince Coordinator] hired five people to type it up.

When [Port au Prince Coordinator] came I liked the way he worked. He was diplomatic and direct. I went to the mayor's office and introduced the idea [of hub] to the mayor's office. I contacted other organisations and they came to a meeting.

An example of [cluster] best practice is the sub-clusters. Dealing with local government has been really good.


What was really useful was when we started moving into the suburbs. You're working with a smaller group. You can get into more details and share problems. That was really useful for some of us ... [Port au Prince Coordinator] worked really hard on relationships with mayors.

Because partners and government counterparts chaired sub-hubs these meetings were thought likely to be more sustainable when the IFRC-led team left.

The efforts deployed by the cluster to hand over the chairing of Hub and Sub-Hub level coordination to NGO focal points and local authorities should carry on. If this is achieved their contribution should not be required anymore in 6 months.⁷³


After IFRC left, hub meetings took place at Carrefour, Croix des Bouquets, Port au Prince Centre and Tabarre.

Carrefour coordination meetings were held at the mayor's office. Minutes of meetings between 16 March and 26 October show participation by an average of 8 agencies. Most meetings were attended by the Deputy Mayor who co-chaired the meeting with a Shelter Project Manager from CARE.



Sub-hubs started at Port au Prince centre in July and Croix-des-Bouquets in August. No minutes are available but meetings were said to be co-chaired by the respective *Mairie* and by representatives of Samaritan’s Purse and the French Red Cross. At Tabarre coordination meetings were held at the Hotel de Ville. Minutes of two meetings in July and August show participation by seven and five agencies respectively. Each was attended by a representative of the *Mairie* who co-chaired the meeting with a representative from Concern.

Delmas coordination meetings were held at the *Mairie*. Minutes of seven meetings between 7 July and 14 October indicate participation by an average of 15 agencies, predominantly international (see below). The *Mairie* co-chaired the meeting together with the Shelter Coordinator from the French Red Cross.



3.6 Advocacy

In April 2010 the Cluster drafted an Advocacy Document to highlight issues, priorities and needs in the shelter response. It was intended for agencies to use in discussions with partners and donors and with the Government of Haiti. It covered:

- The need for accurate assessment of those made homeless
- Funding for transitional shelter
- A clear policy on land tenure by the Government
- Comparative risk and contingency planning for natural disaster

It was presented to the SAG, national Cluster and Port au Prince hub meetings and posted in English on the website. Annexed to it were the Host Family Assessment Guidelines and assessment templates in French and English by partners.

SAG minutes record the need for advocacy on other issues, including NGO registration, customs clearance and vehicle registration. Informants in Port au Prince and at Petit-Goâve were concerned that customs and land title issues had not been resolved. Responsibility for advocacy on these issues was not solely that of the Cluster but shared with other coordinating bodies such as OCHA, the Humanitarian Country Team and the Early Recovery Cluster.

There were a number of other coordinating bodies. These included commissions headed by the President and the Prime Minister, a Working Group on people living in front of the presidential palace, and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) headed by Prime Minister Bellerive and former US President Clinton. Shelter Cluster coordinators participated in Government coordination meetings and Working Groups and provided information to them, to UN partners and to the IHRC. It collaborated with other clusters and agencies, including UN-HABITAT, IOM, World Vision, Oxfam, Concern Worldwide, and the Protection Cluster in advocacy on Housing, Land and Property. Its support and advocacy were appreciated by international bodies.

The cluster has been very useful for us in getting started ... The intelligence that the Shelter Cluster had available when we started was invaluable. We started from scratch. The data, maps, all the people we could talk to were invaluable.

Particularly the advocacy stuff, I think was really [useful] ... I had people coming up explaining policy to me ... when you come to the work of someone like [Housing, Land and Property Adviser] then it's all advocacy stuff so it's really vital to connect with somebody ... who is the go-to person for all the international donors and local media ...

However, the Cluster's lack of a Government counterpart, Cluster turnover, and the existence of multiple coordinating bodies were seen as making its advocacy with the Government of Haiti harder.

Without a direct or semi-direct line to government we were handicapped, e.g. re MTPTC data ... we ... should have been doing more advocacy re shelter and the shelter agencies. It would have been useful to have rattled a few cages and insisted on a reliable interlocutor.

The issue is continuity. You achieve more things by becoming friends. That did not take place with government. It didn't help that there wasn't a person dealing with them. They do not know us. They do not trust us.

[There was] also MINUSTAH Coordination Support Committee (CSC), high level CSC, the CSC Planning Taskforce, Management Oversight Board, the Humanitarian Country Team, I mention this as there was SO MUCH and the layers of coordination actually complicated rather than streamlined efforts.

I think the US influence here has undermined the clusters ... that power centre has thrown the clusters off-base ... I don't think people realised communication channels were occupied by the US.

In July a coordinator was reassigned to the role of Government Liaison Officer to strengthen relations with the Government and with international and other coordinating bodies. Employment of staff with expertise in urban settlement, Housing, Land and Property and debris recycling helped the Cluster to act on issues on which it sought to advocate.

The IASC's evaluation of the cluster approach in Haiti in 2009 noted challenges in urban response for which the Cluster did not as yet have tools. In the light of its experience in 2010, IFRC needs to consider whether expertise in urban planning and Housing, Land and Property could be brought in earlier and what strategic products would be.

3.7 Training

a) Information management

Demonstrations and explanation on how to take and download GPS coordinates were given on request to individual organizations. In September a training course on the use of GPS and Google Earth was designed and delivered in English and French to partners in Léogâne and Petit-Goâve.

The Shelter Cluster also publicized training by the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, WFP & OCHA on GPS and basic GIS. This training was in English and French and took place in Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Léogâne and Jacmel.

b) Environmental issues

An environmental forum and training were intended to be part of Shelter Cluster training. However, the funding crisis and curtailing of the adviser's contract prevented this. Environmental assessments, impacts, areas of concern, mitigation options and best practices were instead presented to partners at a national Cluster meeting in August.

c) Training on standards

Training by Sphere and HAP representatives in English and French was announced formally and informally via the national cluster. Because of high demand, Sphere limited

the numbers of individuals from shelter agencies and prioritised national staff. Given the Shelter Cluster's own role in promoting standards, training may be an area in which Sphere, HAP and the Cluster might collaborate at field level.

d) Other training

In October a one-day workshop was held by staff of the national cluster at Léogâne and Jacmel on

- Seismic Construction
- Debris and Rubble - use and reuse
- Settlement
- Housing, Land and Property Issues

Minutes also refer to other training offered by cluster partners, including rapid environmental impact assessment and structural damage assessment.

3.8 Standards

The Cluster website carries a number of international standards and good practice guidelines. The Technical Reference pages include the Sphere standards in English, French and Haitian Creole, guidance on the use of plastic sheeting and on construction of transitional shelter. The Environmental Reference pages carry best practice guidance on material sourcing, site selection and construction, and debris management.

The Cluster's Transitional Shelter Technical Guidance considered the Sphere shelter standards in the context of the limited space available in camps and towns. This document summarises technical specifications and good practice on distribution, the content of NFI and tools kits, use of tents, shelter reinforcement, timber use and fire safety. It is one of the clearest documents on the Cluster website and rightly marked '*Lecture essentielle!*' yet is available only in English.

Technical references pages of the website include links to on an eclectic range of topics, for example, re-use of building waste, disposal of asbestos, protection of human rights and design of cash transfer programmes. The 'Library of Best Practice' focuses on construction techniques. These comprehensive sets of documents would have benefited from clearer signposting, and cross-referencing: disposal or re-use of debris, for example, is a construction, Health and Safety, cross-cutting, and standards issue.

The TWIG on transitional shelter collected partner designs which met agreed standards. Attempts were made to agree on one or two designs for joint procurement though that proved impossible to implement. One result of having different designs was that affected families in an area served by different agencies might see transitional shelters of different quality and specifications erected side by side. The Cluster could and did promote standards but some partners felt it should play a bigger role in verifying information or challenging partners on standards.

At every cluster meeting, the Emergency Shelter Cluster (ESC) standards were promoted ... This is my second cluster coordination and I am amazed how much humanitarian organizations are willing to follow the established standards set by the ESC.

It worked quite well with the Shelter Cluster compared to others. Lots of participants, regular meetings. But the cluster has no power over partners.

A more directive guideline [on transitional shelter] should be ready – not to be reinvented, not needing discussion – and a way to enforce that.

There is no aggressive quality control.

When I see [agency] doing 1500 shelters in the mountains – doing T-shelters with plastic sheeting ... I thought the cluster was there to make organisations organised..

Be more assertive. It's one thing to say, 'where's your stuff?' Say 'you need to do it like this.' As much as shelter actors lean on the cluster to do things, they [cluster] should set expectations of participation. Of professionalism.

If you accept an agency's shelters and they are low standard and if you put them on a website you are accepting them. ... There is no quality control by the cluster.

The Shelter Cluster was in the same situation as those who set humanitarian standards. It was seen as having responsibility but, in fact, had no authority if partners failed to adhere to standards or exceeded them. Shelter partners, including Federation PNSs, each had preferred shelter designs. However, informants' comments also indicate the growing expectation of leadership from the Shelter Cluster during deployments, and scope for global advocacy on shelter standards and accountability between emergencies.

While the Shelter Cluster promoted Sphere standards and helped publicise Sphere training, there is less evidence of awareness of other humanitarian sector standards and guidance, for example, the HAP Principles, People In Aid Code, ECB Project or Quality COMPAS. Most of these initiatives had material available in French and/or Creole. Given Haiti's inequality and social divisions, and concerns about security, Do No Harm might also have offered tools for context analysis.

3.9 Cross-cutting issues

The humanitarian reform programme identifies a number of themes that cut across the work of all clusters. These are

- Age
- Environment
- Gender
- HIV/AIDS
- Human Rights
- Utilisation of participatory and community based approaches

For the second time, an adviser on environmental issues, recruited via WWF, was appointed to the Shelter Cluster. The role combined analysis of environmental factors relating to emergency and transitional shelter with outreach and advocacy with government, UN, NGOs and inter-cluster forums. The Cluster's funding crisis curtailed activities. Nevertheless, the Cluster assembled a number of key resources on a dedicated web page, including a synopsis of environmental issues in shelter, guidance

on disposal / recycling of plastic sheeting, timber procurement and use of chemical wood protection. This was a significant role which should be better resourced in future deployments.

A debris management adviser was recruited for the first time via the Australian Red Cross. He sought to develop a small-scale enterprise using earthquake debris in the construction of permanent housing. With Cluster partners Haven International and the Australian and American Red Cross Societies, a prototype gabion house was built from wire cages filled with rubble.

The urgency of advocacy on shelter and human rights was indicated by local projects such as the Housing Rights Advocacy Project of the Institute for Justice and Democracy (IJDH) in Haiti and its affiliate, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). Work by the Housing, Land and Property Coordinator addressed the right to shelter in the context of eviction of IDPs from private land or of return home. Draft documentation was stored on the web page of the Land and Settlement Working Group and the issue of eviction presented and quantified in Shelter Cluster information posters.

Technical references on the web site include links to guidance on disability, gender and human rights manuals but cross-cutting issues feature rarely if at all in Cluster strategic documentation. The strategic framework template, Response Plan and Cluster Position Paper name none of the issues. The Advocacy Document references participatory assessment and gender, age and HIV/AIDS status in an annexe. It refers briefly to environmental issues in the context of transitional shelter funding but nowhere to human rights. Performance standards in the Shelter Technical Guidance paper refer to age, gender and HIV/AIDS but not to participatory approaches, environment or human rights.

Again, the Shelter Cluster need not duplicate the work of other organisations and clusters: in July at Léogâne, UNAIDS introduced its work and an awareness campaign to the hub. However, key messages for shelter agencies – even the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – could have helped make these issues more visible, and linked them to work on communication and participatory approaches.

Annex A IASC Primary Objectives and Key Principles ^{††}

Primary Objectives

- To develop and agree on system-wide humanitarian policies
- To allocate responsibilities among agencies in humanitarian programmes
- To develop and agree on a common ethical framework for all humanitarian activities
- To advocate for common humanitarian principles to parties outside the IASC
- To identify areas where gaps in mandates or lack of operational capacity exist
- To resolve disputes or disagreement about and between humanitarian agencies on system-wide humanitarian issues.

Key Principles

- Overall Objective: The ultimate objective of any decision should be that of improved delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected populations.
- Respect for Mandates: The decisions of the IASC will not compromise members with respect to their own mandates.
- Ownership: All members have an equal ownership of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.
- Subsidiarity: Decisions will be taken at the lowest appropriate level.
- Impartiality of the Secretariat: The IASC is serviced by a Secretariat, which does not represent the interests of any member.

^{††} Source: Inter-Agency Standing Committee,
<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default>

Annex B Global Cluster members 2010 ‡

1. ACTED
2. Archi-Urgent
3. Article 25
4. Care UK
5. CHF International
6. Catholic Relief Service (CRS)
7. Danish Refugee Council
8. Habitat for Humanity
9. UK Department for International Development
10. IFRC (co-convenor, natural disaster response)
11. International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
12. Medair
13. Norwegian Refugee Council
14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
15. US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
16. OXFAM GB,
17. ProVention
18. RedR UK
19. Relief International
20. Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors
21. Save The Children UK
22. Shelter Centre
23. Swiss Resource Centre and Consultancies for Development (SKAT)
24. UN-HABITAT
25. UNHCR (co-convenor, conflict response)
26. United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA)
27. World Food Programme
28. World Vision

‡ Source: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Default.aspx?tabid=>

Annex C Shelter Cluster staff roles and support

Recruited via:	Cluster Role:
1. American Red Cross	Information Manager
2. Andorran Red Cross	Cluster Adviser / Interim Coordinator
3. Australian Red Cross	Debris Processing Advisor
4. Australian Red Cross	Hub Coordinator Jacmel 1 st
5. Australian Red Cross	Hub Coordinator Léogâne 5 th
6. British Red Cross	Media and Communications Advisor 1 st
7. Canadian Red Cross	Information Manager
8. Canadian Red Cross	Information Management Global Focal Point
9. CARE	Housing, Land & Property Coordinator
10. CARE	Information Manager
11. CARE	Information Manager 1 st
12. CARE	Technical Coordinator 1 st
13. CARE	Technical Coordinator 3 rd
14. CARE	Technical Coordinator 5 th
15. CARE	Urban Settlement Advisor
16. CartONG	Mapping / GIS Advisor 2 nd
17. Finnish Red Cross	Logistics Advisor 1 st
18. French Red Cross	Contingency Planning Advisor
19. French Red Cross	Technical Coordinator 2 nd
20. German Red Cross	Cluster Coordinator 2 nd and 4 th
21. IFRC	Assistant Coordinator *
22. IFRC	Cluster Coordinator 3 rd
23. IFRC	Cluster Coordinator, Dominican Republic
24. IFRC	Deputy Coordinator
25. IFRC	Deputy Coordinator
26. IFRC	Deputy Coordinator/Hub Coordinator Port au Prince
27. IFRC	Deputy Hub Coordinator Léogâne
28. IFRC	Deputy Hub Coordinator Léogâne
29. IFRC	Deputy Hub Coordinator Léogâne *
30. IFRC	Driver *
31. IFRC	Driver *
32. IFRC	Driver *
33. IFRC	Government Liaison 1 st
34. IFRC	Government Liaison 2 nd
35. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Jacmel 2 nd
36. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Jacmel 3 rd
37. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Jacmel 4 th
38. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Léogâne 3 rd

39. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Léogâne 4 th
40. IFRC	Hub Coordinator Port-au-Prince
41. IFRC	Information Management Remote support
42. IFRC	Information Management Remote support
43. IFRC	Information Manager
44. IFRC	Information Manager
45. IFRC	Information Manager
46. IFRC	Information Manager
47. IFRC	Information Manager *
48. IFRC	Logistics Advisor 2 nd
49. IFRC	Media and Communication Advisor 3 rd
50. IFRC	Media and Communications Advisor 2 nd
51. IFRC	Technical Coordinator 4 th
52. Map Action 1 st / IFRC 3 rd	Mapping / GIS advisor 1 st and 3 rd
53. Netherlands Red Cross	Cluster Coordinator 1 st
54. Spanish Red Cross	Hub Coordinator Léogâne 1 st
55. Spanish Red Cross	Information Manager
56. UNHCR	Hub Coordinator Léogâne 2 nd
57. WWF	Environmental Advisor 1 st and 3 rd
58. WWF	Environmental Advisor 2 nd

Notes

1. The total number of persons appointed (58) is less than the number of appointments made because a small number of individuals were hired more than once, as indicated in the table above.
2. The role or title of some staff changed in the field.
3. Of the total of 58, 6 staff were Haitian nationals or had joint Haitian-USA nationality. Indicated by * in the table above.
4. In addition to appointments by IFRC, a number of other organisations contributed to the work of the Shelter Cluster.
 - a. Just under half of the shelter coordination team was recruited or seconded by national societies (25%) and partner agencies (20%)
 - b. The IFRC Delegation in Port au Prince provided accommodation and support for financial, logistical and security management
 - c. The Haitian Red Cross provided logistical support
 - d. Mayoral representatives and the French Red Cross, CARE, Concern and Samaritan's Purse ran and co-chaired sub-clusters in Carrefour, Croix de Bouquets, Delmas, Port au Prince and Tabarre
 - e. The Shelter Department in Geneva provided recruitment, training and management support

Annex D Timeline

Date	Event
12 January 2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Earthquake strikes Haiti
13 January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC mobilises shelter coordination personnel
14 January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ERC informs cluster lead agencies that five clusters have been activated, including a joint Shelter/Camp Management cluster led by IOM subject to consultation with IFRC. Asks cluster lead agencies to prioritize coordination capacity and to deploy dedicated cluster coordinators. ▪ IFRC proposes to IOM that separate shelter and camp management clusters are established or that shelter is led by the IFRC within a combined IOM-led Cluster. IOM declines proposal.
15 January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC stands down shelter coordination personnel.
22 January	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OCHA reports on agreement to establish 'shadow clusters' in the Dominican Republic, with IOM leading the Shelter Cluster there.⁷⁴
3 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ERC informs IASC principals that, owing to demands on Camp Management Cluster capacity, IFRC will lead Shelter Cluster in Haiti and confirms clusters and lead agencies for the earthquake response. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CCCM: IOM - Early Recovery: UNDP - Emergency Shelter: IFRC ▪ ERC appeals to all cluster lead agencies for senior, dedicated, full-time Cluster Coordinators with no other agency responsibilities and for additional coordination capacity. ▪ Two IFRC delegates in Haiti with Shelter Cluster experience begin transition of Haiti cluster to IFRC leadership.
05 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shelter Cluster meeting notes that Field Hubs are being coordinated at <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jacmel – led by CROSE and MAST - Petit-Goâve – led by IOM - Léogâne
08 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC Cluster Coordinator arrives in Haiti.
10 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leadership of Shelter Cluster and two staff transferred from IOM to IFRC.
15 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ERC again asks clusters to boost coordination capacity, to establish an overview of needs, to develop strategies and analyse gaps.
16 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ OCHA formally activates shadow clusters in the Dominican Republic
01 March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC Cluster Coordinator in Dominican Republic begins mission
11 March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cluster Coordinator in Dominican Republic ends mission
May / June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hurricane season starts

July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shelter Cluster begins discussing handover with UN-Habitat.
August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC and UN-Habitat agree MoU on Cluster handover ▪ Cluster funding crisis. Two staff leave.
September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban Settlement Adviser is appointed
24 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Heavy storm hits Port au Prince
12 October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Shelter Cluster partners informed that transfer of Cluster to UN-Habitat is scheduled for 10 November. The IFRC will return to coordinate in case of emergency.
19 October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ First cases of cholera confirmed at Artibonite
05 November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hurricane Tomas strikes western corner of Haiti
10 November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFRC hands cluster over to UN-Habitat
28 November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General and Presidential Elections held
November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hurricane season ends

Annex E SAG members

Agencies attending one or more meetings of the Shelter Cluster SAG between 15 February and 26 August.

Airline Ambassadors
ALEAH
American Red Cross
ARC
Canadian Red Cross
CARE
CHF
Concern Worldwide
Cordaid
CRS
DFID
Eagles Wings
ECHO
Habitat for Humanity
IFRC
IOM
OFDA
Poverty in Action
Save the Children
UNOPS
USAID / OFDA
Working Group on Disability

Annex F Review terms of reference

Terms of Reference (TOR) for: A Review of the Haiti Earthquake 2010 IFRC-led Shelter/NFI Cluster

1. Summary

- 1.1. Purpose:** The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the coordination services given by the IFRC-led Shelter/NFI Cluster Coordination team to the Haiti Earthquake Repose in 2010 to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.
- 1.2. Audience:** The IFRC and in particular the Shelter & Settlements Department will use the evaluation to improve future deployments. Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn. Cluster partners, donors, and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information.
- 1.3. Commissioners:** This evaluation is being commissioned by IFRC as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for natural disasters.
- 1.4. Reports to:** Miguel URQUIA, IFRC Shelter & Settlements Department.
- 1.5. Duration:** 30 days.
- 1.6. Timeframe:** from 8th October, 2010 to 31st December, 2010
- 1.7. Location:** Home based with travel to Haiti (around 15 days). The visit to Haiti should be done before the 10th of November. The areas to be visited in Haiti are the hubs set up by the Shelter Cluster Coordination Team: Port-au-Prince, Leogane, Jacmel.

2. Background

A 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the Haitian coast on 12 January 2010, 17:00 hours. The epicentre was located 22 kilometres from Port-au-Prince, and 15 kilometres from the closest towns. A series of strong aftershocks have been felt, and more are expected. The most affected area were the Ouest province, the most affected cities were: Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Leogane, and Jacmel.

The Government of Haiti requested international assistance and clusters were activated. The Shelter/NFI cluster was initially led by IOM but on the 3rd of February it was agreed that IFRC would lead it. The IFRC sent a Shelter Coordination Team to support the Haitian government in the inter-agency coordination of shelter actors. This team was made of a national coordination team and a number of hubs including Port-au-Prince. These teams included personnel from the IFRC Secretariat and Red Cross National Societies and from cluster partners (CARE, WWF, MapAction, CartONG). They also include the Information Manager and Technical Adviser provided by CARE to IOM for

the Shelter/ NFI Cluster. It has been agreed that the IFRC will handover the coordination of the Shelter/NFI cluster to UNHABITAT on the 10th of November 2010.

The structure of the cluster coordination team is the following:

- 1. The national coordination team** is coordinating the hubs and liaising with the Humanitarian Country Team and the national government of Haiti. The structure of the coordination team at national level has been adapted to the coordination needs and has comprised different roles at different moments including a Coordinator, a Deputy Coordinator, an Information Manager, a Mapping Adviser, a Technical Coordinator, an Environmental Adviser, a Logistics Adviser, a Media and Communications Adviser, a Government Liaison Adviser, a Housing Land and Property rights (Housing, Land and Property) Adviser, an Urban Settlements Adviser as well as national staff in different roles.
- 2. The coordination teams in the hubs** are liaising with the regional or local government and the other hubs of the other clusters. IFRC is providing a coordination team in each of the hubs. The structure of the coordination team in the hubs has been adapted to the coordination needs in the hubs and have comprised a Hub Coordinator, an Information Manager and sometimes a Deputy Hub Coordinator.

Clusters were activated in the **Dominican Republic** to support the clusters in Haiti as the Dominican Republic was the transit point for many of the goods and people for Haiti. A Coordinator was deployed to the Dominican Republic in support of the coordinator in Haiti. The need for the clusters in Dominican Republic was revised and it was felt that this position was not needed any more.

3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope

The objectives of the review are to:

1. Appraise the service provided by the International Federation as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors;
2. Review and analyze the experience of the International Federation with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;
3. Provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and global levels.
4. Examine if there were aspects of the Federation's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

4. Evaluation Methodology

The methodology employed by the reviewer/s in gathering and assessing information should include:

- Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Shelter Cluster. Most of the materials can be found in the Haiti Shelter/NFI Cluster website www.shelterhaiti.org ;
- Interviews with key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat in Geneva, (by 'phone) within the IFRC Zone Office in Panama, the FACT Team Leader, the Heads of Operations, the Head of Delegation, and the Haitian Red Cross;
- Interviews with the members of the Shelter/NFIs Cluster Coordination Team, and in particular the different coordinators.
- A field visit to Haiti:
 - Interviews with other key stakeholders, in particular Government officials where possible;
 - Interviews with the Shelter Cluster coordination team in-country, WASH Cluster coordinator, the Camp Management coordinator, the Early Recovery coordinator, and other cluster coordinators that might be found interesting;
 - Interviews with the UN OCHA, MINUSTAH, and the UN Resident Coordinator's office;
 - Interviews with shelter agencies participating in the Shelter Cluster, and in particular IOM, UN Habitat, and other key actors;

Note: A suggested list of interviewees will be provided separately.

5. Deliverables (or Outputs)

1. Concise, written document with key recommendations and supporting information. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders.
2. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation.
3. Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.

6. Proposed Timeline (or Schedule)

The exercise will be implemented over a period of 30 days between 8th October 2010 and 31st of December 2010.

7. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team

should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Policy: www.ifrc.org. The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

1. **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
2. **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner.
3. **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
4. **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
5. **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
6. **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
7. **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
8. **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at:

www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp"

8. Evaluation Team

The evaluation will be carried out by an external independent consultant with the support of an internal resource person that has been involved in operation. This internal resource person will be French-speaking and very fluent with the Humanitarian Reform, the Haiti context, and this operation in particular. The roles will be shared as follows:

- **External independent consultant:** lead the evaluation process, carry out the desk top review, do the phone interviews, plan the trip to Haiti in coordination with the resource person and the coordination team on the ground, lead the field visit, lead the interviews, write the draft review, finalise the review according to the comments received.
- **Internal resource person:** advise on the preparation of the trip, participate in the trip, participate in the interviews, give feedback and orientation on the people to be interviewed, give background to the issues raised by the interviewees, give comments to the draft review, and any other actions that he and the external consultant might find useful for the review.

9. Appendices

Key reference documents to be provided:

1. IFRC-UN OCHA Shelter MoU
2. Shelter Coordinator team member's ToRs
3. Correspondence with emergency Relief Coordinator on cluster arrangements in Haiti.
4. List of relevant people to be interviewed with contact details.
5. All documents (meeting minutes, strategy documents etc.) available from the Haiti Shelter Cluster website (www.shelterhaiti.org) or otherwise on request.
6. Reviews of IFRC-led shelter cluster coordination in Nepal (Floods 2008), Myanmar (Cyclone 2008), Bangladesh (Cyclone 2007-2008), Tajikistan (Cold weather 2007), Pakistan (floods 2007), the Philippines (typhoon 2006) and Bangladesh (Cyclone Aila 2009). These reviews can be found at: <http://www.humanitarianreform.org/Default.aspx?tabid=688>

Annex G Informants

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Florian Meyer	Country Director	ASB
Mohd. Rakibul Bari Khan	Country Manager	BRAC Haiti
Neil Bauman	Information Focal Point, Global Shelter Cluster	Canadian Red Cross
Frederic Elias	Shelter Programme Manager, Léogâne	Canadian Red Cross
Kate Crawford	Shelter Assessment Manager	CARE Haiti
Julien Mulliez	Shelter Coordinator	CARE Haiti
Lizzie Babister	Shelter and Reconstruction Senior Specialist	CARE International
Jim Kennedy	Shelter Coordinator	CARE International
Figolé St-Cyr	Secretary-General	Centrale Autonome des Travailleurs Haitiens
Sergio Tepedino	Emergency Technical Adviser	CESVI
Bob Fagan	Regional Director, Léogâne	CHF
Jacques Philippe Mondésir	Coordinateur Programmes, Jacmel	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
Jean-Michel Sabbat	Coordinator Technique, Département du Sud-Ouest	Direction de la Protection Civile
Ronald Louis	Member, Petit-Goâve	Direction de la Protection Civile
Samy Cecchin	TA	ECHO Haiti
Arnaud de Coupigny	Shelter Coordinator	French Red Cross
Tessa Jean-Pierre	Assistant Cluster Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Gerhard Tauscher	Cluster Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Gregg McDonald	Cluster Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Peter Rees-Gildea	Cluster Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Marc Maestre	Consultant / Trainer	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Paul Cornu	Contingency Plan Project Manager	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Chris Howe	Debris Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Chris Howe	Debris Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Lucien Lefcourt	Deputy Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Achala Navaratne	Environment Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Camila Vega	Government Liaison Officer	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Lilianne Fan	Housing, Land and Property Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Don Johnston	Hub Coordinator, Léogâne-Gressier and Petit-Goâve	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Catherine Lefebvre	Hub Coordinator, Jacmel	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Sarah Davies	Hub Coordinator, Jacmel	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Irma Velazquez	Hub Coordinator, Léogâne-Gressier and Petit-Goâve	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Adam Fysh	Hub Coordinator, Port au Prince	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Edward Benson	Hub Coordinator, Port au Prince	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Phyo Wai Kyaw	Information management Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster

Emese Csete	Information Manager / GIS	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Deborah Hyde	Information Manager, Léogâne-Gressier and Petit-Goâve	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Katherine Bundra Roux	Media and Communication Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Timo Luege	Media and Communication Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Joseph Ashmore	Technical Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Regan Potangaroa	Technical Coordinator	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Rafael Mattar	Urban Settlement Adviser	Haiti Shelter Cluster
Celine Gagne	Shelter Coordinator, Petit-Goâve	Handicap International
John F Wain	Country Director, Haiti	Haven Partnership
Nathaniel Harrold	Project Coordinator	HODR / All Hands Volunteers
Riccardo Conti	Chef de Delegation	ICRC Haiti
Graham Saunders	Head, Shelter Department	IFRC Geneva
Miguel Urquia	Senior Officer, Shelter and Settlements	IFRC Geneva
Matthew Cochrane	Communications Coordinator	IFRC Haiti
Marcel Fortier	Country Representative	IFRC Haiti
J-P Taschereau	FACT Team Leader	IFRC Haiti
Ben Chapman	HR Coordinator	IFRC Haiti
Xavier Genot	Movement Coordinator, Shelter	IFRC Haiti
Steve McAndrew	Relief Coordinator	IFRC Haiti
Andy Hawkesford	Security Coordinator	IFRC Haiti
Annie Gell	Fellow, Lawyers' Earthquake Response Network	IJDH / BAI
Beatrice Lindstrom	Fellow, Lawyers' Earthquake Response Network	IJDH / BAI
Jena Shah	Fellow, Lawyers' Earthquake Response Network	IJDH / BAI
Patrice Florvilus	Human Rights Lawyer	IJDH / BAI
Priscilla Phelps	Shelter Adviser	Interim Haiti Relief Commission
Jesse Fisher	Shelter/Housing	Interim Haiti Relief Commission
Mark Snyder	President	International Action Ties
Charlotte Gabet	Camp Manager	IOM
Giovanni Cassini	CCCM Cluster Coordinator	IOM
Ben Odawa Wotsu	CCCM Cluster Coordinator, Jacmel	IOM
Michel Tia	CCCM Cluster Officer, Léogâne	IOM
Tom Corsellis	Consultant / Shelter Cluster Coordinator	IOM
Francois Fournier	Head of Office, Petit-Goâve	IOM
Igor Chantefort	Shelter Project Manager	IOM
Ono Takuya	Technical Coordinator	IOM
Elie Blaise	Deputy Mayor	Mairie de Carrefour
Jean M Edouard Similien	Engineer	Mairie de Jacmel
France Pierre Louis	Mayor's spokesperson	Mairie de Jacmel
Alexis Emmanuel		Member of affected community
Jorel Saintil		Member of affected community

Mariela		Member of affected community
Michel Baltazar		Member of affected community
Jean-Bosco Mofiling	Chargé des Affaires Humanitaires, Petit-Goâve	OCHA
Jessie A Vital	Head of Information Management and GIS Jacmel	OCHA
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Jolanda van Dijk	Inter-cluster coordinator	OCHA
Tania Bernath	Inter-cluster coordinator	OCHA
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Saint Badette Mira	President	Organisation des Victimes du Séisme
Anne Edgerton	Media, Advocacy and Communications Manager	Oxfam International
Philippe Petit	Chef de Mission, Jacmel	Planète Urgence
Jacob Clark	Project Manager	Samaritan's Purse
Sonia Molina	Reconstruction Delegate	Spanish Red Cross
John Damerell	Project Manager	Sphere
Anne Lloyd	Consultant / Trainer	Sphere
Imogen Wall	Spokesperson	UN / OCHA
Esteban Leon	Disaster Management Specialist	UN-Habitat
Jean-Yves Barcelo	Regional Coordinator	UN-Habitat
Faith Chastain	Program Officer	World Vision
Anita van Breda	Director, Humanitarian Partnerships	WWF

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