

Appeal: MDRST003	Hazard: Other	Country: Sao Tome and Principe	Type of DREF: Response
Crisis Category: Yellow	Event Onset: Slow	DREF Allocation: CHF 55,401	
Glide Number: -	People Affected: 220,000 people	People Targeted: 10,000 people	
Operation Start Date: 30-06-2026	Operation Timeframe: 2 months	Operation End Date: 31-08-2026	DREF Published: 15-07-2026
Targeted Regions: Sao Tome, Principe			

Description of the Event

Date when the trigger was met

19-07-2026

What happened, where and when?

São Tomé and Príncipe's presidential election, scheduled for 19 July 2026, is taking place in a more tense political context than previous polls, marked by the aftermath of the 2025 institutional crisis, as well as by electoral disputes amid allegations of fraud, socio-economic and political grievances, and calls for violent gatherings that have already resulted in incidents of violence during the campaign phase.

The 2025 institutional crisis marked an important turning point and continues to poison the political climate, and fuel calls for reaction among party supporters. It stemmed from the dismissal of Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada by President Carlos Vila Nova, which deepened divisions within the ADI and reinforced political polarization. This polarization was amplified by the June 2026 rejection of Nino Monteiro's candidacy, fueling debate and disputes around the electoral process. Following these events, since mid-June 2026, information gathered by the National Society's branches shows the electoral context evolving from a low risk level to a moderate risk level, marked by calls for mobilization, hate speech, political clashes, and several incidents requiring police intervention. Although localized and limited in scale, these events demonstrate an escalating dynamic and the ability of certain influential political actors to rapidly mobilize their supporters, particularly young people. Persistent socio-economic frustrations including the rising cost of living, youth unemployment, power outages, and fuel shortages are also fueling public discontent and encouraging mobilization around political grievances.

Based on both recent and historical events, and in consultation with various actors in the country and community groups, the current electoral context presents a moderate risk level higher than the low-risk scenario anticipated at the start of the year, but lower than the worst-case scenario observed in 2022. This justifies the need for the National Society to prepare and, in the event of an alert, to mount an immediate first-response intervention centered on the presidential phase of the elections, following the calendar below. For the 19 July 2026 presidential election, the main dates on the electoral calendar are as follows:

- 4 June 2026: deadline for filing and official registration of candidacies for the presidential election
- 4 July 2026: start of the presidential election campaign.
- 19 July 2026: presidential polling day (results date to be confirmed later)

Regarding the legislative, regional, and local elections scheduled for September 2026, the main dates are:

- 10 September 2026: start of the election campaign
- 27 September 2026: legislative, regional, and local polling day

Although the concentration of several electoral deadlines within a relatively short period could increase political mobilization and population movements linked to campaign activities and voting operations, the measures supported by this DREF are calibrated to a moderate-risk scenario and are, for now, limited to the presidential election. A revision of the DREF may follow depending on how this first phase evolves.





Red Cross STP volunteers demonstrating first aid actions



A Red Cross STP activity during population movements

Scope and Scale

The combination of political polarization, socio-economic frustrations, and the succession of electoral deadlines poses a moderate risk to communities, in a context where the National Society's response capacity remains limited. Given the trends observed and the influence of the leading candidates from both the opposition and the outgoing president's camp political gatherings could multiply and see rising levels of tension or violence. This risk is compounded by the resources available to respond to a concentrated population of nearly 220,000 people, most of whom live in the districts of Água Grande, Mé- Zóchi, and Lobata, which are particularly politically active. Even localized incidents can spread more broadly, as demonstrated during the mid-June protests. Furthermore, these large towns and above all the capital, São Tomé, which concentrates most of the country's institutions, population, and political activity favor the rapid spread of tensions, amplified by the media and social networks.

Candidate line-up and strong polarization

Although seven candidates are running in the presidential election, only a limited number of influential political and economic figures dominate the political landscape and hold strong community mobilization capacity. The main parties taking part in the elections are the ADI, MLSTP/PSD, MDFM-PL, PCD, BASTA, and MCI/PUN. The political environment is highly polarized due to internal divisions within the ADI and the MLSTP: the ADI is now fragmented into three main factions around Carlos Vila Nova (outgoing president), Nito Abreu, and Nino Monteiro, while the MLSTP is split between supporting a leading opposition candidate and the outgoing president. This polarization, however, goes beyond the ADI's internal divisions alone. Several of the candidates in the race have direct or indirect historical ties to that party's structures. This simultaneous fragmentation of the country's two main political forces creates a particularly competitive and uncertain electoral environment, marked by a strong personalization of political rivalries. The leading candidates also represent political, social, and economic elites who have wielded significant influence over the past decade and have networks capable of rapidly mobilizing different population groups.

Recent developments: from low risk to moderate risk

Information gathered by the National Society's branches since mid-June indicates that the context has shifted from a low risk level to a moderate risk level. In recent weeks, calls for mobilization and confrontation, along with hate speech, have led to physical altercations, internal clashes within political parties requiring police intervention, and several demonstrations linked to political and socio-economic

grievances. Incidents have notably been reported during political events since mid-June 2025, including within ADI structures, where internal tensions resulted in physical confrontations. Although these events remain localized and have caused a limited number of injuries, they demonstrate an escalating dynamic and the materialization of risks that, until recently, remained largely theoretical. The main actors behind these calls for mobilization hold strong influence, particularly among young people and certain socio-economic groups.

The risk is heightened by the succession of several electoral deadlines over nearly four months, which increases the grounds for political involvement and amplifies the scale of debate and gatherings. Between July and October 2026, the country will hold a presidential election followed by legislative, regional, and local elections. This intense electoral calendar will increase the number of political gatherings, population movements, campaign activities, and opportunities for contestation particularly around election results.

Socio-economic grievances and recent escalation fueled by calls to violence from ADI candidates

- Growing socio-economic frustrations are a significant aggravating factor in the electoral risk. The rising cost of living, youth unemployment, recurrent power outages, and fuel supply disruptions are fueling persistent public discontent. These difficulties create an environment conducive to rapid population mobilization in the event of political tensions or the spread of rumors and disinformation.
- Fuel shortages in June triggered demonstrations across the country that disrupted economic activity for several days. Initially driven by economic grievances, these movements were gradually politicized and amplified by certain political actors, particularly within the various ADI factions. This dynamic contributed to incidents requiring police intervention and several physical altercations.

Other historical and socio-political considerations

São Tomé and Príncipe's political context remains sensitive due to a history of institutional instability, marked notably by attempted coups in 1988, 1995, and 2003, as well as the November 2022 crisis. The latter involved armed incidents, several deaths, allegations of torture, and ongoing disputes over the political and military responsibility for those events.

However, the National Society considers it unlikely that a scenario like 2022 will recur in the context of the 2026 elections. The main risk identified is not a security crisis involving the armed forces, but rather tensions linked to electoral disputes, political mobilization, and demonstrations. The events of 2022 are therefore used as a reference for the worst recent scenario known in the country, rather than as an indicator of the most likely trajectory for the upcoming elections.

Consensus on the risk level among national and international actors

Beyond its own contingency analysis, the National Society held consultations with a wide range of actors, including community representatives, political actors, economic groups, the ICRC, and ECCAS's Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. These consultations made it possible to cross-check local and international perspectives on the risks associated with the upcoming electoral deadlines. All the actors consulted converge on the same conclusion: the electoral context presents a moderate risk level. This remains below the severity observed during the 2022 crisis but clearly exceeds a low-risk scenario given the combination of political and socio-economic factors and the incidents already observed on the ground.

This assessment is further reinforced by the country's limited emergency response capacity. The small number of available ambulances limited medical resources, and limited capacity to manage incidents involving large numbers of casualties could quickly come under strain, even in the event of localized incidents causing only a few dozen injuries. In this context, even low-scale unrest could generate humanitarian needs exceeding the usual response capacity, justifying a preventive strengthening of the operational capacities of the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross during the electoral period.

Source Name	Source Link
1. The Independent Democratic Action Party (ADI) approved its internal electoral law and set its national congress for 26 July. The decision was marked by discontent among some council members, who eventually walked out of the meeting.	https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1D8azuWh44/
2. Peaceful demonstrations by a group of activists	https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CgufVwJp1/
3. Rehabilitation of the road linking the districts of Mé-Zóchi and Lobata has resumed, after having been at the center of strong social tensions.	https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1EHa8K2QoL/



Previous Operations

Has a similar event affected the same area(s) in the last 3 years?	No
Did it affect the same population group?	-
Did the National Society respond?	-
Did the National Society request funding form DREF for that event(s)	-
If yes, please specify which operation	-

If you have answered yes to all questions above, justify why the use of DREF for a recurrent event, or how this event should not be considered recurrent:

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Lessons learned:

The São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross has a relatively small operational team, which limits its capacity to manage several interventions simultaneously or to respond to large-scale emergencies. To ensure the effective and progressive implementation of its operations, the National Society has an ongoing need for technical support in various areas, including planning, coordination, operational monitoring, financial management, capacity building, and reporting.

Drawing on lessons learned from previous operations, regular technical support remains essential to help the National Society implement its action plan and adapt its response mechanisms to changes in the context.

Furthermore, financial resources available at the national level remain limited, reducing the National Society's ability to quickly mobilize the resources needed to respond to humanitarian needs that may arise. Additional financial support is therefore important to enable it to maintain its operational preparedness and effectively manage the various situations it may face.

Despite these constraints, the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross remains a recognized actor within the national disaster and risk management system. It actively participates in national coordination mechanisms and is a member of the National Council for Disaster Prevention and Reduction (CONPREC), the country's main coordinating body for disaster preparedness and response. This institutional integration allows it to contribute to national risk management efforts and to work closely with the relevant authorities and other concerned partners.

Did you complete the Child Safeguarding Risk Analysis in previous operations, what was risk level?	No
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Current National Society Actions

Start date of National Society actions

01-06-2026

Activation Of Contingency Plans	The São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross has developed a contingency plan for the presidential, legislative, regional, and local elections, taking into account the country's
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specific context. This plan has enabled it to identify potential risks and define an action plan for preparedness, as well as for a possible response if needed.

IFRC Network Actions Related To The Current Event

Secretariat	The IFRC Cluster office provided technical support to the National Society by sharing reference documents, tools, and guidance that contributed to the development of this contingency plan. The Cluster continues to closely monitor the evolving situation in collaboration with the National Society and is supporting it in developing a funding request through the DREF mechanism, to mobilize the resources needed to implement priority actions and cover the needs identified in the contingency plan. In addition, the Cluster office will continue its role in coordination, technical advice, and advocacy on behalf of the National Society with Movement partners and donors, with the aim of strengthening its capacity to prepare for and respond to potential humanitarian needs linked to the electoral context.
Participating National Societies	No Partner National Society (PNS) is present or permanently operating in São Tomé and Príncipe. Support to the National Society is mainly provided by the IFRC through the Cluster office, as well as by the ICRC through the support mechanisms available within the Movement.

ICRC Actions Related To The Current Event

The National Society shared the contingency plan document with the ICRC to inform it of the preparedness measures planned for the upcoming elections and to foster good coordination within the Movement.

Other Actors Actions Related To The Current Event

Government has requested international assistance	No
National authorities	The Electoral Commission is carrying out its activities in accordance with the timetable established by electoral legislation. To date, no additional measures have been announced or implemented.
UN or other actors	At the request of the UNDP office in São Tomé and Príncipe, the National Society shared its contingency plan to facilitate information sharing and coordination of preparedness actions related to the upcoming elections.

Needs (Gaps) Identified



Health

Although the elections do not in themselves constitute a health emergency, tensions or episodes of violence that could occur before, during, or after the polls are likely to have direct consequences for public health and the continuity of health services.

The populations most at risk include voters taking part in gatherings, young people, women, older people, people living with disabilities, and volunteers and staff involved in the electoral process. In the event of demonstrations or localized clashes, these groups could be exposed to trauma, injuries, psychological stress, and difficulties accessing care.

Even though the potential scale of violence is difficult to anticipate, localized incidents could lead to a sudden increase in the number of injured people requiring first aid, pre-hospital care, and emergency treatment. Such events could also temporarily disrupt the functioning of health facilities, particularly in affected areas, due to a rise in patient numbers, access difficulties linked to insecurity, or disruption to the movement of health personnel.

In this context, strengthening the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross's preparedness particularly through the prepositioning of first aid supplies, the training and deployment of volunteers, and coordination with the Ministry of Health and other relevant actors is essential to support a rapid response, preserve continuity of health services, and reduce the potential humanitarian consequences of any electoral incidents.



Protection, Gender And Inclusion

The electoral context may heighten protection risks, particularly for the most vulnerable groups. Political tensions, mass gatherings, and potential violent incidents can increase the risk of physical violence, harassment, discrimination, gender-based violence (GBV), family separation, and the exclusion of certain groups from access to assistance or essential services.

Those most exposed include women and girls, children, older people, people living with disabilities, people with chronic illnesses, and populations living in remote areas or with limited access to services. Red Cross volunteers may also face security risks, harassment, or stigmatization while carrying out their activities.

The needs identified in relation to PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion) include:

- Strengthening volunteers' capacities on Protection, Gender and Inclusion principles, including the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV), referral mechanisms, and the "Do No Harm" approach;
- Systematically integrating PGI considerations into preparedness and response activities, to ensure safe, equitable, and non-discriminatory access to first aid and other Red Cross services;
- Adapting intervention modalities to meet the specific needs of the most vulnerable people, including through accessible communication and inclusive care arrangements.

Mainstreaming PGI throughout the operation will help ensure that election preparedness activities are carried out with respect for the dignity, safety, and rights of all people, while reducing risks of harm to communities and volunteers.



Community Engagement And Accountability

Needs have been identified in Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) to strengthen communication with communities throughout the electoral period. In a context of strong political mobilization and increased circulation of information on social media, it is important to promote access to reliable information and limit the risks associated with rumours, disinformation, and messages that could fuel tensions.

Strengthening communication and feedback mechanisms will allow communities to voice their concerns and needs, while ensuring that the most vulnerable groups are considered. Needs have also been identified to strengthen volunteers' capacities in community listening, feedback collection and analysis, risk communication, and the promotion of behaviours that foster social cohesion.



Any identified gaps/limitations in the assessment

In the context of the upcoming elections, other potential needs have also been identified. These notably concern the continuity of population access to essential services, such as drinking water and electricity supply, which could be disrupted in the event of prolonged tensions or social unrest.

The education sector could also be affected by potential social mobilization or disruption of public activities, with possible repercussions on the normal functioning of schools. In addition, strengthening coordination among the various national actors, public authorities, the National Society, and humanitarian partners is an important need to ensure a coherent and effective response in the event of an incident.

Finally, logistical constraints must be considered given São Tomé and Príncipe's insularity. The delivery of outside assistance depends primarily on maritime and air links, which could cause delays in mobilizing and deploying additional resources if needed.

[Assessment Report](#)

Operational Strategy

Overall objective of the operation

This operation aims to ensure a minimum level of preparedness and operational readiness of the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross to respond to potential humanitarian incidents that may arise during gatherings linked to the 2026 presidential elections.

The operation will strengthen capacities in first aid, psychosocial support, protection, gender and inclusion (PGI), and community engagement and accountability (CEA), while improving preparedness for incidents related to mass gatherings and any localized unrest. Activities will be implemented mainly in the districts of Água Grande, Mé-Zóchi, and Lobata, where the population and the main electoral activities are concentrated, while maintaining monitoring and response capacity at the national level.

The intervention will be carried out in coordination with the relevant authorities and concerned partners to help reduce humanitarian risks and protect the most vulnerable populations during the electoral period.

Operation strategy rationale

The DREF is aligned with the contingency plan developed by the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross and aims to strengthen the National Society's preparedness and response capacity for humanitarian needs that may arise before, during, and after the elections. Although the succession of electoral deadlines could increase political mobilization and population movements, the planned activities are calibrated to a moderate-risk scenario and focus, in this first phase, on the 19 July 2026 presidential election. A revision of the DREF may be considered depending on how the situation and observed risks evolve during this first phase.

The intervention will focus mainly on strengthening capacities in health and first aid, psychosocial support, community engagement and accountability (CEA), protection, gender and inclusion (PGI), as well as strengthening coordination and information management. Particular attention will be paid to protecting the most vulnerable people, promoting social cohesion, and preventing risks linked to mass gatherings and social tensions.

1. Pre-election period: preparedness and capacity strengthening

This phase aims to ensure the availability of the human, material, and organizational resources needed for a rapid and effective response. Key planned activities include:

- Refresher training for already-trained volunteers, and training of new volunteers in first aid, psychological first aid, community engagement and accountability, protection, gender and inclusion, the Fundamental Principles, and the Code of Conduct;
- Procurement and prepositioning of first aid supplies, visibility equipment, and communication tools;
- Strengthening coordination mechanisms with national authorities, Movement partners, and other relevant actors;
- Organizing briefing sessions for volunteers and staff on operational procedures, coordination mechanisms, and communication chains;
- Implementing community communication activities to promote social cohesion, non-violence, and the dissemination of reliable information to the population.



2. Phase immediately preceding the polls

In the days before the elections, the National Society will strengthen its operational setup through:

- Activation of monitoring, tracking, and early-warning mechanisms;
- Strengthening operational coordination at headquarters and relevant branch level;
- Verifying the availability of teams, equipment, and logistical resources;
- Intensifying community awareness activities and context monitoring.

3. Polling period

During the elections, volunteers will be mobilized in priority areas to:

- Ensure the availability of first aid services;
- Provide appropriate support to vulnerable people when needed;
- Monitor humanitarian-related incidents;
- Facilitate information flow and coordination with the relevant authorities and partners.

Particular attention will be paid to the most vulnerable groups, including pregnant and breastfeeding women, older people, people with disabilities, children, and any other person with specific needs.

4. Post-election period

Between polling day and the final proclamation of results, the National Society will maintain a strengthened monitoring setup to anticipate and respond to any humanitarian needs. Planned actions include:

- Maintaining monitoring and context-tracking mechanisms;
- Participating in coordination meetings with authorities and partners;
- Continuing community communication and awareness activities to prevent social tensions;
- Mobilizing teams in the event of identified humanitarian needs;
- Conducting a lessons-learned exercise to identify good practices, challenges encountered, and recommendations for future interventions.

Target population

The operation primarily targets populations likely to be exposed to risks linked to electoral gatherings, crowd movements, or potential social tensions, mainly in the districts of Água Grande, Mé-Zóchi, and Lobata. Particular attention will be given to:

- Participants in gatherings and campaign activities;
- Communities living in densely populated areas;
- Pregnant and breastfeeding women;
- Older people;
- People with disabilities;
- Children;
- Migrants and other vulnerable groups.

Community engagement, risk communication, and awareness-raising activities will be deployed through various local and mass communication channels to promote social cohesion, build community trust, and limit the risks linked to disinformation and electoral tensions.

The entire intervention will be implemented in close coordination with national authorities, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement partners, and other relevant actors, with the aim of helping reduce humanitarian risks and strengthen community resilience throughout the electoral period.

Targeting Strategy

Who will be targeted through this operation?

The operation will primarily target populations likely to be exposed to risks linked to electoral activities, mass gatherings, crowd movements, and potential social tensions that could arise before, during, or after the polls.

Interventions will focus mainly on the districts of Água Grande, Mé-Zóchi, and Lobata, which are home to a significant share of the national population and are the country's main centers of political, administrative, and economic activity. However, a national-level monitoring and response mechanism will be maintained so the operation can intervene in other districts if needed.

Priority groups include:

- Participants in political meetings, election campaigns, public gatherings, and other events linked to the electoral process;



- Voters and people attending polling stations on election days;
- Communities living in densely populated urban areas where the risk of crowd movements and incidents is higher;
- Community, religious, and civil-society leaders, given their role in promoting social cohesion and disseminating reliable information;
- Young people, who make up a significant share of the population and are often heavily mobilized during electoral periods.

Particular attention will be paid to people with specific vulnerabilities, including:

- Pregnant and breastfeeding women;
- Older people;
- People with disabilities;
- Children;
- People with health conditions requiring special assistance;
- Migrants, foreign nationals, and other groups potentially marginalized or at risk of discrimination or exclusion.

Community engagement and awareness activities will also target a broader audience through the media, community networks, and local communication mechanisms, to promote safe behaviors, social cohesion, the prevention of disinformation, and access to reliable information throughout the electoral process.

Explain the selection criteria for the targeted population

In line with the contingency plan developed by the National Society, the selection of target populations is based on an analysis of risks linked to the electoral context, existing vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of exposure to potential incidents before, during, or after the polls. The main criteria used are as follows:

- Exposure to electoral risks: populations living in or gathering in areas where the main electoral activities take place, including campaigns, political meetings, public gatherings, and voting operations.
- Population concentration: districts and localities with high population density and many voters, political meetings, or public demonstrations.
- Accessibility to essential services: communities with limited access to health services, first aid, or other essential services in the event of an incident.
- Level of vulnerability: particular attention will be given to groups most exposed to the humanitarian consequences of potential tensions or disruptions, including pregnant and breastfeeding women, older people, people with disabilities, children, people with chronic illnesses, and migrants and other marginalized groups.
- Strategic importance of the targeted areas: the districts of Água Grande, Mé-Zóchi, and Lobata have been identified as priorities due to their demographic weight, concentration of public institutions, and the expected intensity of electoral activity.

Information from context monitoring: the selection of target areas and groups may be adjusted based on how the situation evolves, alerts received, information reported by communities, authorities, and partners, and humanitarian needs identified during the electoral period.

These criteria aim to ensure that available resources are directed as a priority to the populations most exposed to risk and most in need of assistance, while ensuring geographic coverage appropriate to the national context.

To ensure adequate visibility for the National Society and strengthen community acceptance of field teams, visibility equipment will be procured and distributed to mobilized volunteers. This equipment will include caps, t-shirts, and bibs bearing the Red Cross visual identity, enabling clear and consistent identification of responders throughout the operation.

Total Targeted Population

Women	2,900	Rural	-
Girls (under 18)	2,500	Urban	100%
Men	2,484	People with disabilities (estimated)	-
Boys (under 18)	2,116		
Total targeted population	10,000		



Risk and Security Considerations (including "management")

Does your National Society have anti-fraud and corruption policy?	No
Does your National Society have prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse policy?	No
Does your National Society have child protection/child safeguarding policy?	No
Does your National Society have whistleblower protection policy?	Yes

Please analyse and indicate potential risks for this operation, its root causes and mitigation actions.

Risk	Mitigation action
Difficulty accessing target populations due to the presence of protest movements.	Safer Access training will be provided to volunteers with support from the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). This training will give them the knowledge and tools needed to facilitate access to communities, strengthen their acceptance among the population and other relevant actors, and carry out their activities safely in a potentially sensitive context.
Risk of delays in launching DREF activities due to administrative procedures, the slowness of certain processes, and possible delays in transferring resources between the Cluster and the National Society (headquarters) for field activities.	To mitigate this risk, the National Society will, where possible, initiate preparatory activities that do not require significant financial resources.
Risk of negative perception or misunderstanding of the National Society's role among the population, which could affect its acceptance and capacity to intervene, due to insufficient awareness of its mandate, its missions, and the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross.	- Conduct information and awareness-raising activities with communities on the National Society's role, mandate, and principles. - Strengthen the capacities of volunteers and staff on the Code of Conduct, integrity principles, and mechanisms to prevent and combat fraud, corruption, and unethical behavior.
Shortage of National Society staff and volunteers due to the small size of the São Tomé and Príncipe Red Cross team.	Mobilization of a Surge personnel member to strengthen the National Society's operational capacities; regular remote technical support from the IFRC Cluster office to assist with planning, coordination, and prioritization of activities; clear definition of operational priorities to optimize the use of available resources before the main electoral deadlines begin.



Please indicate any security and safety concerns for this operation:

There are no significant security risks or active conflict zones in the country. As a result, Red Cross volunteers should not face major access constraints in carrying out their activities.

However, as with any electoral period, it remains essential to strengthen communication on safe and secure access, as well as on the Red Cross's mandate, Fundamental Principles, and auxiliary role, to ensure that its work is well understood and accepted by all stakeholders.

In addition, one of the main operational risks identified concerns recurrent power outages, which also affect internet connectivity. These disruptions could slow down communications, information transmission, and the implementation of certain activities during the electoral period.

Planned Intervention



Budget: CHF 14,551
Targeted Persons: 10,000

Indicators

Title	Target
Number of volunteers trained in first aid, PFA, and Safer Access	20
Number of first aid kits	40
Number of first aid teams	4
Number of volunteers trained in psychological first aid	20
% of people who received PFA	75

Priority Actions

- Under this operation, the following activities are planned:
- First Aid (FA) training: 20 volunteers
 - Psychological First Aid (PFA) training: 20 volunteers
 - Procurement of 40 first aid kits to manage emergencies for injured people
 - Stabilization of the injured;
 - Evacuation and referral to hospital facilities;
 - Provision of psychological first aid by volunteers



Budget: CHF 3,420
Targeted Persons: 10,000



Indicators

Title	Target
Number of volunteers trained in PGI	20
Number of volunteers trained on the Code of Conduct	20
Number of toolkits developed on PGI and child protection	10
• % of people reached by IEC messages on GBV and child protection prevention	75

Priority Actions

- Briefing of 20 volunteers on PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion) topics.
 - Briefing of volunteers and staff on the Code of Conduct.
 - Child protection risk analysis for this operation will be integrated into the overall risk analysis, and risk monitoring will be ensured.
- PGI training sessions will be organized for branches and staff, applying the PGI minimum standards as well as IFRC guidelines on gender-based violence. The PGI theme will be integrated as a module in the volunteer capacity-building workshop covering different topics.



Community Engagement And Accountability

Budget: CHF 6,497

Targeted Persons: 10,000

Indicators

Title	Target
Number of daily feedback items collected	25
Number of volunteers trained on CEA	20
Number of radio spots broadcast per week	5
Number of TV spots broadcast per week	5

Priority Actions

Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) activities will focus on setting up a digital monitoring unit tasked with developing, disseminating, and tracking reliable awareness and information messages throughout the electoral process. These messages will focus on the Red Cross's role of remaining neutral, impartial, and independent. All public communication will focus on safety, social cohesion, humanitarian principles, and access to services not on political parties, candidates, or electoral preferences.

This unit will use various communication channels to ensure broad population coverage, including Facebook; WhatsApp; local digital platforms; daily 30-second radio spots; daily 30-second educational videos; posters and digital visuals; and institutional press releases.

The objective is to promote access to verified information, combat rumours and disinformation, raise community awareness of safe behaviours, and strengthen the visibility of the Red Cross's neutral, impartial, humanitarian role during the electoral period. Volunteers will be trained in Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) as well as in collecting community feedback during the electoral period. The feedback collected will be analysed to identify recurring trends, enabling timely and appropriate action and response.





Secretariat Services

Budget: CHF 7,460

Targeted Persons: 10,000

Indicators

Title	Target
Number of communication missions	1
Number of online follow-up meetings	8
Percentage of insured volunteers	100

Priority Actions

- Communication mission.
- Remote follow-up by the Cluster.
- Translation of the document into Portuguese to share with the National Society.
- Subscription of volunteer insurance.
- Logistical support as needed.
- Support in facilitating the lessons-learned workshop.



National Society Strengthening

Budget: CHF 23,473

Targeted Persons: 10,000

Indicators

Title	Target
Number of volunteers trained and deployed	20
Amount of visibility equipment to outfit volunteers (caps, t-shirts)	50
Number of weekly Movement coordination meetings	4
Number of coordination meetings with other stakeholders	2

Priority Actions

- DREF launch workshop at the National Society's headquarters with staff involved in implementation, as well as stakeholders concerned by the contingency plan.
- Training and deployment of 20 volunteers. These volunteers will be placed under the supervision of 2 National Society staff members.
- Production and distribution of visibility equipment (caps, t-shirts, bibs).
- Coordination meetings with other stakeholders at the national level.
- Weekly meetings with Movement partners.



About Support Services

How many staff and volunteers will be involved in this operation. Briefly describe their role.

As part of preparations for the 2026 presidential election, the National Society plans to deploy 30 volunteers, including supervisors. These volunteers will be distributed across the areas considered priority or at-risk, as follows:

- Team 1 – Água Grande
- Team 2 – Mé-Zóchi
- Team 3 – Northern Zone (Lobata and Lemba)
- Team 4 – Southern Zone (Cantagalo and Caué)
- Team 5 – Autonomous Region of Príncipe

These volunteers will be trained and mobilized to monitor the electoral situation, from five days before polling day until two days after the proclamation of results. They will provide first aid and psychosocial support (PSS) services, while conducting community monitoring to quickly identify and report any incident or humanitarian need.

At national headquarters level, 5 staff members will be mobilized to coordinate the volunteer teams deployed in the field and ensure the functioning of the emergency operations centers. They will also monitor the situation in collaboration with partners and other relevant stakeholders. The budget also provides for a contribution equivalent to one month's salary for the five staff members mobilized under the operation, in recognition of their role in coordinating, monitoring, and implementing the planned activities.

If there is procurement, will it be done by National Society or IFRC?

The National Society will carry out procurement procedures with IFRC support, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures. Purchases of supplies such as first aid kits will be made locally in São Tomé and distributed to the areas of intervention.

For items not available on the local market, the IFRC may provide additional support through its supply chain and logistics system to ensure the availability of the goods and equipment needed to implement the activities.

How will this operation be monitored?

Given the very small size of the current team and its limited operational experience, the National Society has a genuine need for additional technical and operational support. However, given the limited budget allocated to this operation and DREF cost-control requirements, the deployment of dedicated surge personnel is not planned.

Nevertheless, having within the National Society a resource person with operational experience and skills in emergency operations management (surge) will be a major asset. This person will help build the capacity of teams and volunteers, while supporting operational coordination and monitoring of field activities.

In addition, a one-week mission by an IFRC staff member specializing in communication will be organized to provide close support to the National Society during the critical period ahead of the elections. This mission will contribute to strengthening institutional communication, the visibility of Red Cross action, and the dissemination of key messages to communities and stakeholders.

This support will be complemented by ongoing remote technical support from the various units of the Yaoundé Cluster notably the Operations, PMER, Finance, and Communication teams through regular coordination meetings and close monitoring of activity implementation.

Please briefly explain the National Societies communication strategy for this operation

Activities will be shared on the social media accounts of the National Society and the IFRC. The National Society will also disseminate awareness messages on the Movement's Fundamental Principles, its mandate, and its role and activities through the country's main



media outlets. Regular updates will be shared via social media and other communication channels, as needed. The IFRC office in Yaoundé will provide technical and operational support and, if necessary, deploy staff to support the National Society in implementing the activities.



Budget Overview



DREF OPERATION

Code - SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
Plan de contingence Elections

Operating Budget by Output Codes

	Total
Planned Operations	24,468
Shelter and Basic Household Items	0
AP005 Shelter assistance to households	0
Livelihoods	0
AP007 Improvement of income sources	0
Multi-purpose Cash	0
AP081 Multipurpose cash grants	0
Health	14,551
AP107 NS health capacity	0
AP108 Health services	0
AP109 Health services in emergencies	14,551
Water, Sanitation & Hygiene	0
AP110 WASH	0
AP111 WASH in emergencies	0
Protection, Gender and Inclusion	3,420
AP114 Humanitarian values and principles	0
AP116 Protection/gender/inclusion services	519
AP117 Protection/gender/inclusion capacity	2,901
Education	0
AP115 Access to education	0
Migration	0
AP112 Support to migrants and displaced	0
AP113 NS Migration & Displacement Capacity	0
Risk Red., Climate Adapt. and Recovery	0
AP101 Climate change adaptation	0
AP103 Comm. risk reduction and resilience	0
AP104 Assistance to people affected	0
AP105 NS DM Capacity	0
AP106 Disaster Law	0
Community Engage. and Accountability	6,497
AP129 Community engagement/accountability	6,497
Environmental Sustainability	0
AP102 Climate change mitigation&greening	0
Enabling Approaches	30,933
Coordination and Partnerships	0
AP049 IFRC coord. in humanitarian system	0
AP118 Engagement w. stakeholders	0
AP119 Influencing and hum. diplomacy	0
AP120 Innovation	0
AP121 Digital Transformation	0
AP127 Membership Coordination	0
AP128 Movement Cooperation	0
Secretariat Services	7,460
AP122 Secretariat services strengthening	7,460
National Society Strengthening	23,473
AP124 National Society Development	23,473
AP125 Volunteering development	0
AP126 Leadership development	0
TOTAL BUDGET	55,401

all amounts in Swiss Francs (CHF)



Contact Information

For further information, specifically related to this operation please contact:

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