



NRCS first aider responding to a casualty during the Presidential Election @Branch Incident Report

Appeal: <b>MDRNG036</b>	Total DREF Allocation: <b>CHF 115,340</b>	Crisis Category: <b>Yellow</b>	Hazard: <b>Other</b>
Glide Number: <b>N/A</b>	People Affected: <b>20,000,000 people</b>	People Targeted: <b>2,000,000 people</b>	
Event Onset: <b>Slow</b>	Operation Start Date: <b>2023-02-08</b>	New Operational End Date: <b>2023-04-30</b>	Total Operating Timeframe: <b>2 months</b>


Targeted Areas:

Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara

# Description of the Event



Nigeria: Anticipatory Actions towards General Elections  
IFRC/ICRC BRANCH SUPPORT  
Date 08/02/2023



## Provide any updates in the situation since the field report and explain what is expected to happen.

On 25 of February 2023, Nigerian citizens participated in their democratic duty by heading to the polls to elect the next president. Nonetheless, the election occurred amidst an atmosphere of increasing dissatisfaction within the country, fueled by worsening economic challenges and anxieties about security issues.

The 2023 general election marks the seventh election in the sequence of general elections held since Nigeria's return to civilian governance in 1999. This election took place in two phases. The federal election, which determined the president, vice president, and members of the National Assembly, occurred on 25 February 2023. Following that, the state election, responsible for electing governors, deputy governors, and members of the State Houses of Assembly, was held on 18 March 2023.

Throughout the election period, the NRCS Situation Room functioned as the main hub for receiving data and reports from the field (branches). Subsequently, these inputs underwent thorough analysis and were disseminated through daily outlooks to pertinent stakeholders.

The NRCS Situation Room had a crucial role in enabling comprehensive information sharing among branches and partners, conducting immediate assessments of field reports by the EOC team, responding promptly to crises and emergencies, especially election-related violence, and fostering positive engagement between branches and other involved parties.

In the lead-up to the elections, one of the paramount concerns weighing on the minds of voters in the country revolved around addressing the pressing issue of insecurity. Nigeria was grappling with a multifaceted crisis that encompassed a surge in kidnappings-for-ransom, the presence of militant Islamist groups in specific regions of the north, and a separatist insurgency in the south-east.

The alarming surge in kidnappings-for-ransom had engendered a climate of fear and uncertainty among citizens, affecting various communities across the nation. The audacious actions of these criminal groups had resulted in the abduction of innocent civilians, including schoolchildren, leading to traumatizing incidents and putting immense pressure on the government to respond

effectively.

Furthermore, the persistent presence of militant Islamist groups in certain areas of the north posed a significant security challenge. These groups were responsible for carrying out attacks on both civilian and military targets, leading to loss of lives and property damage. The relentless nature of their activities had raised concerns about the government's ability to effectively combat such threats and safeguard the well-being of the populace.

Additionally, the separatist insurgency in the south-east had added another layer of complexity to Nigeria's security landscape. The rise of secessionist movements seeking independence had heightened tensions in the region, resulting in clashes with security forces and further exacerbating the already fragile security situation.

The confluence of these security challenges had created an atmosphere of unease, apprehension, and calls for decisive action from political leaders. Voters, cognizant of the gravity of the situation, had prioritized candidates and parties that demonstrated a comprehensive and robust approach to address the nation's security concerns. As the election drew near, the electorate's hope had lain in electing leaders who could formulate effective strategies, foster interagency cooperation, and implement measures to restore stability and safety across the nation. Addressing insecurity was not just a campaign promise; it had become a pivotal factor in shaping the future of Nigeria and the well-being of its citizens.

Intra-party clashes dominated the political landscape. Apart from the lack of issue-based campaigns, the 2023 general election campaigns in Nigeria have been marred by a disturbing surge in violence. While comparative data is not yet accessible, existing records indicate that within a span of one month (between 8 October and 9 November 2022), there were 52 reported incidents of political violence across 22 states (Premium Times, "Nigeria Records 52 Acts of Political Violence in One Month – NSA Monguno," 11 November 2022, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/564797-nigeria-records-52-actsof-political-violence-in-one-month-nsa-monguno.html?tztc=1>).

Tragically, these incidents resulted in the loss of 24 lives, with over 20 others sustaining injuries. Even more concerning is the fact that from November 2022 to February 2023, political violence continued to escalate throughout the nation. The escalating trend of violence during this period poses significant challenges to ensuring a peaceful and secure electoral process (Abbas Jimoh and Haruna Ibrahim, "2023: INEC Raises Red Flag as 24 Killed in Violent Campaigns," Daily Trust, 25 November 2022, <https://dailytrust.com/2023-inec-raises-red-flag-as-24-killed-in-violentcampaigns/>).



NRCS Paramedic taking the vital signs of a woman who started feeling dizzy after standing on the que for a very long time



NRCS first aiders attending to a wounded woman during the Presidential Election

## Scope and Scale

Nigeria had a history of election-related violence, dating back to its independence. Previous elections had witnessed fatalities and violence, underscoring the persistent challenges faced during the electoral process. For example, the 1993 presidential election, although relatively free and fair, was marred by controversy and violence, resulting in over 100 deaths during protests. Similar incidents of violence occurred in the post-1999 elections, with around 80 deaths attributed to electoral violence in 1999 and over 300 fatalities connected to the 2007 elections.

The 2011 elections witnessed the worst outbreak of political violence in Nigeria's history, with over 800 people losing their lives during post-election riots in the northern states. The 2015 and 2019 general elections were also marked by violence and fatalities, further highlighting the ongoing electoral challenges in Nigeria.

The 2023 general elections in Nigeria encountered numerous challenges, similar to electoral processes in other countries. The pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral periods were vulnerable to various risks. Economic, environmental, and security issues were prevalent in Nigeria during that time. The country grappled with significant insecurity, particularly in the northern states, where violent jihadist groups, criminal gangs, and other armed factions posed threats to local communities. The southern regions also experienced civil unrest, clashes between farmers and herders, and insurgent activities.

As the campaign season intensified, concerns arose over the potential for violence and exacerbation of partisan tensions during large political rallies.

Security remained a major concern for voters during the 2023 General Elections due to the presence of armed groups contributing to political and security issues nationwide. Violence increased during campaign events, involving party affiliates, supporters, and individuals seeking personal gains from the election.

Two key issues arose in the build-up to the 2023 election. Firstly, violence targeted facilities managed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), raising concerns about the safety of electoral officials and the feasibility of conducting nationwide

elections. Secondly, the electoral campaign fueled media polarization, leading to attacks on perceived partisan media outlets and questioning the relationship between the government and non-friendly media organizations.

These challenges occurred amidst heightened socio-economic instability, with a significant portion of Nigerians living in poverty, and recent natural disasters, such as floods, resulting in fatalities and displacements, which could exacerbate conflicts over resources within local communities.

## National Society Actions

Have the National Society conducted any intervention additionally to those part of this DREF Operation?	No
Please provide a brief description of those additional activities	-

## IFRC Network Actions Related To The Current Event

Secretariat	<p>The IFRC has a presence in Abuja, Nigeria, where it collaborates with the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) on various disaster-related programs.</p> <p>The IFRC through this DREF supported the activities of the NRCS in 21 states of the federation. Support provided included all the activities stated in the operational strategy for this DREF. The IFRC also provided technical and operational coordination, while the NRCS took the lead in implementing all activities supported by this DREF.</p>
Participating National Societies	<p>The British Red Cross (BRC) operates within the country and is integrated under the IFRC secretariat, offering technical support in various sectoral areas.</p> <p>The BRC supported this operation with the provision of temporal ID cards for all volunteers and coordinators deployed.</p>

## ICRC Actions Related To The Current Event

<p>The ICRC maintains an office in Abuja and operates in the conflict-affected Northeast and other regions of Nigeria. Regular Movement coordination meetings continue to take place, adhering to the existing Movement Cooperation Agreement. This ensures a coordinated approach within the Movement to support the NRCS in its preparedness, readiness, and response efforts.</p> <p>The ICRC supported the activities of NRCS in 16 states during the election. Through a well-coordinated mechanism, the ICRC supported the conduct of strategic planning meeting in 3 regions, conduct of 48 simulations exercise, the deployment of 720 volunteers and 48 supporters in 16 branches, propositioning of 16 vehicles for the operation, communication support to 16 branches and prepositioning of 770 ready to eat food packs.</p>
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## Other Actors Actions Related To The Current Event

Government has requested international assistance	No
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<p><b>National authorities</b></p>	<p>In general, during the 2023 presidential election, the government was responsible for ensuring security during election activities through its diverse security agencies. Despite incidents of violence reported in different regions of the country, security personnel successfully prevented violence in certain areas.</p> <p>Other actions of the Government in the buildup to the 2023 general elections in Nigeria include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The signing of the 2023 election peace accord by presidential candidates to promote a peaceful electioneering process. Organized and supervised by the National Peace Committee, candidates pledged to run issue-based campaigns at all levels and refrain from making statements that could incite violence before, during, and after the election.</li> <li>2. Strengthening of security apparatus for the conduct of the elections.</li> <li>3. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) organized a summit for political parties to address and curb electoral violence in Nigeria.</li> <li>4. The deployment of troops across Nigeria by the military to provide security during voting days and ensure no interference with the electoral process. Troops were instructed to remain neutral and not take sides in any political party or candidate's campaign activities.</li> <li>5. The military provided training for INEC staff on proper and safe conduct of elections.</li> <li>6. The Inspector General of Police, in collaboration with an international security consultancy company, organized a 3-day retreat/conference for 162 senior police officers in Owerri, Imo State, focused on the imperative of Nigeria police strategic plan for peaceful elections.</li> </ol>
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<p><b>UN or other actors</b></p>	<p>External partners actively monitored the situation in the country, providing follow-up actions. They engaged in various activities, such as assessments, technical assistance, and financial support. Collaborating with local authorities and civil society, they addressed urgent needs, advocated for the country's interests, and worked towards sustainable solutions. The involvement of external partners demonstrated solidarity and support for the nation's goals and aspirations.</p> <p>Additionally, both international and local observers were present for the election, including the European Union Election Observation Mission to Nigeria, the Joint Election Observation Missions of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), as well as the Civil society situation room, among others.</p>
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**Are there major coordination mechanism in place?**

During the 2023 election, there was no central coordination system activated by the government for emergencies. However, the NRCS worked closely with the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and Ministry of Health at National and Sub-National Level on emergency first aid and evacuation.

Internally, the NRCS maintained a well-organized coordination system with Movement partners. Coordination meetings were convened frequently with the EOC providing daily Outlook to partners throughout the operation.

# Needs (Gaps) Identified



## Health

During election violence it is essential to reduce morbidity, mortality and disability. Vulnerable groups such as the wounded, sick, children, pregnant women, lactating mothers, People living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs), victims of sexual violence, and traumatized may require medical attention.

If health and safety recommendations are not followed, NRCS volunteers and staff participating in activities may be exposed to potential tensions or conflicts, which could lead to injuries or fatalities. This could result in psychological trauma for both the affected communities and the volunteers/staff, requiring the need for psychosocial support.



## Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation And Recovery

There is a need to improve coordination with external partners/actors to ensure smooth communication, transfer of information and readiness for possible scenarios. This is particularly important prior to the elections, as it is necessary to establish agreed-upon standard operating procedures for various potential scenarios. Without effective coordination, communication and information transfer may be disrupted, hindering the success of the election response.

The inability to access information from the branches to support operational planning, due to lack of computers and other devices, potential interruption of communication e.g., Internet shutdown or telephone lines cut increases the need for use of VHF radios to ensure.

The NS' response capacity could be jeopardized if there is insufficient equipment, such as first-aid kits, ambulances, and vehicles to transport teams, and insufficient fuel to support the response operation. Sourcing these items during the election period may be risky as movements may be restricted. It is therefore important to ensure that these items are prepositioned to ensure the full capacity of the NRCS in case of tensions.

Considering the possibility of tensions occurring before, during, and after the elections, it is important to establish a base for NRCS volunteers and staff where they can rest, receive psychosocial support (PSS), and share information gathered from working within the community to aid in strategic planning. This is especially important as volunteers and staff may need to spend several days away from their homes on operations. To effectively support this effort, it is important to decentralize the emergency operation centre (EOC) and have an operational base in each of the hotspot regions.

In total, 37 states are at risk. Even considering different levels of risk, all the 37 states are likely to experience troubles and the need to keep vigilance is essential as all the states shared some of the key risk factors analyzed. Impartiality of NRCS needs to be maintained in this particular context. As such, the NS auxiliary role should be played in all the at-risk areas. Area at risk states and support by Movement is reflected in the table above.

# Operational Strategy

## Overall objective of the operation

The primary objective of this DREF was to bolster the capabilities of NS volunteers in effectively addressing potential humanitarian emergencies arising from various election scenarios and the potential for election-related unrest. This was achieved by ensuring the readiness of NS teams in vulnerable regions, closely coordinated with Movement partners and other relevant stakeholders.

The execution of this objective was characterized by an equitable and unbiased approach, exemplified by the coordinated assistance to all 37 states. As captured in the DREF, financial support covered support in 21 states, whereas ICRC supported 16 states.

Key to the success of this operation was the adoption of scenario planning methodologies. These preparations served a dual purpose: firstly, to empower NS-trained personnel and volunteers with the capacity to administer vital first-aid services and psychosocial support, and secondly, to disseminate messages of peace. The overarching ambition was to extend this assistance to a substantial demographic, encompassing a minimum of 2,000,000 individuals (equivalent to 333,333 households) within high-risk states. This effort was strategically tailored to include critical stages in the election timeline.

## Operation strategy rationale

In retrospect, the operational strategy was harmonized with the NRCS Contingency Plan, taking into account the distinct phases of the election period: the pre-election phase, election day, and the post-election phase. The principal goal was to ensure thorough preparedness and an effective response throughout these critical stages.

### 1. Pre-Election Phase (Anticipatory Actions):

In this preliminary phase, the main focus was on training, coordination, and strategic prepositioning of essential resources. Operational teams within the NS were assembled, followed by refresher training sessions and the deployment of First Aid and PSS responders. The following concrete actions were undertaken:

#### a) Strategic Meeting for the 2023 General Election at Branch Level:

A one-day strategic meeting was held simultaneously across five locations. Participants included representatives from all 37 branches, alongside members of the National Disaster Response Teams (NDRT) from each geopolitical zone. Importantly, expenses for two (2) of these meetings were covered by this DREF, with the ICRC supporting the remaining three. This facilitated comprehensive discussions and decisions at regional level.

#### b) Coordination Measures:

**Operational Situation Room:** A pivotal component of the operation was the establishment of a national situation monitoring room, operational throughout the election period. This hub was situated at the headquarters and was manned by dedicated volunteers and NHQ staff providing daily briefs to partners and the senior management team. The Situation Room also implemented an Incident Reporting System that provided real-time incident reports to teams with operational advisory.

**Collaboration with Stakeholders:** Engaging in high-level dialogues with relevant stakeholders was prioritized. These discussions emphasized NRCS's auxiliary role to the government, underscoring its independence, impartiality, and neutrality in humanitarian endeavours. These interactions also introduced the use of Red Cross emblem jackets and bibs, facilitating easy identification and invoking emblem protection. However, these dialogues happened at the branch levels with branch teams engaging relevant stakeholders. These meetings at various levels fostered a secure environment for volunteers and contributed to a harmonious operation.

**Establishment of Communication Channels:** effective and regular communication channels with relevant authorities were instituted, ensuring the safety of volunteers within the Red Cross mandate.

#### c) Deployment of first-aid Responders and PSS Support (2 days pre-election):

Within the 48 hours preceding the elections, teams were deployed in all 37 states. The 21 branches covered by this DREF had a team of 15 volunteers constituting an EFAT team while the 16 branches supported by the ICRC had 3 teams deployed in each branch (15 volunteers per team). They monitored the situation, provided first aid and psychological support, and facilitated referrals to local healthcare facilities when necessary. A supervisor from each branch office in the DREF-supported branches and 3 supervisors in each of the ICRC-supported branches oversaw these teams.

One (1) NDRT was also deployed in each of the six regions to provide technical and oversight support to the teams.

**d) PGI concerns:** The incorporation of PGI Focal Points within EFAT teams across all branches proactively addressed potential PGI concerns.

**e) Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA):** CEA was integrated throughout, maintaining active and open communication with government entities, communities, humanitarian agencies, and other stakeholders. Feedback mechanisms, including hotlines, facilitated the reception and response to feedback, enhancing alignment with field realities throughout the operation.

### 2. During Elections (1 day):

- Teams of 15 volunteers in each DREF-supported state and 45 volunteers in ICRC-supported states were deployed. They monitored situations, provided necessary first aid and psychological support to those affected by election-related violence, and ensured transportation and referrals to healthcare facilities for severe cases.

### 3. Post-Elections Phase (2 days):

- In the two days following the elections, teams of 15 volunteers in each DREF-supported state and 45 volunteers in ICRC-supported states continued to monitor the situation. Like the days prior to the voting and the voting day, their primary responsibility was responding promptly to post-election violence, offering first aid and psychological support, and facilitating referrals.

#### Lessons Learnt Workshop:

Whereas lessons learnt workshop was not held as proposed. Branches, however, provided lessons learnt and challenges in their report. These lessons learnt and challenges have duly been captured under the thematic areas of intervention; Health and Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation and Recovery.

It's notable that even though the situation did not evolve beyond the projected likely scenario, NRCS saw the need to repeat the same operation during the governorship/state assembly election which was held a couple of weeks after the presidential election but due to insufficient funding and the inability of the DREF to be scaled up, the second operation was only carried out in the 16 branches supported by the ICRC. One key lesson from this is the need to ensure operations of this nature in the future cover both elections in other to enshrine the Red Cross's activities in the heart of people and enhance her visibility and also to avoid letting down the expectation of stakeholders who were looking up to the NRCS to provide effective response operations in this critical period.

## Targeting Strategy

### Who will be targeted through this operation?

In anticipation of the 2023 General Elections, an estimated 20 million individuals were considered potentially at risk in the event of election-related violence. Responding to this potential crisis, the NRCS initiated this DREF operation with a pivotal goal: proactively preparing and extending support to mitigate such risks.

Fundamental to this operation was the aspiration to provide aid to a considerable segment of the population. Specifically, the NRCS aimed to reach out to a minimum of 2,000,000 individuals, equivalent to 333,333 households. This expansive coverage encompassed all 37 states along with the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Importantly, this outreach strategy was underpinned by meticulous planning and coordinated efforts.

Through dynamic collaboration and targeted distribution, the NRCS succeeded in making a substantial impact by enhancing preparedness and providing assistance. This concerted effort played a crucial role in safeguarding vulnerable populations during the anticipated election period.

### Explain the selection criteria for the targeted population

The targeted states were selected based on past experiences of elections, the areas where incidents have started to be recorded and updated analysis of how the situation evolved. EFAT reports were also taken into consideration to adapt the priority actions and areas depending on potential hotspots.

Specific consideration was given to areas around the voting points.

# Total Targeted Population

Women	1,200,000	Rural	70%
Girls (under 18)	-	Urban	30%
Men	800,000	People with disabilities (estimated)	10%
Boys (under 18)	-		
Total targeted population	2,000,000		

## Risk and Security Considerations

Please indicate about potential operation risk for this operations and mitigation actions

Risk	Mitigation action
Natural disasters and outbreaks of disease may occur.	Nigeria just experienced a flood which is believed to be the worst flood in the last decade. The 2022 flood left over 600 dead with over 1.4 million displaced. This displacement has in some cases led to conflict due to competition for scarce resources – pasture and water. There have also been cases of cholera in some states.
Possible increase in positive COVID-19 cases in targeted areas leading to lockdown or other government measures.	Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be distributed to staff and volunteers involved in the response. This DREF will take all the preventive measures for COVID-19 to reduce the risk on the side of the staff and volunteers of NRCS. Its operational strategy considers the risks related to the current COVID-19 pandemic and is aligned with the IFRC global Emergency Appeal that supports NS to deliver assistance and support to communities affected or at-risk of being affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.
Increased workload for staff and volunteers already assigned to other interventions.	Staff and volunteers of NRCS are already responding to the Hunger Crisis through MDRNG032 Emergency Appeal and the 2022 Flood Emergency Appeal through MDRNG034. In addition to their other thematic and annual projects, staff and volunteers have been assigned additional tasks related to the national elections. To effectively manage all operations, the NS must devise a plan to distribute tasks and prioritize certain areas. By refocusing its strategy and prioritizing hot spots, the NS will be able to operate effectively within its capacity.
Tensions related to politics and security	Project-based risk assessments will be carried out and measures to mitigate risks implemented. Monitoring of the security environment. Training on Safer Access Framework modules will be provided to volunteers with the support of ICRC. The importance of applying Safer Access Framework (SAF) will be emphasized during the training.

## Please indicate any security and safety concerns for this operation

Overall, the security situation in Nigeria is complex and volatile. Nigeria is a country that faces a number of security risks, including terrorism, insurgency, and ethnic and religious violence. The country has been particularly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the north, which has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. Nigeria has also faced a number of attacks by other extremist groups, such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The country also faces risks of ethnic and religious violence, particularly in the middle belt region where there have been a number of clashes between different groups.

In most urban areas, especially in the capital city, the most significant security risks come from violent and petty crimes. During national political events such as elections, the risk of unrest tends to increase. Threats to security may include spontaneous or planned protests and riots, harsh security crackdowns, vigilante roadblocks, and a potential rise in opportunistic crime due to political unrest.

Throughout the operations, the security manager based at headquarters will continue to provide security briefings through email and visits. The team leaders in the respective operational areas will continue to communicate with local officials and community leaders and update them on the situation.

To protect RCRC personnel from crime, violence, and road hazards, it will be implemented active risk mitigation measures and strict minimum-security requirements maintained. All NS and IFRC personnel participating in the operations will complete the IFRC security e-learning courses (Stay Safe Version 2) before deployment. Our security management for this operation will be guided by the RCRC's Fundamental Principles and humanitarian values. Additionally, we will implement the following security actions:

- Provision of regular security updates to all staff and volunteers involved in the operation.
- Use of the NRCS Situation room to monitor field activities in real-time.
- All staff and volunteers must have completed the Stay Safe courses and general security briefing sessions and must sign and commit to following the Code of Conduct.

## Implementation



### Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation And Recovery

**Budget:** CHF 35,041

**Targeted Persons:** 2,000,000

**Assisted Persons:** 5,172

### Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Number of coordination meeting conducted with Local authorities and external partners	5	1
Number of coordination meeting conducted with movement partners	5	5

### Narrative description of achievements

In preparation for the 2023 elections, the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) adopted a movement approach, ensuring comprehensive coordination and effective response across the country. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) committed to covering the operational costs in 21 states through a Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF), while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) bore the cost of operations in the remaining 16 states.

To seamlessly execute their plan, strategic planning meetings were held at zonal levels— Ibadan, Port Harcourt, Lafia, Kano, and

Yola—covering South-west, South-south, South-east, North-central, North-west, and North-east regions. These efforts allowed for a unified approach to election preparedness.

The NRCS activated the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), managed by two dedicated volunteers and seven staff, including two drivers. The EOC served as the central hub for information management and coordination. For real-time updates, a one-month subscription to the Incident Reporting System (IRS) was procured and activated in the EOC, providing daily security updates and live feeds for enhanced situational awareness.

To ensure swift response, two vehicles—an ambulance and a highlander—were prepositioned at the EOC. Additionally, six National Disaster Response Teams (NDRTs) were deployed to hotspot states in each zone, providing immediate support.

Effective communication was facilitated through 41 VHF Radio (2-way) devices deployed across zones and the FCT, enabling seamless coordination among teams. To properly identify NRCS vehicles, 200 vehicle stickers (36") were printed and distributed for use on branch-prepositioned vehicles, easily removable from non-NRCS vehicles after use.

To cater to the needs of deployed volunteers, vendors were procured to provide ready-to-eat food packs, ensuring sustained support during the operation. Enhanced readiness was achieved through EFAT refreshers and simulation exercises in high-risk divisions, preparing teams for potential challenges during the election period.

The NRCS demonstrated proactive and well-coordinated efforts, equipping themselves to respond swiftly and effectively to any emergencies or incidents during the electoral process. The collaborative approach between IFRC and ICRC, along with the dedication of volunteers and staff, showcased the NRCS's commitment to ensuring citizens' safety and well-being during the critical election period.

## Lessons Learnt

- **Communication and Information Management:** Maintaining effective communication and real-time situational awareness were critical lessons learned from the operation, urging for better information management systems and seamless communication across teams.
- **Prepositioning and Response Capacity:** Prepositioning assets, such as vehicles and NDRTs, proved essential in enhancing the NRCS's response capacity in critical areas, underlining the importance of strategic asset placement.
- **Sustained Support and Preparedness:** The operation reinforced the significance of sustained support and preparedness, including the provision of ready-to-eat food packs and conducting training exercises, to ensure effective response throughout the entire operation duration.

## Challenges

- **Logistical Complexities:** Coordinating strategic planning meetings in various zonal locations presented logistical complexities, which affected timely decision-making and resource distribution.
- **Operational Centre Management:** Managing the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) with limited personnel (two dedicated volunteers and seven staff) was challenging, especially during high-pressure situations and the need for the EOC to run 24 hours.
- **Hotspot Deployment Challenges:** Deploying six National Disaster Response Teams (NDRTs) to hotspot states in each zone was challenging due to limited resources and the need for simultaneous response in different regions.
- **Effective Communication Across Zones:** Despite deploying 41 VHF Radio (2-way) devices, ensuring seamless communication among teams across the five zones and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) posed challenges, especially in remote areas with limited connectivity.

Despite these challenges, the NRCS demonstrated proactive efforts during the operation, showcasing their dedication to an effective response. Addressing these key challenges can help improve future operations and ensure a more seamless and efficient response during critical events.



**Secretariat Services**

**Budget:** CHF 5,441

**Targeted Persons:** 327

Assisted Persons: 327

## Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Monitoring and support visit by IFRC	2	2

## Narrative description of achievements

During the conducted operation, the IFRC supported the coordination efforts of NRCS and provided guidance on scenario analysis and actions to be undertaken by the NRCS. The IFRC also participated in strategic meetings, including Movement and external meetings, as part of the overall support provided during the operation.

## Lessons Learnt

- There is nothing to highlight regarding lessons learned on this sector.

## Challenges

- No specific challenge was recorded in this sector.



Budget: CHF 9,192

Targeted Persons: 327

Assisted Persons: 327

## Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Number of feedbacks received and addressed through the established hotline	1,000	221
Number of staff and volunteers who have received appropriate briefing before being deployed	327	349
Number of NDRT members deployed	5	6
Number of volunteers deployed	315	315

## Narrative description of achievements

During the conducted operation, the NS prioritized volunteers' security through regular briefings. NDRTs efficiently coordinated deployed teams, aided by Incident Reporting System (IRS) and ICRC's valuable security monitoring support. Volunteers were trained in CEA, PSS, and protection. The briefing was done for 315 volunteers (15 each in 21 branches), 21 branch coordinators (supervisors), 6 NDRTs and 7 staff at the NHQ EOC. Thus a total of 349 people were reached by the briefing.

Regular updates on the election progress were obtained from branches, ensuring agility in response. The operation's success stemmed from its emphasis on safety, coordination, and responsiveness, exemplifying the commitment to serve and protect the community during this critical period.

## Lessons Learnt

- There is nothing to highlight regarding lessons learned on this sector.

## Challenges

- No specific challenge was recorded in this sector.



**Budget:** CHF 17,041

**Targeted Persons:** 2,000,000

**Assisted Persons:** 5,172

## Indicators

Title	Target	Actual
Number of days for team mobilisation	5	5
Number of first aid provided	100	221
Round surveillance conducted by the EFAT	32	105
Number of EFAT deployed under this operation	21	21

## Narrative description of achievements

In response to the 2023 Presidential Election, the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) launched a comprehensive care and support initiative to assist persons affected or injured during the electoral process. The aim was to ensure the safety and well-being of individuals before, during, and after the election. To accomplish this, the NRCS deployed dedicated teams of volunteers and staff across its branches, along with Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) staff, who provided first-aid and psychosocial support (PSS) readiness.

With election day approaching, the NRCS meticulously prepared for the deployment of resources. The organization enlisted the help of 15 dedicated volunteers for each branch (21 branches), totaling 315 volunteers supported directly by this DREF and an additional 720 volunteers (45 volunteers each in 16 branches) supported by the ICRC bringing the total of deployed volunteers to 1,035 across the nation. Their task was to provide essential care and support to those affected or injured during the election period. These volunteers underwent extensive training to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge to handle diverse scenarios effectively.

Furthermore, 21 NRCS branch staff members were appointed to supervise the teams in each state, ensuring coordination, organization, and adherence to safety protocols. Additionally, 7 NRCS staff members were stationed at the headquarters to manage logistical and administrative matters.

Two days prior to the election, the teams were deployed in their respective states, covering all regions of the country. Each team was well-equipped with medical supplies, first-aid kits, and PSS materials. The volunteers were strategically stationed around flash points, and public gathering areas, allowing them to respond promptly to emergencies.

On election day, the NRCS volunteers and staff were on high alert, ready to respond swiftly to any medical emergencies or emotional distress experienced by individuals. The teams worked tirelessly, providing immediate first aid to those injured in any incidents and offering psychological support to those experiencing anxiety or stress related to the electoral process.

The NRCS teams collaborated closely with local authorities and other emergency response units, enhancing their operations'

overall efficiency and effectiveness. Their swift actions saved lives, prevented further injuries and offered a sense of reassurance to the citizens during this critical period.

The commitment of the NRCS extended beyond election day. For two days following the election, the volunteers continued to provide care and support to individuals who might still be affected emotionally or physically by the electoral events. The NRCS staff worked tirelessly to ensure that no one was left without assistance during the aftermath of the election.

The 2023 Presidential Election brought forth numerous challenges, but the Nigerian Red Cross Society's response showcased their unwavering dedication to the welfare of the people. By deploying skilled volunteers and supervising experienced staff, the NRCS effectively provided care and support to persons affected or injured before, during, and after the election.

Their timely and empathetic interventions played a crucial role in maintaining the safety and well-being of individuals, contributing to the overall success and security of the electoral process. The NRCS demonstrated the power of humanitarian efforts, showcasing the importance of preparedness and compassion in times of national significance.

## Lessons Learnt

- **Enhanced Preparedness:** The response highlighted the importance of robust preparedness measures before significant events like elections. Planning should include securing sufficient resources, training volunteers, and establishing effective communication channels.
- **Flexibility and Adaptability:** The NRCS learned the value of being flexible and adaptable in dynamic situations. Elections can present unforeseen challenges, and the ability to adjust strategies and resources accordingly is crucial.
- **Resource Mobilization:** The response highlighted the need to enhance resource mobilization efforts. Adequate funding and supplies are essential to ensuring that the NRCS can effectively support those in need during critical events.
- **Risk Assessment and Mitigation:** The experience underscored the importance of conducting thorough risk assessments before and during the election period. Identifying potential security risks and implementing appropriate measures can safeguard the safety of volunteers and staff.
- **Coordination and Collaboration:** The NRCS response demonstrated the value of collaboration with local authorities and emergency response units. Effective coordination can enhance the overall efficiency and impact of humanitarian efforts.
- **Training for Psychological Support:** The response emphasized the importance of specialized training for providing psychosocial support during high-stress events like elections. Building the capacity of volunteers and staff in this area is crucial for effective assistance.
- **Improved Data Management:** Efficient data collection and reporting are essential for evaluating the impact of the NRCS response. Investing in better data management systems can enhance the organization's understanding of its efforts' effectiveness.
- **Public Awareness and Outreach:** The response showed the significance of public awareness and outreach initiatives. Raising awareness about the NRCS's presence and services can encourage more individuals to seek help during emergencies.
- **Incorporating Lessons into Future Planning:** The NRCS should systematically document and analyze the lessons learned from their response to the 2023 general election. Incorporating these insights into future planning and preparedness can lead to more effective responses in similar situations.

## Challenges

- **Resource Constraints:** The NRCS's response to the 2023 Presidential Election involved deploying 315 volunteers and additional staff across branches and states, which strained their available resources. Limited funding and supplies impacted the extent of care and support they could provide during the election period.
- **Security Risks:** With heightened tensions and security risks during the election, ensuring the safety of NRCS volunteers and staff stationed in flashpoints and public gathering areas became a major challenge. They had to navigate potential dangers while carrying out their duties effectively.
- **Logistical Challenges:** Coordinating the movement of 315 volunteers and staff to their respective locations within a short timeframe during the 2023 general election posed significant logistical complexities. Managing transportation and accommodation arrangements added to the challenges faced by the NRCS.
- **Psychosocial Support Demands:** The emotional impact of the election on citizens led to an increased demand for psychosocial support. Ensuring adequate and timely support for those in distress proved challenging, considering the limited number of volunteers and staff available.
- **Political Sensitivities:** Providing care and support during a presidential election required the NRCS to navigate political sensitivities and maintain a neutral stance. They faced challenges in ensuring their activities were perceived as non-partisan by all stakeholders.
- **Data Collection and Reporting:** Amid the fast-paced and high-pressure environment of the 2023 general election, efficient

data collection and reporting became challenging for the NRCS. Accurate documentation of the assistance provided and its impact required extra effort.

- Public Awareness and Access: Ensuring the public was aware of the NRCS's presence and available support during the 2023 general election proved challenging. This might have limited the number of people seeking assistance from the NRCS despite their efforts.

# Financial Report

## Please explain variances (if any)

The total DREF allocation was CHF 66,714 and the agreement signed with the National Society was CHF 55,055.21. The National Society was able to spend 81% of the amount.

During the period of implementing this DREF, Nigeria experienced a cash crunch, which was consequence on the currency change and redesign and other financial crises within the country. This led to an excessive exchange rate. Hence, the NS received enough funding to complete all DREF activities and still refunded about CHF 9,000.

Furthermore, the secretariat's support for this operation was also affected by the same reason stated above. Additionally, the cost sharing with ICRC further led to reduced cost allocation.

Finally, the anticipated crisis was not at the expected level, which reduced the number and frequency of volunteers' engagement for the DREF, leading to a total burn rate of 63% of the total DREF allocation as observed in the financial report.

# Contact Information

For further information, specifically related to this operation please contact:

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**IFRC Project Manager:** Francis Salako, Operation coordinator, francis.salako@ifrc.org, +254 780 77 11 59

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[Click here for reference](#)

# DREF Operation

Selected Parameters			
Reporting Timeframe	2023/2-2023/10	Operation	MDRNG036
Budget Timeframe	2023/2-2023/4	Budget	APPROVED

## FINAL FINANCIAL REPORT

Prepared on 17/Nov/2023

All figures are in Swiss Francs (CHF)

## MDRNG036 - Nigeria - Anticipatory actions towards General Elections

Operating Timeframe: 08 Feb 2023 to 30 Apr 2023

### I. Summary

<b>Opening Balance</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Funds &amp; Other Income</b>	<b>66,714</b>
DREF Anticipatory Pillar	66,714
<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>-44,058</b>
<b>Closing Balance</b>	<b>22,656</b>

### II. Expenditure by area of focus / strategies for implementation

Description	Budget	Expenditure	Variance
AOF1 - Disaster risk reduction	35,041	27,135	<b>7,906</b>
AOF2 - Shelter			<b>0</b>
AOF3 - Livelihoods and basic needs			<b>0</b>
AOF4 - Health	17,041	15,316	<b>1,725</b>
AOF5 - Water, sanitation and hygiene			<b>0</b>
AOF6 - Protection, Gender & Inclusion			<b>0</b>
AOF7 - Migration		436	<b>-436</b>
<b>Area of focus Total</b>	<b>52,081</b>	<b>42,886</b>	<b>9,195</b>
SFI1 - Strengthen National Societies	9,192	20	<b>9,172</b>
SFI2 - Effective international disaster management			<b>0</b>
SFI3 - Influence others as leading strategic partners			<b>0</b>
SFI4 - Ensure a strong IFRC	5,441	1,152	<b>4,289</b>
<b>Strategy for implementation Total</b>	<b>14,632</b>	<b>1,172</b>	<b>13,460</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>66,714</b>	<b>44,058</b>	<b>22,656</b>

# DREF Operation

Selected Parameters			
Reporting Timeframe	2023/2-2023/10	Operation	MDRNG036
Budget Timeframe	2023/2-2023/4	Budget	APPROVED

## FINAL FINANCIAL REPORT

Prepared on 17/Nov/2023

All figures are in Swiss Francs (CHF)

## MDRNG036 - Nigeria - Anticipatory actions towards General Elections

Operating Timeframe: 08 Feb 2023 to 30 Apr 2023

### III. Expenditure by budget category & group

Description	Budget	Expenditure	Variance
<b>Relief items, Construction, Supplies</b>	<b>4,378</b>		<b>4,378</b>
Food	4,378		4,378
<b>Logistics, Transport &amp; Storage</b>	<b>9,912</b>	<b>7,746</b>	<b>2,166</b>
Transport & Vehicles Costs	9,912	7,746	2,166
<b>Personnel</b>	<b>19,199</b>	<b>13,620</b>	<b>5,579</b>
National Staff		432	-432
National Society Staff	1,463	720	744
Volunteers	17,735	12,469	5,267
<b>Consultants &amp; Professional Fees</b>		<b>1,502</b>	<b>-1,502</b>
Professional Fees		1,502	-1,502
<b>Workshops &amp; Training</b>	<b>17,290</b>	<b>5,584</b>	<b>11,706</b>
Workshops & Training	17,290	5,584	11,706
<b>General Expenditure</b>	<b>11,863</b>	<b>12,918</b>	<b>-1,055</b>
Travel	4,720	9,224	-4,504
Information & Public Relations		375	-375
Office Costs	5,161	129	5,033
Communications	1,782	240	1,542
Financial Charges	200	409	-209
Other General Expenses		2,541	-2,541
<b>Indirect Costs</b>	<b>4,072</b>	<b>2,689</b>	<b>1,383</b>
Programme & Services Support Recover	4,072	2,689	1,383
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>66,714</b>	<b>44,058</b>	<b>22,655</b>