



Volunteer and community representative in action @Floods Response MDRCF029 2022

Appeal: MDRCF033	Total DREF Allocation: CHF 169,884	Crisis Category: -	Hazard: Civil Unrest
Glide Number: -	People Affected: 6,000,000 people	People Targeted: 20,000 people	
Event Onset: Slow	Operation Start Date: 13-12-2025	New Operational End Date: 31-03-2026	Total Operating Timeframe: 3 months
Reporting Timeframe Start Date: 13-12-2025		Reporting Timeframe End Date: 09-02-2026	
Additional Allocation Requested: 0		Targeted Regions: Bangui, Haut-Mbomou, Kémo, Lobaye, Mambéré-Kadéi, Mbomou, Ombella M'Poko, Ouham-Pendé	

Description of the Event

Date when the trigger was met

28-12-2025

What happened, where and when?

Following the electoral calendar established by the National Elections Authority (ANE), the Central African Republic held its general elections on December 28, 2025. These included presidential, legislative, regional (governors), and municipal (mayors) elections, which are bound to take place in several phases between September 2025 and June 2026.

The first round included regional, municipal, presidential, and legislative elections, with a campaign period from December 13 to 26, 2025, and voting on December 28, 2025. Provisional results were published on January 5, 2026, for the presidential elections and on January 10, 2026, for the legislative elections.

The final results are expected to be announced between January 20 and March 18, 2026, depending on the level of election.

The second round of the presidential election scheduled for February 15, 2026, will no longer take place because the results favor the incumbent president who won the first round with 77.90% of the vote. The inauguration of the president-elect is scheduled for March 30, 2026.

The second round of legislative elections is scheduled for April 5, 2026, and will involve 66 constituencies, as 74 candidates obtained a majority in the first round. The campaign is scheduled to run from March 28 to April 3. Provisional results will be published on April 13, and the final results on June 2, 2026.

The entire electoral cycle of the combined elections in general was marked by challenges from two opponents in the presidential election. As for the legislative elections, some candidates complained of irregularities on election day and contested the provisional results announced by the ANE.

Isolated security incidents occurred in the southeast of the country (Haut-Mbomou prefecture), where clashes broke out between the Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) militia and the regular armed forces in Bambouti on 27 December 2025 and in Zemio on 2 January 2026. The situation caused temporary disruption and led to casualties, injuries, and short-term displacement of populations to official sites in Zemio (Catholic Church and Zemio Secondary Hospital), as well as across borders into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.

However, the incidents remained localized, and the situation has since stabilized, with no significant risk of further escalation or spread reported. The ICRC has been responding to the humanitarian needs arising from these events.

Scope and Scale

Historical data, contextual analysis, and operational gaps indicate a high to very high risk of violent incidents before, during, and after the December 28, 2025, elections.

With the support of its partners in the Movement, the SN has developed its contingency plan for the elections. Scenario 1 of the contingency plan, which anticipated little violence, appears unlikely given historical data and current tensions. The combination of past political violence, ongoing armed conflict and community tensions in several regions of the country, as well as the limitations of the health system, expose populations to serious injury, preventable mortality, and significant psychosocial distress.

The last elections held in December 2020 were marked by serious violence. The various stages of the election were punctuated by clashes between supporters of opposing political groups, civil unrest, armed attacks in several localities, and hostage-taking at polling stations.

During the campaign and voting phases, these incidents prevented elections from being held in certain areas and resulted in dozens of deaths and an unknown number of injuries. On election day, December 27, 2020, many polling stations were stormed by supporters and armed groups, leading to clashes.

When the election results were announced, further violence erupted, including attacks by the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) against government forces and civilians. The humanitarian impact of these elections has been significant. However, limitations in data collection and poor media coverage mean that it is not currently possible to document all incidents accurately. Nevertheless, the CRCA, through its branches, was present in all provinces with the support of the Movement's partners and was able to gather a minimum amount of information.

In remote areas, where data collection was not structured, figures remain unclear, but dozens of clashes were recorded over a period of two weeks to one month between the date of the vote and the announcement of the results. In Bangui and its surroundings, particularly



in Bouar and Bimbo, armed clashes between political groups left hundreds dead and wounded. Informal data collected by the branches nevertheless indicated several hundred wounded nationwide.

The major humanitarian impact was that thousands of people were injured, with limited access to medical care. The number of people affected amounted to approximately 200,000 internally displaced persons and refugees. In light of these events, it seems likely that the scenario observed in previous elections could be repeated.

Furthermore, the general elections scheduled for December 2025 are taking place in a context of significant instability marked by weakened institutional credibility, particularly following the restructuring of the Constitutional Court, as well as increasing repression illustrated by the imprisonment of opponents, the banning of gatherings, and growing calls for a boycott. Added to this are rising political tensions, heightened social polarization, and the active presence of armed groups such as the CPC, the ex-Séléka, and the anti-Balaka, which continue to pose threats to journalists, humanitarian actors, and the population.

All of these factors create a high risk of violence, confirmed by the “probable” and “worst-case” scenarios in the contingency plan, which anticipate gunfire, assaults, armed attacks, and various acts of sabotage. Currently, several other factors are exacerbating the risk associated with the 2025 elections, including chronic insecurity with access restrictions in many areas. In addition to armed groups, the country is facing persistent inter-community conflicts in several localities. Furthermore, the country is experiencing a fragile social and economic climate, with a context marked by various humanitarian crises. There are challenges in the functioning of public infrastructure, particularly health facilities, which often lack emergency capacity, especially in sub-prefectures. Among these structural challenges is the critical deterioration of roads, making humanitarian interventions difficult in general.

In its election contingency plan, the Central African Red Cross identifies 55 localities at risk out of the country's 91 sub-prefectural committees. These 55 localities are identified as being at high risk compared to others. They are classified as very high risk, high risk, or moderate risk. This analysis is justified either by their strategic location near borders or by the presence of armed groups in these areas. The consolidated list of 55 localities at risk includes:

- Bangui: priority given to the 1st District (Youth Center), 2nd District (Lakouanga School, Saint-Jean School, and CTF), 3rd District (Koudoukou School, Mamadou Mbaïki Community Health Center, Castors Hospital, Gbayadombia School, Yakité School, Kina School); 4th (Gobongo School, CS Boy-Rabe, Ndress 1 School, Notre-Dame Parish); 5th District (Miskine High School, Malimaka School, Ngou Ciment School, 6th District, Fatima School, Nzangogna School, etc.); 7th District (Rapides State High School, Kassai School, Ngaragba School, Sao School), 8th District (Combattants School, Galabadja School, ANEB Gobongo); 9th District.

Summary of Changes

Are you changing the timeframe of the operation	No
Are you changing the operational strategy	No
Are you changing the target population of the operation	No
Are you changing the geographical location	Yes
Are you making changes to the budget	No
Are you requesting an additional allocation?	No

Please explain the summary of changes and justification:

This update reflects the context evolution since the initial DREF allocation. The National Society originally requested funding to prepare for potential unrest related to the electoral process through preventive and readiness activities in identified high-risk areas. Fortunately, the presidential elections took place in a single round, with the reelection of the incumbent president. The anticipated election-related disturbances did not materialize in most of the initially targeted locations.

On 28 December 2025, armed clashes erupted in the south-eastern part of the country, particularly in Bambouti and Zémio (Haut-Mbomou prefecture) leading to the displacement of approximately 6,599 people in Zémio and created urgent humanitarian needs. While the National Society had initially proposed a reorientation of the DREF operation in response to that situation and upcoming second round of legislative elections, several considerations led to maintaining the original budget and reducing the scope of the operation.

Firstly, emergency needs arising from the armed clashes that occurred in Bambouti and Zémio have been covered by the ICRC, reducing the necessity for DREF reallocation toward this response.

Secondly, as the presidential elections were conducted rather calmly, and the anticipated widespread election-related unrest did not



materialize, a significant portion of the originally planned preparedness and response activities was not implemented.

While the National Society also proposed extending the timeframe to cover the second round of the legislative elections, the current context is not assessed as presenting heightened risks beyond normal levels. Therefore, the justification for extending the operation period was not considered sufficient.

In light of the above, the operation will proceed with reporting on activities implemented to date, and the unspent balance will be reimbursed in accordance with DREF procedures.

IFRC Network Actions Related To The Current Event

Secretariat	IFRC country cluster for Chad and CAR is based in Bangui. The cluster helps in drafting and updating this DREF. It is also a member of the Disaster Management-Health Thematic Group, where it actively participates in meetings. Support in assessing and monitoring the security situation. Support in logistical resources in Bangui as well as with communication means (VHF radio).
Participating National Societies	French Red Cross: has offered to provide fuel support Dutch Red Cross: simulation exercises in preparation for the elections will be carried out next week.

ICRC Actions Related To The Current Event

The ICRC, which is present in the country, has already contributed to CRCA interventions by:

- Providing 11 districts of Bangui with first aid equipment (first aid kits, blankets, raincoats, boots, jerry cans and stretchers).
- Training/refresher courses in life-saving techniques for 525 volunteers in 21 sub-prefectural committee , at a rate of 25 per committee.
- Evaluation of emergency rescue brigades.

The prefecture of Haut Mbomou affected by the crisis is a red zone covered by the ICRC, which had already supported the CRCA in training and equipping the committees with 2 first aid kits and about twenty body bags as part of the committee's preparation and contingency plan.

An MCA (Movement Cooperation Agreement) is in place and provides the framework for movement coordination. It will ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities, as well as consistency of interventions in an environment marked by high insecurity. Measures include:

- The establishment of a Crisis Committee, which has been activated. Its mission is to monitor developments, analyse risks and provide strategic and operational guidance for activities in the field, in line with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
- The Movement's coordination meeting is normally held every three months, with an agenda tailored to the current emergencies and priorities. It provides an opportunity to share essential information, harmonise approaches and strengthen the complementarity of actions. As the situation evolves, extraordinary meetings will be convened.
- Continued support for the SN.

The CICR water team is currently in Zemio for the repair of boreholes and the distribution of aqua tabs. Two boreholes have been made operational by the CICR, those at the hospital and the Catholic church. (An emergency WASH meeting will be organized among all WASH partners to coordinate activities)

Other Actors Actions Related To The Current Event

Government has requested international assistance	No
National authorities	- The national authorities are responsible for managing the elections. The National Electoral Authority is in the process of deploying electoral materials



throughout the country.

- Central African ministries also play an essential role.
- The Ministry of Territorial Administration coordinates the national response through disaster prevention and risk reduction mechanisms and liaises between local authorities and the CRCA.
- The Ministry of Health is responsible for identifying and ensuring the functionality of health facilities authorised to receive victims. It must provide a list of key teams to ensure medical coordination, facilitate the management of mortal remains, and collaborate in the referral of the injured and response operations.
- Local authorities and communities, including foreign communities, participate in facilitating operations by supporting outreach activities, awareness-raising and community acceptance. They help to inform the population and avoid misunderstandings about the humanitarian role of the Movement.

The Ministry of Health has activated the public health emergency operations center, which ensures the coordination of partner responses; three meetings have already been organized in which movement partners participate as part of alignment and complementarity to avoid duplication.

UN or other actors

UN agencies support national authorities in securing the electoral process. The UN has contacted United Nations agencies can be mobilised in accordance with national multi-risk provisions, in particular to provide logistical, technical or sectoral support. Their involvement is through emergency coordination mechanisms, complementing the central role of the CRCA and the Movement's partners.

MINUSCA supports national authorities in securing the electoral process as well as the sites of displaced persons. WHO is involved in managing the post-election crisis. Alima and UNICEF have supplies, but there is currently no humanitarian access. OCHA will organize a cargo flight to Zemio, and all partners wishing to send supplies should contact Dr. Thomas at OCHA as soon as possible.

UNICEF has taken a position on water and latrines, but the team that was supposed to carry out a rapid needs assessment is currently in Bangui due to accessibility reasons.

Are there major coordination mechanism in place?

The CAR has coordination mechanisms defined in its risk management plan, which are also integrated into the SN's contingency plan. In this context, the roles are defined as above.

The implementation of the contingency plan relies on close coordination between the Central African Red Cross and Movement partners, as well as with institutional and community actors involved in managing election-related emergencies.

The operational management structure is organised around three distinct levels in line with the CRCA's organisational structure. Level 1 comprises the CRCA's technical and operational departments, which report to the Secretary General and are supervised by the National President. Level 2 is the intermediate level, consisting of permanent coordination units of local sub-prefectural representations under the leadership of the local president and the committee's management team, appointed according to the roles and responsibilities set out in the committee's charter and the provisional arrangements put in place. Level 3 consists of the intervention units of the sub-prefectural committees made available at the health facilities under the technical supervision of the local disaster management focal point.

Coordination meetings will be organised as needed at each level. Several weekly coordination meetings will be organised at each level to review the monitoring of alert indicators and ongoing operations in each sensitive area. In non-priority areas, these meetings will be held twice a week. During these meetings, those in charge will be required to:

- Assess the status of implementation of interventions and manage operational risks.
- Make proposals/suggestions for improvement for future interventions.
- Reorganise operations based on developments in the situation and available resources.

It should be noted that, with regard to movement coordination, movement meetings continue to be held and security coordination under the leadership of the CRCA punctuates these meetings. As part of the coordination process, the GRC Health Working Group liaises with partners to identify focal points across the country and their positioning for health interventions.

In addition to the existing coordination mechanisms/platforms, the Public Health Emergency Operations Center has been activated, and movement partners participate regularly.



Needs (Gaps) Identified



Health

In this context and given the potential for escalation in the current scenario, there is a high risk of multiple injuries, severe psychological trauma and disruption to access to essential services. This risk is particularly acute in Page 6, 18 densely populated urban areas, but also in areas where the presence of armed groups or persistent conflicts is already documented. The need for first aid is therefore essential, as is psychological first aid coverage.

The SN's capacity to manage the extent of anticipated needs remains limited, even taking into account the support of Movement partners. The CRCA must intervene in 55 high-risk localities, covering more than 2.8 million people who are already vulnerable. Based on the 2020 elections, approximately 200,000 people were displaced or injured, in addition to the deaths recorded. To meet these anticipated needs, significant gaps remain in terms of training, relief and burial equipment, as well as visibility and protective equipment for teams. This capacity must be strengthened in order to provide first aid, ensure evacuations, offer psychosocial support and manage mortal remains.

Teams must be trained, comprising approximately 2,000 first aiders and psychosocial workers to cover the 55 localities at risk, whereas the current contribution from partners only covers part of the needs. There is a shortfall of at least 1,400 volunteers and instructors who need to be trained or receive refresher training. In terms of equipment, fourteen unequipped ambulances were mobilized during the first round, including nine from the ICRC (six in Bangui, two in Bossangoa, and one in Bambari) and five from the CRCA (all in Bangui). Fifteen VHF radios were also mobilized by the ICRC in Bangui.

Other essential logistical resources also remain limited for covering the most priority areas. To date, poor communication systems are affecting the ability to receive and manage alerts, as well as to monitor the situation for the deployment of teams. This analysis takes into account the training and support efforts provided by partners since July 2025. Since the outbreak of the crisis in Zémio, humanitarian flights have been suspended, with only the ICRC flight authorized once a week.

In addition to health needs, the crisis in Haut-Mbomou highlights a need for medicines and nutritional inputs, which are in short supply.

- Absence of a surgical team in Zemio: Alima has expat surgeons and anesthetists (one Congolese and one Burkinabe), but they are facing visa issues. The only anesthetist in Zemio is at the end of his contract and must leave at any moment; however, there are cases of injured people requiring surgical interventions (mostly combatants).

In the event of electoral violence, the combination of degraded road infrastructure and weaknesses in the health system will lead to:

- critical delays in evacuation, increasing preventable mortality.
- rapid saturation of healthcare facilities, which will be unable to cope with a massive influx of casualties. The national health contingency plan for the elections, currently being finalised by the COUSP, already highlights several shortcomings in the emergency response chains and medical facilities coordinated with healthcare units, mainly in terms of medical transport and available personnel.
- a high risk of acute psychological trauma among civilians, volunteers and communities exposed to violence.
- Trauma for exposed groups and all personnel involved in managing the electoral phases.

The situation and shortcomings described above also highlight a critical need to strengthen psychosocial support in exposed areas and for teams involved in responding to electoral violence. As current capacities are insufficient, it is necessary to train new psychosocial workers in order to fill the identified gap and ensure an effective presence in all priority areas. To ensure adequate and accessible care for those affected, it is essential to set up safe spaces for listening within deployment sites, particularly in schools and community centres.

The contingency analysis carried out by the SN also highlights the need to integrate a structured psychosocial referral mechanism to quickly refer cases requiring specialised follow-up to health facilities (FOSA) and the relevant organisations. Finally, in a context where volunteers are exposed to potentially traumatic situations, systematic PSS briefings before, during and after operations are essential to ensure their well-being, prevent emotional exhaustion and maintain their operational capacity throughout the response.



Protection, Gender And Inclusion

The combination of security tensions, social prejudices and multiple vulnerabilities make it essential to have a robust, cross-cutting PGI mechanism in place to prevent abuse, protect the most vulnerable groups and ensure that humanitarian intervention does no harm and remains inclusive, safe and respectful of everyone's dignity.

Sites hosting displaced people pose significant risks to the most vulnerable populations, particularly women, girls, people with disabilities, the elderly, and minorities: These risks require mitigation measures

According to some past humanitarian reports, gender-based violence and protection risks are a significant concern. In the anticipated context, it is possible that protection issues and risks will increase. At the same time, the presence of armed groups in several regions, forced displacement, road insecurity and reported incidents against humanitarian workers increase the risk of exploitation, harassment, coercion and abuse, including by non-state actors. Vulnerability is also exacerbated by the scarcity of specialised services, difficulty in



accessing secure health facilities and barriers to reporting, linked to fear of reprisals or socio-cultural norms.

The contingency plan highlights that women, girls, persons with disabilities, older persons, unaccompanied children and marginalised communities are more vulnerable to violence, stigmatisation and exclusion in situations of civil unrest in the country. This analysis is based on past observations by the CRCA.



Community Engagement And Accountability

The contingency plan highlights an electoral context marked by heightened political tensions, weak social cohesion, and the rapid spread of rumors that could fuel fear, confusion, and violence within communities. In the 55 localities identified as being at risk, including the 11 districts of Greater Bangui and 44 sub-prefectures, people have limited access to reliable and relevant information, while mistrust of institutions and the presence of armed groups encourage misinformation and misinterpretations of the electoral dynamics. The plan also highlights that the neutral and impartial role of the Central African Red Cross remains poorly understood, exposing volunteers to risks of stigmatization, obstruction, or hostility during their interventions.

The lack of feedback mechanisms in some localities prevents communities from expressing their concerns, reporting incidents, or articulating their priority needs, while also hindering the transmission of this information to operational structures. Harmonizing messages between the CARRC, the ICRC, the IFRC, and partner National Societies is essential to avoid contradictions and ensure consistent and secure communication. Finally, volunteers must receive specific briefings on ECA in order to strengthen their communication skills, improve their attitude in sensitive contexts, and reduce the risk of misunderstandings or hostility during interventions.

Inter-community tensions, particularly between farmers and herders, social fragmentation, and security instability further exacerbate the vulnerability of communities, where rumors can quickly trigger riots or violent incidents. In addition, many rural and peri-urban areas are characterized by language barriers and limited access to official communication channels, reinforcing the need to disseminate clear and appropriate information in local languages. The contingency plan also highlights the importance of involving neighborhood leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, and local authorities, who play a key role in ensuring the acceptance of relief teams and disseminating credible messages within communities.

In this context, there are multiple needs in terms of CEA. It is essential to establish a structured system for managing rumors and community monitoring in order to detect and respond quickly to false information, ease tensions, and prevent escalations. Targeted awareness-raising activities must be put in place to explain the strictly humanitarian role of the CRCA, its principles, and its limits of action, particularly in a highly politicized environment. Similarly, clear, simple, and contextualized prevention and safety messages must be prepared and disseminated through appropriate channels, including local radio stations, door-to-door visits, megaphones, and audiovisual media in local languages.

The feedback mechanism will enable communities to express their concerns, report incidents, or articulate their priority needs, while facilitating the transmission of this information to operational structures. Harmonization of messages between the CRCA, the ICRC, the IFRC, and partner National Societies is essential to avoid contradictions and ensure consistent and reliable communication.

Operational Strategy

Overall objective of the operation

The objective of this DREF is to strengthen the National Society's capacity to provide emergency response and protection to communities during the 2025–2026 general elections in high-risk areas of the Central African Republic.

Operation strategy rationale

The implementation strategy, taking into account the two selected scenarios, is based on a set of activities grouped under the following points:

- Strengthening the response capacities of the field offices.
- Deployment and intensification of actions targeting communities and humanitarian response in 66 localities during the 2nd round of legislative elections, considering the crisis in Haut-Mbomou.
- Assistance in the displaced persons' sites in Zemio.
- Strengthening awareness-raising actions on humanitarian priorities.

1. Improvement of branch response capacities in targeted localities

The NS prioritises the mobilisation and training or retraining of 725 volunteers in the various sectors of intervention required. With 25 volunteers per emergency rescue operational post (POSU), the various technical specificities will be taken into account. These volunteers provide all the services set out in the plan: emergency first aid, evacuation, psychological first aid (PFA), management of mortal remains



(MMR) and gender protection and inclusion, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), survivor-centred approach, psychological first aid and child protection. Preparation and alerting of branches prioritise the 25 localities at risk sur 55 according to the contingency plan's scenario analysis, while deployment will be limited to the 20 POSUs in the 20 localities at very high risk for the first phase of this DREF.

The second priority will be to strengthen emergency equipment, logistical equipment and vehicles to support the deployment of the 20 branches with first aid and visibility equipment. At least three kits are needed per POSU, visibility for approximately 1,200 volunteers and the replacement of certain equipment for ambulances. To strengthen response capacity, priority is also given to ensuring access through community engagement and advocacy for the establishment of intersectoral collaboration mechanisms. Priorities are defined taking into account ICRC support at the Bangui level.

2. Deployment and intensification of actions targeting specific communities

Planned activities will mainly take place during the voting and results phases. Over a total of 21 days, divided as follows: one week before the elections, during the week of voting and during the weeks of the results. During these 21 days, priority will be given to the 55 localities most at risk. Volunteers will play the role of first responders, raise awareness and manage crowds. As part of this DREF funding, 1,375 volunteers will be mobilised and trained. In this phase, only 500 will be deployed for rescue services and body management. 25 volunteers per POSU. These volunteers will be deployed as follows:

- 02 as PSS deployed as needed
- 05 emergency responders stationed at the rear base with the mobile intervention brigades (with vehicles), at headquarters for any interventions/alerts received.
- 05 of these volunteer first aiders are support staff (rotation team)
- 13 volunteer emergency first-aid workers stationed at polling stations/offices. The teams will be deployed in pairs on a rotation basis depending on need and alert levels.

The NS will mobilise and deploy the two ambulances that are currently operational. Seven additional vehicles will be mobilised through rental arrangements and deployed to transport and deploy POSU teams. Due to the high risk in remote provinces, the vehicles will only be deployed in Bangui and its surroundings. To facilitate the deployment and monitoring of POSU teams in other regions, motorcycles and helmets will be rented in remote branches, or travel expenses will be reimbursed to branches to manage with the available means of transport.

As for the PSS monitors, they will provide psychosocial support to the population throughout the operation and with alternative funding afterwards, as the trauma will extend beyond the period covered by this DREF. One of these PSS volunteers will be the PGI focal point, responsible for providing guidance on the protection of vulnerable people, the management of returns and sensitive reports, and the victim-centred approach. During alerts related to protection cases, the PGI focal point will provide guidance on identifying and referring protection cases to the appropriate mechanisms, in coordination with COUSP and FOSA.

Community engagement and risk communication will focus on key messages of peace, the NS's mandate, and acceptance. A variety of tools will be used to ensure inclusive awareness-raising. Local channels will include door-to-door visits by volunteers and community meetings with leaders. These visits and meetings with communities and representatives will involve both verbal and visual messages. To expand dissemination, mass awareness campaigns will also be organised before, during and after the elections over the next three months via at least 10 local radio stations to spread messages of peace, calm, mandate and principles of the movement. Messages of protection will also be integrated across these various channels to promote dignity and access to services for the entire population, both in times of peace and in times of turmoil. This is especially important for the most marginalised and stigmatised communities, and for strengthening efforts to combat intolerance.

3. Strengthening awareness-raising actions on humanitarian priorities, rumour management and ensuring access.

This part of the intervention will be ongoing and has already been underway since July. The resources mobilised here will be used to extend these efforts beyond Bangui and its surroundings. In particular, the fight against intolerance, the call for peace, stigmatisation and discrimination against communities. The aim will be to promote messages of peace and messages to address rumours through targeted advocacy.

- Participate in meetings of the national crisis management committee.
- Organise advocacy meetings to mobilise resources
- Hold preparatory meetings and debriefings with foreign communities.
- Mobilise community leaders and carry out local awareness-raising activities

The coordination is built around three levels (strategic, operational, deployment), supported by security, communication, information management and close collaboration mechanisms with authorities, communities, political parties, UN agencies and Movement partners, in order to ensure a rapid, secure and consistent humanitarian response during the elections. Internally, continuous information sharing and coordination between headquarters and branches will be strengthened to ensure effective implementation measures, but above all as an essential pillar of security and real-time information sharing in a highly volatile context. The coordinator will supervise and liaise with local authorities.



Targeting Strategy

Who will be targeted through this operation?

The NS aims to cover 20,000 people in 20 high- and very high-risk localities among the 55 areas identified as presenting varying levels of risk in the country. However, the awareness and information messages disseminated by the NS via radio, volunteers and community spaces could reach several hundred thousand people, exceeding the above direct target. The reach of the messages and community engagement will certainly exceed 20,000 people, depending on how the situation develops.

The NS will carry out all of its activities in the 20 localities identified as high and very high risk, while team preparation activities such as training and advocacy for access will be carried out in all 55 localities classified as at risk. This will ensure operational capacity in all hotspots, while maintaining a focused health response in the 20 areas most likely to experience major incidents during the early hours of the elections. The target will be revised and interventions expanded as the situation evolves. The 20 priority areas of this DREF classified as very high- and high-risk localities include: Bangui 1, Bangui 2, Bangui 3, Boali, Damara, Yaloké, Mongoumba, Boda, Nola, Bayanga, Berberati, Gamboula, Bouar, Baboua, Bozoum, Bocaranga, Paoua and Ngaoundaye. Geographically, these are the priority targets for the current scenario.

The priority of CRCA actions under this DREF is to cover the groups most exposed to the identified risks, in particular:

- Voting groups, particularly young working people in urban and peri-urban areas.
- Migrant groups, who are particularly exposed to violence and rapid deterioration of the situation.
- Socially vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the elderly.
- Users of youth centres, schools and other centres selected as polling stations or offices.
- People residing in the outskirts of Bangui and other major cities.
- Internal displaced persons

Explain the selection criteria for the targeted population

The target population for this DREF is based on the direct target of NS assistance. It is defined as the total number of people at risk, estimated on the basis of historical data. Although the total population of the Central African Republic is estimated at around 6 million, all of whom could potentially be affected by the crisis in different ways, the groups most at risk remain to be confirmed. As a result, the CRCA estimates the number of people at risk based on historical data. Approximately 200,000 people were displaced, injured or otherwise affected in 2020. The National Society plans to provide direct support to at least 10% of this figure, or approximately 20,000 people.

Specifically, the objective is to support at least 1,000 people per locality in 20 targeted localities through:

- early warnings and relief interventions,
- psychosocial support (PSS) activities,
- and other forms of direct assistance via volunteers.

Then to expand these targets through community activities and mass awareness-raising.

The areas identified as priorities the 11 localities of Greater Bangui and the 44 sub-prefectures in the provinces share several characteristics observed by the CRCA:

- High population density, which facilitates the rapid spread of rumours.
- High political and community tensions.
- Limited awareness of the neutral and impartial role of the CRCA, which is often confused with public institutions.
- Increased sensitivity to disinformation, particularly during election periods.

Based on these characteristics, the NS classifies the 55 localities at risk into three levels:

- Very high risk: areas of active armed conflict, densely populated urban centres, localities located near arms trafficking corridors.
- High risk: areas under the influence of armed groups, dangerous roads, localities with a history of electoral violence.
- Moderate risk: localities exposed to rumours, community tensions or susceptible to crowd movements.

This phase of the intervention will focus on high- and very high-risk areas. This includes Greater Bangui and at-risk sub-prefectures in the provinces.

Requiring operational pre-positioning, a robust first aid system and enhanced preparedness to respond to a high humanitarian risk.



Total Targeted Population

Women	10,200	Rural	57.2%
Girls (under 18)	-	Urban	42.9%
Men	9,800	People with disabilities (estimated)	-
Boys (under 18)	-		
Total targeted population	20,000		

Risk and Security Considerations (including "management")

Does your National Society have anti-fraud and corruption policy?	Yes
Does your National Society have prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse policy?	Yes
Does your National Society have child protection/child safeguarding policy?	No
Does your National Society have whistleblower protection policy?	Yes
Does your National Society have anti-sexual harassment policy?	Yes

Please analyse and indicate potential risks for this operation, its root causes and mitigation actions.

Risk	Mitigation action
Protection risks, particularly gender-based violence. Based on the country risk analysis, GBV is often used as a weapon of war and severely affects women and girls in affected areas. Violence against children is also a general risk in the current context.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Train teams on PGI, GBV, child protection concepts and safe referral mechanisms. - Designate PGI focal points for monitoring and secure referral. - Establish confidential mechanisms for identifying and referring survivors. - Raise awareness among communities about GBV and violence against women. <p>For children.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide psychosocial support and psychological first aid. <p>This DREF includes the above measures, but it is also essential that work be done during calm periods to strengthen coordination with institutions on prevention mechanisms and referrals.</p>
Insecurity linked to armed and inter-community conflicts.	Training of staff and volunteers on safer access and safety rules in emergency situations, training on IHL, raising awareness



	among stakeholders about the mandates of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
Deterioration of road infrastructure due to a lack of road maintenance, leading to inaccessibility in certain geographical areas.	use of other means of transport and communication (flight, Thuraya, etc.).
Financial, logistical and human resources incapacity.	Development and implementation of a multi-risk contingency plan, and mobilisation of partners to support the contingency plan Coordination with COUSP for the pooling of resources, strengthening the capacity of teams to provide a rapid response.
Violation of the fundamental principles of the RED CROSS and RED CRESCENT movement.	Strengthening advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy.

Please indicate any security and safety concerns for this operation:

The presence of armed groups remains a major factor of instability: rebel groups (CPC, ex-Séléka, anti-Balaka), as well as the FACA and their Russian allies, continue to operate in several regions, causing clashes and creating no-go zones. Attacks against humanitarian workers are on the rise, with more than 90 incidents recorded in 2025, including kidnappings, harassment and looting of convoys. Organised crime and road insecurity exacerbate the risks, particularly through arms and mineral trafficking, extortion and illegal checkpoints imposing taxes on NGOs.

Inter-community violence remains recurrent, particularly between herders and farmers, exacerbated by scarce resources and the circulation of weapons. Gender-based violence, often used as a weapon of war, severely affects women and girls in the affected areas. Finally, regional instability, marked by cross-border incursions from Sudan and Chad, further exacerbates the security situation in the north and east of the country.

These dynamics impose significant restrictions on NGOs and humanitarian agencies, rendering certain areas inaccessible, delaying aid delivery and significantly increasing logistical costs. To mitigate this during this intervention, the security mitigation strategy is based on a few key actions implemented in all interventions in the country:

- Training and awareness-raising for volunteers, staff and stakeholders. This includes training teams on Safer Access and emergency safety rules to strengthen their capacity to respond in contexts of tension and violence.
- For technical units, training also includes modules on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to ensure a better understanding and application of the principles of protection of civilians and humanitarian actors.
- Awareness-raising activities are carried out with local authorities, security forces, community leaders and religious leaders to remind them of the mandates and fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in particular neutrality, impartiality and independence to remind them of the mandates and fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in particular neutrality, impartiality and independence.
- At all times, field missions will be preceded by briefings, and security regulations will be enforced for personnel management, team movements, vehicle movements, etc.

All of these measures are designed to reduce the exposure of volunteers and staff to risks, ensure the continuity of humanitarian operations, and strengthen community acceptance and trust in the National Society.

Has the child safeguarding risk analysis assessment been completed?	Yes
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Planned Intervention



Budget: CHF 103,214
Targeted Persons: 20,000
Targeted Male: -
Targeted Female: -



Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Number of volunteers trained or retrained in first aid and psychological first aid	750	0
Number of localities benefiting from a POSU team trained and prepared for the risk of pre- and post-election unrest	55	20
Number of POSU teams deployed for monitoring and emergency services	20	20
Percentage of volunteers reporting that they received up-to-date information on risks.	100	0
Number of first aid kits distributed	165	0
Number of victims assisted with first aid, PSS and/or evacuated to health centres.	20,000	105
Number of body bags purchased for POSU team interventions	100	0
Percentage of GDM cases managed in accordance with humanitarian standards and dignity protocols.	100	0
Number of psychosocial support sessions organised in targeted areas	90	0

Progress Towards Outcome

1. Actions taken since the launch of the DREF

Deployment of 500 volunteers (480 volunteers and 20 supervisors) covering POSUs for emergency first aid and evacuation services at the health centre (one days of voting).

2. Changes made during the update:

- Training did not take place before the first round, only one training session will be organized
- The number of volunteers to be trained has been reduced from 1,375 to 750
- The volunteers will provide psychosocial support at the displacement sites.
- Purchase and provision of medicines for the health centers in Djema, Zémio, and Mboki.

3. Challenges encountered to date/Explanation of achievements falling short of what was planned:

- The training plan did not take into account the areas covered by the ICRC and the CRNL.
- Funding for the training was underestimated, as it did not take into account the travel of facilitators to remote areas (UNHAS flights, accommodation, and per diems for facilitators)
- The transfer of funds from the IFRC to the CRCA was significantly delayed, with the result that the funds arrived at the CRCA after the elections; even volunteers from areas not covered were not trained The CRCA requested that training be organized during the second round and that areas already covered by other partners in the movement be avoided.
- Lack of local skills to facilitate training in remote areas.
- Some activities, such as the purchase of first aid kits, are planned as part of the second transfer.



Protection, Gender And Inclusion

Budget: CHF 8,318

Targeted Persons: 20,000

Targeted Male: -



Targeted Female: -

Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Percentage of volunteers who received a briefing on Protection, Gender and Inclusion (PGI) and child safeguarding risks	100	0
Number of materials produced and distributed on the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection, as well as the percentage of targeted communities that received these messages	5,000	0
Percentage of protection-related feedback and reports collected, analysed and managed in accordance with victim protection measures	100	0

Progress Towards Outcome

1. Actions taken since the launch of the DREF
No action taken
2. Challenges encountered to date/Explanation of achievements falling short of what was planned:
 - No activities under this component were implemented because the DREF funds arrived in the SN account after the elections.
 - Low pre-financing capacity of the CRCA.
 - Very long delay in transferring funds.



Community Engagement And Accountability

Budget: CHF 13,626

Targeted Persons: 20,000

Targeted Male: -

Targeted Female: -

Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
-Number of volunteers trained or retrained in Community Engagement and Empowerment (CEA).	1,375	0
Percentage of messages collected and reported to inform NS actions	100	0
Number of rumours identified and corrected thanks to the monitoring and information line system	80	0
Number of community leaders and local actors actively engaged in promoting peace and reducing tensions.	200	0
Number of interactive radio/TV programmes produced and broadcast.	80	6
Percentage of target communities that received prevention and	60	0



awareness messages via religious and traditional platforms.

Progress Towards Outcome

1. Actions taken since the launch of the DREF

Produce and broadcast two interactive radio/television programmes every two weeks on the ten most popular radio stations

3. Challenges encountered to date, or explanation of achievements falling short of what was planned

- Unavailability of CEA focal point within the CRCA.
- Lack of training for CEA focal points identified in local committees
- Lack of data collection tools (smartphones)



Secretariat Services

Budget: CHF 4,386

Targeted Persons: 1,390

Targeted Male: -

Targeted Female: -

Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Percentage of national, internal and external coordination meetings in which the NS participated and actively contributed.	90	10
Number of security monitoring reports produced and used to guide team security management and deployment of interventions (weekly and daily for voting days and results).	18	4
Transparent provision and use of logistical and communication resources.	100	0

Progress Towards Outcome

Actions initialement planifiées

- Technical support.
- Support for coordination with partners.
- Participation in the national and internal and external coordination platform.
- Monitoring and tracking the situation, supporting security analysis and managing team security.
- Provision of logistical and telecommunications tools (VHF) in the Bangui areas.
- Monitoring of the intervention and ensuring accountability
- Risk management

1. Actions taken since the launch of the DREF

- Support for coordination with partners.
- Participation in the national and internal and external coordination platform.
- Monitoring and tracking the situation, supporting security analysis and managing team security.
- Provision of logistical and telecommunications tools in the Bangui areas.
- Risk management

Support ensuring volontiers

Support à la SN dans la mise à jour du DREF

2. Changes made during the update:

Training of SN staff on the DREF by a member of the Region's DREF team

3. Challenges encountered to date/Explanation of achievements falling short of what was planned:

Delay in the HF radio purchasing process





Budget: CHF 40,341

Targeted Persons: 1,390

Targeted Male: -

Targeted Female: -

Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Number of volunteers trained and deployed for first aid and evacuation services during the two days of voting	500	500
Number of volunteers trained and deployed during high-risk days before and after polling	260	0
Number of high-risk areas covered by POSU teams.	55	20
Percentage of teams equipped with functional communication tools for their operations, security and safety (VHF radios, telephones, communication credits)	100	0
% of volunteers insured and having received adequate training and briefing prior to deployment	100	0

Progress Towards Outcome

- Actions taken since the launch of the DREF
 - Mobilisation of logistical resources:
 - Ambulances was positioned in high-risk prefectures.
 - Specifically: 14 ambulances; 05 vehicles.
 - Mobilisation of means of communication, including 6 VHF radios,
 - Reimbursement of transport/per diem expenses for 500 volunteers.
 - Ensuring the visibility and protection of volunteers. (Insurance)
- Changes made during the update:
 - Mobilisation of human resources: 750 volunteers and 30 staffs to be trained in 30 localities and 625 to be deployed in 30 localities for planned activities in the targeted branches.
 - La ligne location de 7 vehicles sera utilisée pour le vol UNHAS des facilitateurs
- Challenges encountered to date/Explanation of achievements falling short of what was planned:

RAS

About Support Services

How many staff and volunteers will be involved in this operation. Briefly describe their role.

As part of this DREF, the personnel mobilized included members of the Management Committee, technical staff, and a large contingent of volunteers, including 1,375 mobilized within POSU teams. Among them, 500 volunteers were deployed in the field for relief operations, evacuation, election monitoring, and the transmission of alerts and information, with the support of the IFRC for volunteer insurance. In this update, the mobilized personnel have been revised.



Does your volunteer team reflect the gender, age, and cultural diversity of the people you're helping? What gaps exist in your volunteer team's gender, age, or cultural diversity, and how are you addressing them to ensure inclusive and appropriate support?

Yes, whenever possible, the CRCA combines diversity and presentation with the capacity of the volunteers selected. It should be noted that diversification and good representation ensure access and acceptance.

If there is procurement, will it be done by National Society or IFRC?

Purchases will be managed by the NS at the local level, with the exception of VHF radios.

How will this operation be monitored?

The coordinated monitoring strategy between the Central African Red Cross (CRCA) and the IFRC is based on close coordination between the strategic and operational levels of the Movement, as described in the contingency plan. The CRCA, as the operational lead, will directly manage the electoral response mechanism, while the IFRC will provide technical, financial and methodological support, ensuring continuous supervision and harmonisation of interventions.

Joint monitoring is organised primarily through strategic coordination, whereby the CRCA, IFRC and Movement partners (ICRC, NCRC, FRC) analyse developments in the context, validate operational adjustments and oversee the application of security and access procedures. This level allows for regular monitoring of the implementation of the contingency plan, risk management, emerging needs and compliance with the Movement's commitments.

At the operational level, the IFRC works alongside the CRCA Secretary General and technical coordinators to ensure continuous monitoring of activities, including planning, volunteer training, POSU operations, logistics, security analysis, reporting and incident management. Monitoring tools (incident reports, deployment matrices, stock consumption, logistical requirements and security reports) are shared between the CRCA and the IFRC to ensure a common understanding of progress and constraints.

The monitoring strategy also includes joint reporting, enabling the IFRC to provide technical support to the CRCA for data compilation, report quality, documentation of lessons learned and capacity assessment. Deployment indicators, activity results, protection data, security incidents and logistical needs are monitored in a coordinated manner.

Please briefly explain the National Societies communication strategy for this operation

In terms of communication and information management, the CRCA and the FICR prioritise managing the sensitivity of the situation. National and local media will only be used to promote peace. To ensure respect for the sensitivity and security considerations associated with this operation, the NS will review all communication materials, maintaining a 'low profile' approach.

In addition, communication management will also ensure the monitoring and management of rumours, perceptions and incidents through the media and traditional communication systems at community level. This monitoring will be managed by the emergency communication unit coordinated between the CRCA and the IFRC. The information gathered from this monitoring will be centralised, jointly analysed and integrated into operational decisions, ensuring consistency of messages and coordinated management of the risks of misinformation.



Budget Overview



DREF OPERATION

MDRCF033 - Central African RC Elections 2025

Operating Budget

Planned Operations	125 158
Shelter and Basic Household Items	0
Livelihoods	0
Multi-purpose Cash	0
Health	103 214
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	0
Protection, Gender and Inclusion	8 318
Education	0
Migration	0
Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation and Recovery	0
Community Engagement and Accountability	13 626
Environmental Sustainability	0
Enabling Approaches	44 726
Coordination and Partnerships	0
Secretariat Services	4 386
National Society Strengthening	40 341
TOTAL BUDGET	169 884

all amounts in Swiss Francs (CHF)



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